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DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.advisor | 林惠玲(Hui-Lin Lin) | |
dc.contributor.author | Ya-Chin Liang | en |
dc.contributor.author | 梁雅琴 | zh_TW |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-08T07:10:54Z | - |
dc.date.copyright | 2008-08-04 | |
dc.date.issued | 2008 | |
dc.date.submitted | 2008-07-31 | |
dc.identifier.citation | 王文宇(2000),《公司與企業法制》,154,台北:元照。
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dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/26455 | - |
dc.description.abstract | 企業間結合行為,可能藉由規模經濟或範疇經濟提升經營效能,也可能導致市場結構丕變,甚至造成市場遭少數大企業獨占或聯合壟斷,導致競爭效益的減損。為維護市場競爭之自由與公平,依據我國公平交易法規定,應由行政院公平會對一定規模之廠商結合案件進行審核,俟該會許可或不異議之後,企業始能進行結合。
為檢視企業依據公平交易法規定結合後,其經營績效的變化及長短期效果,本文利用該會81至95年間許可或不禁止結合案件資料,篩選5種產業廠商進行實證研究,實證結果主要發現:(1)長期而言,廠商結合後可提高其在營業毛利率、股東權益報酬率及總資產報酬率等績效指標表現。(2)市場力高低將影響廠商結合後的績效水準,當廠商結合後的市場占有率愈高,其績效報酬率也愈高。(3)產業別對於廠商績效影響相當重要,具有強烈獨占或寡占特質的傳播及節目播送業、電信業等產業,結合後常有較高的績效水準,而近年競爭較為激烈之金融中介業,其在股東權益報酬率與總資產報酬率等之經營績效相對較低。 | zh_TW |
dc.description.abstract | Mergers may improve enterprises’ performance through economies of scale or economies of scope. However, merger may cause the rearrangement of market structure, result in monopolies or facilitate concerted actions in relevant markets, thus reduce competition as well. According the Fair Trade Act, to maintain free and fair competition, any merger which acrosses specific threshold should be submitted to the Fair Trade Commission (FTC) for review in advance. Enterprises shall not proceed to merge until the FTC approves it or not to block it.
Using a research sample of mergers of 5 industries approved by the FTC between 1992 and 2006, this study examines the post-merger operating performances and their short-term and long-term effects of the merging parties. The results include: (1) In the long run, the post-merger enterprises may improve the performance of rate of gross profit, ROE and ROA. (2) The level of market power may influence the post-merger performance. With the higher market power, the firm may obtain higher rate of return. (3) Industry-type plays an important role in enterprises’ performance. Industries with monopolistic or oligopolistic market structure, such as broadcasting and programming or telecommunications, usually have better operating performances. Meanwhile, financial intermediations which compete vigorously the last few years have lower ROE and ROA. | en |
dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-08T07:10:54Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-97-P94323008-1.pdf: 1434807 bytes, checksum: fe78eed36f3789caa43ebaf3865729b8 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008 | en |
dc.description.tableofcontents | 目 錄
口試委員會審定書…………………………………………………………………… i 謝辭……………………………………………………………………………… ii 中文摘要…………………………………………………………………………… iii 英文摘要…………………………………………………………………………… iv 第一章 緒論………………………………………………………………….. 1 1.1研究動機與目的…………………………………………………………… 1 1.2研究範圍與研究方法…………………………………………………… 2 1.3本文架構………………………………………………………………… 2 第二章 理論與文獻回顧………………………………………………………….. 3 2.1結合定義與型態…………………………………………………………… 3 2.2結合動機………………………………………………………………… 5 2.3結合績效實證…………………………………………………………………9 第三章 公平交易法規範與執法概況………………………………………….. 20 3.1公平交易法相關規範…………………………………………………… 20 3.2審酌因素與分析方式………………………………………………………23 3.3公平交易委員會執法概況…………………………………………………28 第四章 研究方法與實證模型…………………………………………………….. 38 4.1資料來源及樣本篩選……………………………………………………… 38 4.2被解釋變數-績效指標…………………………………………………… 41 4.3模型設定……………………………………………………………………48 第五章 實證結果與分析……………………………………………………………54 5.1 模型A實證結果……………………………………………………………54 5.2 模型B實證結果…………………………………………………………63 5.3小結…………………………………………………………………………67 第六章 結論與建議………………………………….. …………………………… 69 6.1主要研究結果………………………………………………………………69 6.2檢討與建議…………………………………………………………… 70 6.3研究限制及未來研究方向……………………………………………72 參考文獻…………………………………………………………………….……… 73 | |
dc.language.iso | zh-TW | |
dc.title | 公平交易法結合管制與其績效之實證分析 | zh_TW |
dc.title | The Empirical Analysis of Merger Regulation and its Performance of the Fair Trade Act | en |
dc.type | Thesis | |
dc.date.schoolyear | 96-2 | |
dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 鄭秀玲,莊春發 | |
dc.subject.keyword | 結合,公平交易法,競爭,經營績效,市場力, | zh_TW |
dc.subject.keyword | merger,Fair Trade Act,competiton,operating performance,market power, | en |
dc.relation.page | 75 | |
dc.rights.note | 未授權 | |
dc.date.accepted | 2008-07-31 | |
dc.contributor.author-college | 社會科學院 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.author-dept | 經濟學研究所 | zh_TW |
顯示於系所單位: | 經濟學系 |
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