品質、材料與設計

Abstract

品質為廠商非價格競爭決策的重要變數,本文假設產品品質決定於設計成本和材料的使用,稱之為品質函數。探討一家廠商如何決定其產品之設計費與使用的材料之工本費。我們針對兩種市場結構做討論: 獨占市場與垂直差別化之市場。在市場結構為獨占下,假設品質函數為CES函數形式,透過設算其設計成本及材料成本,討論均衡時廠商之決策。在市場結構為垂直差別化之下,假設市場中有兩類廠商:一家高品質之獨占廠商與許多生產低品質之完全競爭廠商。討論並比較品質函數為Cobb-Douglas函數形式以及Leontief函數形式下,均衡時廠商之決策。

Quality is an important variable of non-price competition between firms. In this thesis,we assume the quality of products is determined by the material used and the cost of product design,which are called the quality functions. To analyze how a firm decides its expenses on product design and material,we focus on two industry structures: monopoly and vertical product differentiation markets. In the monopoly market,the quality function is assumed as constant elasticity of substitution,and the firm's decision when equilibrium is achieved is investigated by computing the costs on material and product design. On the other hand, in the vertical product differentiation market,we assume there are two kinds of firms in the market: a monopoly firm producing high-quality products,and many other perfect competition firms producing low-quality products. The decisions of firms under equilibrium condition are discussed and comparedwhen the quality functions are in the form of Cobb-Douglas and Leontief.