Skip navigation

DSpace

機構典藏 DSpace 系統致力於保存各式數位資料(如:文字、圖片、PDF)並使其易於取用。

點此認識 DSpace
DSpace logo
English
中文
  • 瀏覽論文
    • 校院系所
    • 出版年
    • 作者
    • 標題
    • 關鍵字
    • 指導教授
  • 搜尋 TDR
  • 授權 Q&A
    • 我的頁面
    • 接受 E-mail 通知
    • 編輯個人資料
  1. NTU Theses and Dissertations Repository
  2. 公共衛生學院
  3. 健康政策與管理研究所
請用此 Handle URI 來引用此文件: http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/26135
完整後設資料紀錄
DC 欄位值語言
dc.contributor.advisor張睿詒(Ray-E Chang)
dc.contributor.authorShih-Pi Linen
dc.contributor.author林士弼zh_TW
dc.date.accessioned2021-06-08T07:01:04Z-
dc.date.copyright2009-09-16
dc.date.issued2008
dc.date.submitted2009-05-12
dc.identifier.citation中文部分
何千惠:第2型糖尿病患者自我效能及社會支持與遵醫囑行為之相關研究-以台北縣某區域教學醫院為例。國立台灣師範大學衛生教育研究所碩士論文,2004。
沈茂庭:台灣論量、論質、DRG等支付制度之執行現況與比較。全民健保支付制度論壇,2006。
李復華:老年人不遵從服用藥物原因之探討。護理雜誌,1997;44(4):69-74。
李玉春:建立全民健保以共同照護模式為基礎的糖尿病患疾病管理計畫先導性研究(III)。行政院衛生署委託研究計畫。台北:行政院衛生署2002。
李待弟:全民健康保險糖尿病醫療給付改善方案初步影響評估。國立台灣大學衛生政策與管理研究所碩士論文,2006。
翁慧卿、徐慧君、林育慈、陳淑銘、李佩儒、李集美等人:糖尿病患介入疾病管理在經濟面、臨床面及滿意度成效評估之初探-以台南某區域醫院糖尿病病患為例。醫務管理期刊,2004;5(2):222-242。
翁慧卿、蔡魯、劉貞娟:氣喘疾病管理在醫療資源耗用、臨床指標改善與自我照護能力的影響。福爾摩莎醫務管理雜誌,2006;2(1):36-46。
許惠恒:糖尿病醫療給付改善方案在某醫學中心實施成效探討。國立台灣大學醫療機構管理研究所碩士論文,2003。
黃三桂、王悅萍、錢慶文:疾病管理對糖尿病患醫療資源耗用之影響。醫務管理期刊,2002;3(2):35-48。
黃偉堯、蔡依珍:論病例計酬下醫院選擇病患之行為分析-以腹腔鏡膽囊切除術為例。醫務管理期刊,2004;5(2):23-31。
劉見祥、曲同光、陳玉敏:糖尿病共同照護與健保給付。臺灣醫學,2002;6(4):581-584。
劉貞娟:全民健保氣喘疾病管理計畫成效評估--以南部某健保分局資料為例。義守大學管理科學研究所碩士論文,2004。
賴美月:探討糖尿病論質計酬改善方案對於中部某醫學中心糖尿病病患之實施效果。中國醫藥大學醫務管理研究所碩士論文,2005。
蘇喜、宋鴻生:精神醫療機構對健保論質的態度與預期醫療服務的變化。醫務管理期刊,2006;7(4):383-402。

