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完整後設資料紀錄
DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.advisor | 陳聖賢 | |
dc.contributor.author | Chia-Wei Huang | en |
dc.contributor.author | 黃嘉威 | zh_TW |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-08T07:01:14Z | - |
dc.date.copyright | 2009-05-12 | |
dc.date.issued | 2009 | |
dc.date.submitted | 2009-05-07 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Allen, Franklin, and Roni Michaely, 2003, Payout policy, in George M. Constantinides, Milton Harris, and Ren´e M. Stulz, eds.: Handbook of the Economics of Finance (Elsevier, North Holland, Amsterdam).
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dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/26142 | - |
dc.description.abstract | 本篇論文利用股票購回公司的被接管機率與其長期績效,來檢測管理者在使用防禦性股票購回時的動機。實證結果發現,被接管機率與長期績效是呈現顯著的負向關係。這個結果支持管理者鞏固職位假說,即公司在被接管機率很高的情況下進行股票購回,則相對於其它股票購回的公司,它會有比較低的長期績效表現。更進一步的來看,擁有很大私利的管理者其鞏固職位的現象是比較明顯的。另一方面;上述的結論在我們控制了其它的影響因素之後,它仍然是被支持的。本篇論文提供了解釋股票購回公司的管理者動機,另外,也提供了一條新的管道來解釋股票購回公司的長期績效表現。 | zh_TW |
dc.description.abstract | This paper examines the relation between the ex ante takeover probability and firm’s stock abnormal return and operating performance in explaining the managerial incentives for the defensive open-market share repurchase. We find a significantly negative relation between a firm’s takeover probability and its stock abnormal return and operating performance response to announcements of open-market repurchase. This evidence supports the managerial entrenchment hypothesis that repurchasing firms generate a lower performance for firms with high takeover probability. The results are more pronounced for the CEOs of repurchasing firms with larger private control benefits or with more protected by antitakeover provisions. Furthermore, these findings hold even after controlling for other potentially influential variables. Our paper provides a better understanding of the managerial incentives for announcing open-market repurchase, as well as provides a new way to explain post-repurchase long-run stock abnormal return and operating performance. | en |
dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-08T07:01:14Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-98-D94723002-1.pdf: 803554 bytes, checksum: d84294acb43534297ad816df84ba73cd (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009 | en |
dc.description.tableofcontents | 口試委員會審定書 i
誌謝 ii 中文摘要 iii 英文摘要 iv I. Introduction 1 II. Hypotheses Development and Related Studies 4 A. The management incentives to use open-market repurchase as defensive mechanism in response to takeover attempts 4 B. Private control benefits and managerial incentives 6 C. Antitakeover provisions and managerial incentives 7 D. Actual share repurchases and managerial incentives 8 III. Samples Selection 9 A. Estimated The ex ante Takeover Probability 9 B. Open-Market Share Repurchases 9 IV. Empirical Methodologies 10 A. Takeover Probability Estimation 10 B. Stock Performance 11 C. Operating Performance 12 D. Private Control Benefits 13 E. Entrenchment Index 15 V. Empirical Results 16 A. Variable Construction and Sample distribution 16 B. The ex ante Takeover Probability Estimation 17 C. The Determinants of Actual Share Repurchases 18 D. Takeover Probability and Stock Performance 19 E. Takeover Probability and Operating Performance 24 F. Controlling for Earnings Management and Market Competition 26 G. Sensitivity Test 28 VI. Conclusions 28 REFERENCES 30 Appendix 34 | |
dc.language.iso | en | |
dc.title | 防禦性股票購回:管理者鞏固職位或股東利益 | zh_TW |
dc.title | Defensive Repurchases: The Managerial Entrenchment
versus Shareholder Interests | en |
dc.type | Thesis | |
dc.date.schoolyear | 97-2 | |
dc.description.degree | 博士 | |
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 胡星陽,陳業寧,何耕宇,周冠男,王衍智,陳一如 | |
dc.subject.keyword | 股票購回,接管防禦,管理者鞏固職位,股東利益,私利,管理者鞏固職位指數, | zh_TW |
dc.subject.keyword | Share Repurchases,Takeover Defense,Managerial Entrenchment,Shareholder Interests,Private Control Benefits,Entrenchment Index, | en |
dc.relation.page | 54 | |
dc.rights.note | 未授權 | |
dc.date.accepted | 2009-05-07 | |
dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.author-dept | 財務金融學研究所 | zh_TW |
顯示於系所單位: | 財務金融學系 |
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