跨產業策略聯盟與交易成本之個案研究

Abstract

全球玩具產業已步入結合科技電子技術的時代，傳統的玩具公司為保持其競爭力與永續成長，必須與資通訊廠商合作開發有價值的產品，以迎接未來的挑戰。但是，跨產業合作雖有能耐互補之效，但合作雙方的交易成本可能抵銷合作效益。因此，如何選擇適合的合作夥伴、如何建構有效的統治機制、以降低技術與市場不確定性，將影響企業競爭優勢的形成。 本研究採用交易成本的理論分析架構，以一家傳統玩具廠商與知名電子資訊廠商的合作個案為基礎，探討跨產業廠商策略聯盟建構決策的相關問題。藉由此一分析，找出可與傳統玩具結合、提高產品附加價值的技術，以及策略聯盟方式，並分析可能產生交易成本的原因，以建立合適之統治機制，以及未來產業可能發展的方向。 本研究發現跨產業合作的雙方（B玩具公司與A電子公司）在建構合作架構時，顯然面臨了機會主義、交易專屬性投資與技術不確定性等可能產生潛在交易成本的問題，反映在雙方對於創新的技術難度與合作的出資比例上，導致後續在規劃統治機制設計上的歧異。另一方面，由於，合作雙方的規模相當不對稱，規模較小的公司在掌握合作對方的投機行為、監督合作進行、以及談判等相關成本上，顯然比其自行內部垂直整合更高。 根據交易成本的分析，本研究歸結B玩具公司應該是自外部延攬相關新技術人才，於公司內部設立智慧型玩具部門，如此方能給自己較高的自由度與犯錯的機會，同時，在成本的考量下，內部垂直整合將比較能掌控在自己預算內去達成所設定目標。 本研究對於異業合作的交易模式提供一個有趣的實務分析，其結果不僅對於未來欲進行跨業合作的廠商，所可能面對的交易風險來源提供一個質性的分析，對於交易成本與交易價值在跨業合作過程中扮演的理論意義，亦有一定程度的參考價值。

The toy industry has marched into an era of competition which characterized by adding on features powered by advanced technology. To maintain competitiveness, toy makers in the traditional sector strive to engage cooperative relationships with technology-based companies. While the benefits of such inter-industry collaboration are apparent, the potential hazard to gaining positive effect from collaboration is much higher than originally expected. Given a high cost of vertical integration for both parties, inter-industry strategic alliances seem to be a useful yet difficult-to-managing strategic alternative. Therefore, the issue becomes how to select ideal partners, how to define an appropriate governance mechanism, how to reduce the likelihood of incurring transaction hazards. With these inquiries in mind, the present research would like to pursue a qualitative study aiming at this issue with a special emphasis on the sources of transaction costs of inter-industry strategic alliances. Based on a potential collaboration between a toy maker and a major IT player in Taiwan, our research undertook a qualitative analysis of potential transaction costs. By so doing, we are able to identify sources of potential transaction hazards and transaction values. With considerations on transaction costs, we then discuss appropriate modes for inter-organization governance. With a thorough analysis, we found that ex-post opportunistic behavior, relation-specific investments, technology uncertainty may play critical roles in elevating potential transaction costs for collaborating parties. Transaction hazards may also occur in the areas of perception to continuous innovation and ownership definition. In addition, the unbalanced scale between collaborating parties worsens the stability of collaboration. In other words, the transaction costs of this collaboration would be comparatively higher for strategic alliances than for internalization. Facing such transaction hazards, the toy maker is suggested to recruit technological talents and establish internal venture unit for designing wisdom toys. By so doing, the benefits of budget control and efficient coordination may overcome some losses of feature superiority. Implications of these results to practitioners who are evaluating inter-industry strategic alliances and to future research that can further expand the sources of transaction hazard are discussed.