英文部分
Anderson, G. (1993). Implementing practice guidelines. CMAJ, 148(5), 753-755.
Call, K. T., Dowd, B., Feldman, R., & Maciejewski, M. (1999). Selection experiences in Medicare HMOs: pre-enrollment expenditures. Health Care Financ Rev, 20(4), 197-209.
Chaix-Couturier, C., Durand-Zaleski, I., Jolly, D., & Durieux, P. (2000). Effects of financial incentives on medical practice: results from a systematic review of the literature and methodological issues. Int J Qual Health Care, 12(2), 133-142.
Doran, T., Fullwood, C., Gravelle, H., Reeves, D., Kontopantelis, E., Hiroeh, U., et al. (2006). Pay-for-performance programs in family practices in the United Kingdom. N Engl J Med, 355(4), 375-384.
Dracup, K. A., & Meleis, A. I. (1982). Compliance: an interactionist approach. Nurs Res, 31(1), 31-36.
Ellis, R. P. (1998). Creaming, skimping and dumping: provider competition on the intensive and extensive margins. J Health Econ, 17(5), 537-555.
Fairbrother, G., Hanson, K. L., Friedman, S., & Butts, G. C. (1999). The impact of physician bonuses, enhanced fees, and feedback on childhood immunization coverage rates. Am J Public Health, 89(2), 171-175.
Feldstein, P. J. (1999). The Market for Hospital Services. In: Health Care Economics.
5th ed. New York: Delmar publishers.
Freed, G. L., & Uren, R. L. (2006). Pay-for-performance: an overview for pediatrics. J Pediatr, 149(1), 120-124.
Frolich, A., Talavera, J. A., Broadhead, P., & Dudley, R. A. (2007). A behavioral model of clinician responses to incentives to improve quality. Health Policy, 80(1), 179-193.
Hillman, A. L. (1991). Managing the physician: rules versus incentives. Health Aff (Millwood), 10(4), 138-146.
Hurley, J., Linz, D., & Swint, E. (1990). Assessing the effects of the Medicare Prospective Payment System on the demand for VA inpatient services: an examination of transfers and discharges of problem patients. Health Serv Res, 25(1 Pt 2), 239-255.
Kasper, J. D., Riley, G. F., McCombs, J. S., & Stevenson, M. A. (1988). Beneficiary selection, use, and charges in two Medicare capitation demonstrations. Health Care Financ Rev, 10(1), 37-49.
Langwell, K. M., & Hadley, J. P. (1989). Evaluation of the Medicare competition demonstrations. Health Care Financ Rev, 11(2), 65-80.
Long, M. J., Fleming, S. T., & Chesney, J. D. (1993). The impact of diagnosis related group profitability on the skimming and dumping of psychiatric diagnosis related groups. Int J Soc Psychiatry, 39(2), 108-120.
Lu, M., Ma, C. T., & Yuan, L. (2003). Risk selection and matching in performance-based contracting. Health Econ, 12(5), 339-354.
Maciejewski, M. L., Dowd, B., Call, K. T., & Feldman, R. (2001). Comparing mortality and time until death for medicare HMO and FFS beneficiaries. Health Serv Res, 35(6), 1245-1265.
Mehrotra, A., Pearson, S. D., Coltin, K. L., Kleinman, K. P., Singer, J. A., Rabson, B., et al. (2007). The response of physician groups to P4P incentives. Am J Manag Care, 13(5), 249-255.
Morgan, R. O., Virnig, B. A., DeVito, C. A., & Persily, N. A. (1997). The Medicare-HMO revolving door--the healthy go in and the sick go out. N Engl J Med, 337(3), 169-175.
NCQHC. (2006). CEO survival Guide pay for performance. Washington: NCQHC.
Newhouse, J. P. (1989). Do unprofitable patients face access problems? Health Care Financ Rev, 11(2), 33-42.
Newhouse, J. P. (1996). Reimbursing health plan and health providers: efficiency in production versus selection. Journal of Economic Literature, 34: 1236-1263.
Nikolaus, T., Kruse, W., Bach, M., Specht-Leible, N., Oster, P., & Schlierf, G. (1996). Elderly patients' problems with medication. An in-hospital and follow-up study. Eur J Clin Pharmacol, 49(4), 255-259.
Reiter, K. L., Nahra, T. A., Alexander, J. A., & Wheeler, J. R. (2006). Hospital responses to pay-for-performance incentives. Health Serv Manage Res, 19(2), 123-134.
Robinson, J. C. (2001). Theory and practice in the design of physician payment incentives. Milbank Q, 79(2), 149-177, III.
Rosenthal, M. B., Fernandopulle, R., Song, H. R., & Landon, B. (2004). Paying for quality: providers' incentives for quality improvement. Health Aff (Millwood), 23(2), 127-141.
Rosenthal, M. B., & Frank, R. G. (2006). What is the empirical basis for paying for quality in health care? Med Care Res Rev, 63(2), 135-157.
Rosenthal, M. B., Frank, R. G., Li, Z., & Epstein, A. M. (2005). Early experience with pay-for-performance: from concept to practice. JAMA, 294(14), 1788-1793.
Rosenzweig, J. L., Weinger, K., Poirier-Solomon, L., & Rushton, M. (2002). Use of a disease severity index for evaluation of healthcare costs and management of comorbidities of patients with diabetes mellitus. Am J Manag Care, 8(11), 950-958.
Roski, J., Jeddeloh, R., An, L., Lando, H., Hannan, P., Hall, C., et al. (2003). The impact of financial incentives and a patient registry on preventive care quality: increasing provider adherence to evidence-based smoking cessation practice guidelines. Prev Med, 36(3), 291-299.
Selby, J. V., Karter, A. J., Ackerson, L. M., Ferrara, A., & Liu, J. (2001). Developing a prediction rule from automated clinical databases to identify high-risk patients in a large population with diabetes. Diabetes Care, 24(9), 1547-1555.
Shen, Y. (2003). Selection incentives in a performance-based contracting system. Health Serv Res, 38(2), 535-552.
Sloan, F. A., Morrisey, M. A., & Valvona, J. (1988). Case shifting and the Medicare Prospective Payment System. Am J Public Health, 78(5), 553-556.
Smith, P. C., & York, N. (2004). Quality incentives: the case of U.K. general practitioners. Health Aff (Millwood), 23(3), 112-118.
Town, R., Wholey, D. R., Kralewski, J., & Dowd, B. (2004). Assessing the influence of incentives on physicians and medical groups. Med Care Res Rev, 61(3 Suppl), 80S-118S.
Young, G. J., White, B., Burgess, J. F., Jr., Berlowitz, D., Meterko, M., Guldin, M. R., et al. (2005). Conceptual issues in the design and implementation of pay-for-quality programs. Am J Med Qual, 20(3), 144-150.

