獨立董事.公司績效與董監酬勞之關聯

Abstract

摘要 我國上市櫃公司發放董監酬勞已成常態，但長期以來不斷被詬病董監事領取超過合理標準的酬勞，故本研究欲探討影響董監酬勞的因素為何；又近年來政府推行獨立董事制度，希望藉由其獨立的特性，在台灣現今董事會與管理當局高度重疊的經營模式下，獨立董事能發揮其監督的功能，並有效抑止過度發放酬勞，畢竟董監酬勞屬於稅後盈餘的分配，分配比例越高對股東的傷害越大。基於過去文獻與制度設立目的，本研究發展假說如下： 假說一：董事與監察人酬勞與公司經營績效呈正相關。 假說二：董監酬勞發放比例與董事會中獨立董事比例呈負相關。 本研究使用2003至2005年間資料，以台灣上市櫃家數最多，同時是台灣經濟命脈的資訊電子產業為分析對象，各變數資料取自於公司所有公開的資料，範圍包括台灣經濟新報資料庫、公開資訊觀測站與公司網站等。總取得584家公司、1752筆樣本資料。研究結果發現： 假說一：公司績效與董監酬勞有顯著的正向關係。 假說二：董監酬勞發放比例與董事會中獨立董事所佔比例無顯著之關聯。 此外公司營運現金流量、董監事的實際持股比例與公司規模，同為決定董監酬勞金額的影響要素，本研究另發現最終控制者所控制的席次與其持有的股份偏離幅度越大時，董監酬勞發放比例越高，顯示因以不成比例的股份取得董事會的席次，最終控制者可能因此過度浪費公司資源，使酬勞發放的金額增加，而犧牲了小股東的權益；另一方面最終控制者任董事比例與酬勞發放比例呈負相關，顯示控制者與公司利益一致，會配合公司的營運概況，故會制止董監酬勞過度發放。又多數獨立董事兼職情況嚴重時，對公司的影響力降低，將促使公司發放較高比例的董監酬勞。

This thesis examines two research issues. First is the association between compensation for the members of board of directors and supervisors (hereafter “compensation of directors and supervisors”) and company performance. Second is the association between independent directors and percentage of compensation for directors and supervisors to net income (hereafter “percentage of compensation for directors and supervisors”). Percentage of compensation for directors and supervisors is defined as the proportion of compensation for directors and supervisors to net income. Using data obtained from Taiwan Economic Journal, Market Observation Posting System (MOPS), and company websites for the electronics companies listed in Taiwan Stock Exchange and GreTai Securities Market for the period 2003-2005, a total of 584 companies and 1,752 observations for the variables constitute the sample for this study. The empirical results show that compensation of directors and supervisors is positively and significantly associated with company performance. In addition, proportion of independent directors has no significant association with percentage of compensation for directors and supervisors. Using the median of the percentage of compensation for directors and supervisors to split the sample into two sub-samples and conduct the same analyses indicates that when the companies whose percentage of compensation for directors and supervisors is above the median, there is a significant and negative association between proportion of independent directors and percentage of compensation for directors and supervisors. Further, disparity between control right (number of directors) and cash flow right (number of shares owned) of ultimate controllers (owners) is positively correlated with compensation of directors and supervisors. Number of directors coming from ultimate controllers (owners) is negatively correlated with percentage of compensation for directors and supervisors. Finally, independent directors serving on the board for more than three companies tend to be associated with higher percentage of compensation for directors and supervisors.