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  1. NTU Theses and Dissertations Repository
  2. 管理學院
  3. 會計學系
請用此 Handle URI 來引用此文件: http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/30571
完整後設資料紀錄
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dc.contributor.advisor王泰昌,劉嘉雯
dc.contributor.authorSz-Ying Chenen
dc.contributor.author陳思穎zh_TW
dc.date.accessioned2021-06-13T02:09:07Z-
dc.date.available2007-07-03
dc.date.copyright2007-07-03
dc.date.issued2007
dc.date.submitted2007-06-29
dc.identifier.citation一、中文部份:
朱正雄,民93,代理成本對自願性盈餘預測影響之研究,國立中山大學企業管理未出版碩士論文
吳安妮,民80,經理人員自願性揭露盈餘預測資訊給外界之決定因素,會計評論,第25期:1-24
李建然,民86,影響台灣上市公司自願性盈餘預測頻率之研究,會計評論,第32期(夏):49-79
林于聖,民94,「強制性財務預測」政策改變對自願性盈餘預測之影響,國立台北大學會計研究所未出版論文
張希恭,民84,自願性揭露下管理當局盈餘預測準確性決定因素之研究,國立台北大學會計研究所未出版碩士論文
許周全,民90,機構投資人與管理當局盈餘預測準確性決定因素之研究,國立台北大學會計研究所未出版碩士論文
許盟,民89,我國董事會結構與自願性盈餘預測行為之研究,國立政治大學會計研究所未出版論文
黃鈺光,民82,我國上市公司董事會特性與經營績效之研究,國立台灣大學會計研究所未出版論文
楊俊中,民87,股權結構與經營績效相關性之研究,國立台灣大學會計研究所未出版論文
廖秀梅,民93,董事會結構特性與公司績效關係之研究—探討台灣家族控制企業因素的影響,國立台北大學會計研究所未出版論文
劉聯旭,民88,實施強制性財務預測對管理當局自願性盈餘預測揭露行為之影響,國立台灣大學會計研究所未出版論文
二、英文部份:
Ajinkya, B., and M. Gift. 1984. Corporate managers’ earnings forecasts and symmetrical adjustments of market expectations. Journal of Accounting Research 22(Autumn):425-444.
Ajinkya, B., S. Bhojraj, and P. R. Sengupta. 2004. The Association between Outside Directors, Institutional Investors and the Properties of Management Earnings Forecasts. Journal of Accounting Research 43(June):343-376.
Baginski, S. and J. Hassell. 1997. Determinants of Management Forecast Precision. The Accounting Review 68(October):913-927.
Baginsik, S. P., J. M. Hassell, and M. D. Kimbrough. 2002. The Effect of Legal Environment on Voluntary Disclosure: Evidence from Management Earnings Forecasts Issued in US and Canadian Markets. The Accounting Review 77(January):25-50.
Beasley, M. S. 1996. An Empirical Analysis of the Relation between the Board of Directors Composition and Financial Statement Fraud. The Accounting Review 71(October):443-465.
Coller, M. and T. Yohn. 1997. Management Forecasts and Information Asymmetry: An Examination of Bid-Ask Spreads. Journal of Accounting Research 35(Autumn):181-191.
Gaber, M. 1985. Management incentives to report forecasts of corporate earnings. Ph. D. Dissertation, The City University of New York.
Grossman, S. 1981. The role of warranties and private disclosure about product quality. Journal of Law and Economics 24(Summer):461-483
Jaggi, B. 1980. Further evidence on the accounting of management forecasts vis-a-via analysis forecasts. The Accounting Review 55(January):18-23
Jensen, M. C., and W. H. Meckling. 1976. Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of financial Economics 33 (October):305-360
Jensen, M. C. 1993. The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit and Failure of Internal control systems. The Journal of Finance, 48(Autumn), 831-880.
Karamanou, I. and N. Vafeas. 2005. The Association between Corporate Boards, Audit Committees, and Management Earnings Forecasts: An Empirical Analysis. Journal of Accounting Research 43(June):453-486
Kasznik R., and B. Lev. 1995. To warn or not to warn: management disclosures in the face of an earnings surprise. The Accounting Review 70(January):113-134.
Kiel, G. C. and G. J. Nicholson. 2003. Board composition and Corporate Performance: how the Australian experience informs contrasting theories of corporate governance. Corporate Governance 11:189-205.
Lev, B. and S. Penman. 1990. Voluntary forecast disclosure, nondisclosure and stock prices. Journal of Accounting Research 28(spring):49-76
Firth, M. and A. Smith. 1992. The Accuracy of Profits Forecasts in Initial Public Offering Prospectus. Accounting and Business Research 22(Summer):239-247.
