併購雙方揭露消息之誘因探討

Abstract

在併購案中，市場資訊往往具有一定的參考價值，然而併購雙方卻不一定有誘因去傾聽市場的意見並且將其考慮進最後是否繼續進行併購案的決策。本論文採用建立模型的方式來針對此現象進行探討。對於主併公司而言，整體綜效的預期大小、市場資訊的準確程度以及揭露消息前後分配到的綜效多寡都會影響到主併公司事前對市場揭露消息的意願；另一方面，對於目標公司而言，其揭露消息的誘因不一定和主併公司一致，而這將可能進一步造成「揭露不足」或是「揭露的不效率性」的情況。為了使雙方的利益盡量一致，主併公司可採用股票或其他具有風險分攤效果的交易方式來達成這個目標。

This paper presents an analytical model about managers’ learning behavior in mergers and acquisitions (M&As). The amount of the expected synergy, the accuracy of the market information, and the splitting of the synergy pie with the target all have an influence on the bidder’s willingness to disclose news to the public and learn from the market reaction. The target’s incentive, however, is not necessarily the same as the bidder’s, which may further result in disclosure inefficiency. To solve this problem, a bidding structure with risk sharing such as the utilization of the stock exchange can be implemented.