中共對台政策之演變: 以三次台灣大選之文攻武嚇為例

Abstract

至今台灣暨有的三次總統大選當中，中共對台大選前的政策呈現：1996年文攻加武嚇，2000年重文攻輕武嚇，2004年輕文攻無武嚇。第四次的2008年大選在即，台灣的新憲與公投將對兩岸關係產生何種影響更引發關注。圍繞著台灣的這三次大選，本文主要在探討幾個中共對台政策的問題，特別是在文攻武嚇方面，包括： (1) 在政策的內涵方面，這三次大選當中，中共對台的政策，特別是在文攻武嚇策略上，有何變化起伏？ 中共對台的文攻武嚇可否比較？ (2) 在政策的效果與影響方面，三次大選中的中共對台政策對於台美中戰略三角的關係有何影響？中共自身又如何評估其對台政策的效果？ (3) 在政策的原因方面，中共在三次大選中的政策為何迥異？什麼因素決定了中共對台政策？在影響中共對台政策的眾多因素當中，國際因素與國內因素如何作用於其政策的產出？究竟是國際因素或是國內因素較能解釋與預測中共對台政策？中共對台的文攻武嚇是否符合現實主義？ 本研究主要分為兩大部份，第一在政策內涵的變化方面，本文採取質化轉量化的方法來分析中共對台文攻武嚇的變化，假定中共所控制的媒體真實地反應了中共高層的對台政策，蒐集中共官方、軍方、半官方三種報紙的對台報導，特別是文攻與武嚇方面，然後加以歸類、統計與圖表分析，每一個大選年的研究時間範圍設定為一整年，自選前8個月開始到選後4個月為止，得出中共對台文攻武嚇的數據資料，這些的數據與圖表使得中共對台政策更易於比較，而其起伏也更一目了然。 本文的第二部份探討原因，採取「三邊架構雙層賽局」來觀察中共對台政策的影響，並探討影響中共對台政策產出的原因。首先，「三邊架構」允許我們研究台灣、美國、中共這三方的國際環境與這個戰略三角之間的互動，特別是中共對台文攻武嚇之前與之後的戰略三角變動；其次，「雙層賽局」則從國內途徑 (domestic approach) 分析一國內部份的各種社會、政治、經濟力量如何影響到三邊的國際互動，進而牽動中共對台政策的產出。最後，本文將回答究竟是國內因素或者是現實主義的國際因素在中共對台政策的解釋與預測的效用上較高。 本文的主要結論包括：首先，在政策的內涵上，本文發現這三次大選當中，選前的中共對台文攻武嚇受到政策的回饋作用等而呈現逐次下降的趨勢；然而，大選後並沒有相應的下降走向。整體而言，中共對台政策的手法日益翻新細膩而多樣，對台情勢的研判越趨進步。其次，在中共對台政策的宣傳上，中共媒體受到其對台宣傳機構的指揮與控制，不但在對台文攻武嚇上表現出高度一致的報導，也有為其對台政策勸說、質辯、消毒等功能。其三，在政策的影響上，中共對台的文攻武嚇策略雖然升高了台灣人民對台獨的恐懼，但是也產生了某些反效果，不但能造成台灣選民的棄保效應，也能牽動台、美、中戰略三角以及亞太戰略態勢的變化。其四，在政策的原因上：一則，長期而言，因為國際體系結構的制約，現實主義對中共對台政策有長遠的制約效果。二則，短期而言，中共對台政策易受到台、美、中三方的國內因素對中共政權的影響而波動，尤其是台灣大選期間引發的主權爭議，也使得戰略三角的關係在大選年較不穩；此外，當各方因素對中共政權穩定相當有利時，中共對台政策較有彈性，反之則較為強硬而沒有彈性。三則，中共對台政策深受到回饋作用的影響，中共過往對台文攻武嚇的效果會回饋到其決策系統，不斷調整修正，造成第三次大選前的低文攻無武嚇現象。四則，關於現實主義途徑與國內途徑在中共對台政策的分析效用上，本文歸納出現實主義對於中共長期的對台政策有有強的解釋力，而國內途徑則對於短期的政策有較佳的預測力，二者在長程與短程的解釋力與預測力上雖有不同，但是缺一不可，端視研究的需要與目的而定。

From Taiwan’s first democratic presidential election in 1996, and for each Taiwanese presidential election since then, China’s policies toward Taiwan have evolved dramatically. When we compare China’s Taiwan-policies right before all three of Taiwan’s democratic presidential elections so far, we find an intriguing contrast between: (a) high rhetoric threat and high military threat in 1996, (b) high rhetoric threat but low military threat in 2000, and (c) low rhetoric threat and even no military threat in 2004. To understand China’s Taiwan-policies, my research explores three aspects of those policies: the policy variations, the policy influences, and the explanatory factors for the differences in policies for the three periods. First, I narrowed down the broad policy issue areas into two main categories, military threats and rhetoric threats. Then, I sampled, analyzed, and categorized reports from three of China’s symbolic newspapers including official, semi-official, and military newspapers during the three presidential election periods of Taiwan. Each “election period” covers a time span from eight months before to three months after the election. The categorized news reports are counted and then transformed into comparative statistical charts. The quantitative charts enable us to compare China’s policy variations more easily. In addition, I also use qualitative policy resources to complement my quantitative analysis and complete the whole study, especially when military threats and rhetoric threats virtually disappear in 2004. Second, regarding explanatory factors, I utilize a two-level triangular framework under the realist paradigm to examine how the interactions within the China-U.S.-Taiwan triangle affect China’s policy outputs toward Taiwan, and vice versa, how China’s policy outputs toward Taiwan affect the interactions within the China-U.S.-Taiwan triangle. The triangular framework enables us to examine the external environment for the three parties and the triangular interactions, especially to compare the triangular relations before and after China’s threats toward Taiwan. By two-levels, I mean the domestic and international levels. Two-level analysis allows us not only to examine the international external factors, but also to study how the domestic factors affect the international interactions in the strategic triangle. Finally, this study attempts to explain how the international and domestic factors affect China’s policies toward Taiwan, and determine which approach is more applicable in explaining China’s Taiwan-policies, especially the utility of realism. My conclusions are: (1) Regarding policy content, the severity of China’s threats toward Taiwan right before each of the three presidential elections show a downward trend from 1996 to 2004 because of feedback effects. However, the three post-election periods do not show such a decline. During the three presidential election campaigns, Taiwan’s domestic politics dealing with Taiwan-sovereignty issues easily trigger China’s intense reactions. China’s policies show interesting patterns, especially around Taiwan’s election days and inauguration days. Overall, China’s policies evolve over time, and the tactics become more versatile. (2) Regarding policy influences, from China’s perspective, its threats toward Taiwan in the first two elections lead not only to counterproductive results of Taiwanese voters electing the DPP candidate, but also negative impacts on the triangular-relationship and Asia-Pacific security. (3) Regarding policy input factors, several interesting points appear: (a) In the long run, China’s policies are consistent with state rationality. (b) But in the short term, China’s policies can be easily affected by internal events within Taiwan, the United States, and China, and also by the external actions of each of them. When the events and actions from the three parties strengthen the Chinese government’s ruling legitmacy, its policies tend to be more flexible. (c) There is a strong feedback function in China’s Taiwan-policies. (d) Both realist and domestic approaches have significant but different utilities in studying China ’s Taiwan-policies.