論美國以自衛為名攻打阿富汗之非法性

Abstract

摘 要 本文主要是經由實證法學之探討，來界定現行國際法下自衛權的實體內容與行使要件，同時藉由2001年美國因九一一恐怖攻擊而起的阿富汗戰爭，來瞭解自衛權適用於反恐怖主義領域的容許性與合法性。由於帶有高度政治性，關於武力使用之國際法一向是國際法領域裡爭辯不休的議題。阿富汗戰爭所帶來的爭議，本質上與以往美國或以色列藉反恐行使自衛的爭議並無不同，只在軍事回應的強度甚於前例，同時，受害人的地位提供反恐戰爭更大的正當性。 從重新省思美國實證法學的角度來分析當代關於武力使用之國際法及阿富汗戰爭，有下列四點值得吾人特別關注： 第一、反對學者認為恐怖主義只是私人暴力，只有當一個國家對另一個國家攻擊才能構成聯合國憲章第51條之「武力攻擊」，贊成學者認為九一一已經構成武力攻擊，因為九一一的規模和傷害都不小於常規的戰爭。傳統上用以定性恐怖攻擊的法律框架，在九一一之後顯然備受挑戰。 第二、即使是贊成九一一構成武力攻擊的學者，在處理上仍然將武力攻擊與特定國家連結，否則找不到可以當作自衛客體的對象。不同之處只在於將傳統上的替代責任（間接責任）詮釋成原始責任（直接責任），視阿富汗為九一一的共同行為人。 第三、以九一一作為自衛的理由，以比例原則加以檢驗，適當性、必要性均不足，也逾越比例性的要求而變成自衛過當。 第四、學術界批判阿富汗戰爭的聲浪，皆因美國舉證不足而起，事實真偽不明導致美國對自衛法律的解釋適用公信力不足，如果美國確實握有神學士涉入九一一個案的具體證據，並公佈之，當能消除其以阿富汗作為自衛對象而被質疑不合法之處。

Abstract This study aims at defining the concrete content and requirements of the right of self-defense under the international law in the view of positivism theory. Through an exploration on the case of the US’ War on Afghanistan in response to the terrorist attack on 11th September, 2001, this study also examines the applicability and the legality of taking self-defense as a instrument to combat terrorism. Owing to its highly political nature, the law on the use of force（jus ad bellum）is one of the most debated issues of international law. The debate of the 2001 “Operation Enduring Freedom” is in essence a sequel following the debates in respect to the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the 1984 Israeli bombing Tunisia and the 1986 US’ bombing Libya, but larger in military gravity and more legitimately persuasive in victimhood. An analysis on this case from a reflection upon the state-will-centric positivist perspective has led to four points for our reference as follows: First, the cons insist that a correct understanding of the term “armed attack” in the UN Charter must be an act of a state, and violence originated from private individuals or groups is not included; while the pros argue that the scale and effects of 911 are no less than a regular war. In the aftermath of 911, the dichotomy of armed conflicts and terrorism crimes has been greatly blurred and tangled. Second, even those who argue that 911 constitutes an armed attack, still adhere to a nexus between the attack and a sovereignty state. Without such nexus, it therefore implies that no state is attributable for the terrorist attack, resulting in that the US cannot direct forcible response towards any other state! What is revolutionary is that vicarious (indirect) responsibility weighs equal to original (direct) responsibility when invoking the so-called sovereign duty. In US’ eyes, harboring terrorists by Taliban makes no difference from a direct attack by it. Third, to examine “Operation Enduring Freedom” with Webster’s formula in the Caroline Case, not only both the necessity and immediacy cannot stand, but the proportionality is violated as well. Fourth, the issue in question is not technical uncertainty of norms about the use of force and self-defense, but the lack of crucial proof of the existence of facts that allow the US to trigger the right of self-defense. Had the US revealed substantial proof in public, its “Operation Enduring Freedom” might have never given rise to fierce challenges.