OECD. 1999. OECD Principles of Corporate Governance
Ruland, W., and N. E. George. 1990. Factors Associated with the Disclosure of Managers’ Forecasts. The Accounting Review 65(July):710-721
Yermack, D. 1996. Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors. Journal of Financial Economics 40:185-211
dc.identifier.urihttp://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/30571-
dc.description.abstract金融監督管理委員會規定於民國94年1月1日起正式取消強制性財務預測之規定,希望改為自願性財務預測能使資訊揭露的品質提高。本研究主要目的係在探討強制性財務預測規定取消對於管理當局自願性盈餘預測揭露行為的影響,並以公司治理的角度探討,分析其對管理當局自願性盈餘預測行為的影響,及在強制性規定改變前後,公司治理各變數對盈餘預測行為的影響是否有所改變。
實證結果顯示,當公司董事會規模愈大、獨立董事比例愈低、負債比率愈高時,管理當局揭露自願性盈餘預測的意願愈高,且當獨立董事比例愈高時,管理當局愈可能過於樂觀預測盈餘,而強制性財務預測規定取消後,管理當局發佈自願性盈餘預測的意願明顯降低,且管理當局傾向過於樂觀預測盈餘。在公司治理交互影響部份,電子產業在強制性規定取消前,當獨立董事佔董事席次比例愈低時,管理當局發佈自願性盈餘預測的可能性愈高,但在強制性規定取消後,獨立董事比例愈低,管理當局反而不傾向發佈自願性盈餘預測,非電子產業部份則影響方向相同,但不具顯著性;非電子產業在強制性規定取消前,當公司負債比率愈大,管理當局發佈自願性盈餘預測的可能性愈高,而強制性規定取消後,其影響雖不具顯著性,但負債比例愈大,管理當局反而不傾向發佈盈餘預測,電子產業之負債比率影響則不具顯著性。
zh_TW
dc.description.abstractFinancial Supervisory Commission of Executive Yuan has decided to terminate the regulation of mandatory disclosure of financial forecasts in order to improve the quality of financial forecasts since 2005. The study examines the effect of terminating the mandatory regulation on management earnings forecasts’ behavior. Furthermore, we examine the change of the effects of corporate governance on management earnings forecasts after terminating the regulation.
The empirical results show that firms with larger size of board of director, less independent directors, and greater debt ratio are more likely to issue earning forecasts voluntarily. In addition, firms with more outside directors are inclined to forecast more optimistically. After terminating the regulation of mandatory disclosure of financial forecasts, managers are less likely to make an earnings forecast and inclined to forecast more optimistically. Additional analysis suggests that companies of electronics industry which have more independent directors are less likely to issue earnings forecasts voluntarily before terminating the regulation. But after terminating the regulation, the proportion of independent directors is positively associated with the willingness of disclosure. Companies of non-electronic industry with greater debt ratio are more likely to make an earnings forecast before terminating the regulation. After terminating the regulation, debt ratio is negatively associated with the willingness of disclosure. But the effect of debt ratio is not obvious.
en
dc.description.provenanceMade available in DSpace on 2021-06-13T02:09:07Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1
ntu-96-R94722008-1.pdf: 459120 bytes, checksum: e0952b8fd8d68bf8fe1718859a5db11d (MD5)
Previous issue date: 2007
en
dc.description.tableofcontents口試委員審訂書 I
誌謝 II
中文摘要 III
英文摘要 IV
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究動機與目的 1
第二節 研究問題 2
第三節 研究架構與流程 3
第二章 文獻探討 5
第一節 代理理論及公司治理相關文獻 5
第二節 自願性盈餘預測揭露意願之決定因素 11
第三節 自願性盈餘預測揭露準確性之決定因素 23
第三章 研究方法 31
第一節 研究假說 31
第二節 變數衡量 37
第三節 資料分析方法 43
第四節 樣本選取與資料來源 47
第四章 實證研究結果與分析 52
第一節 敘述性統計分析 52
第二節 公司治理與自願性盈餘預測揭露意願之關聯性 62
第三節 公司治理與自願性盈餘預測準確性之關聯性 67
第四節 強制性財務預測規定改變對管理當局自願性盈餘預測行為所造成的影響 71
第五節 敏感性分析 81
第五章 結論與建議 89
第一節 研究結論 89
第二節 研究限制 92
第三節 後續研究建議 92
參考文獻 93
dc.language.isozh-TW
dc.title強制性財務預測規定取消對管理當局自願性盈餘預測揭露行為之影響--以公司治理角度分析zh_TW
dc.titleThe Impact of Terminating Mandatory Financial Forecasts on Management Earnings Forecast Behavior—In the Perspectives on Corporate Governanceen
dc.typeThesis
dc.date.schoolyear95-2
dc.description.degree碩士
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee林瑞青
dc.subject.keyword自願性盈餘預測,公司治理,揭露意願,準確性,樂觀偏差,zh_TW
dc.subject.keywordVoluntary earnings forecasts,Corporate governance,willingness of disclosure,Accuracy,Optimistic biased,en
dc.relation.page95
dc.rights.note有償授權
dc.date.accepted2007-06-29
dc.contributor.author-college管理學院zh_TW
dc.contributor.author-dept會計學研究所zh_TW
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