網路資料
行政院衛生署國民健康局:糖尿病預防、診斷與控制流程指引,2004。2008年5月22日,取自:http://www.health91.bhp.doh.gov.tw/1-3-11.htm
行政院衛生署統計室:全民健康保險醫療統計,2005。2008年5月22日,取自:
http://www.doh.gov.tw/statistic/index.htm
中央健保局:全民健康保險糖尿病醫療給付改善方案照護項目表,2008。2008年5月28日,取自:
http://www.nhi.gov.tw/information/bbs_detail.asp?menu=1&menu_id=&Bulletin_ID=884
World Health Organization. http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs312/en/index.html (accessed May
29,2008)
dc.identifier.urihttp://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/26135-
dc.description.abstract近年來,糖尿病醫療照護廣受國內外重視。因此,一種為引導醫療提供者提供糖尿病患完整性照護服務,進而提昇醫療品質,而以支付額外獎金予醫療提供者為手段,並連結其績效作為支付依據之糖尿病醫療給付改善方案便應運而生,期藉此方案達到疾病控制之目的。然而根據醫師行為理論指出,醫師為追求利潤最大化,可能出現選擇低嚴重度病患之行為,這將嚴重扭曲此方案提昇照護品質與疾病控制之美意,因此,在此方案下參與之醫師是否存在傾向選擇輕症病患之行為,值得探討。
本研究之資料來源為全民健康保險研究資料庫,研究對象為2002~2005年參與糖尿病醫療給付改善方案之醫師,2002年共計220位醫師,2003年共計413位醫師,2004年共計620位醫師,2005年共計810位醫師。本研究以DCSI作為糖尿病疾病嚴重度之評估指標,分析參與糖尿病醫療給付改善方案之醫師下符合收案條件之糖尿病就診病患收案與未收案者其糖尿病疾病嚴重度是否有差異,以推論參與之醫師是否出現選擇病患之行為,期能增添更多攸關資訊,提供有關單位未來制訂政策參考使用。
本研究之主要研究結果如下:
一、參與糖尿病醫療給付改善方案之醫師下符合收案條件之就診病患收案與未收案DCSI平均分數之平均2002年分別為2.977與6.176分,2003年分別為2.655與6.037分,2004年分別為2.334與5.998分,2005年分別為2.325與6.186分,且均達統計上顯著差異,意即參與糖尿病醫療給付改善方案之醫師存在選擇病患之行為。
二、參與糖尿病醫療給付改善方案之醫師下符合收案條件之就診病患收案與未收案DCSI平均分數的差值之平均,2002年為3.199分,2003年為3.382分,2004年為3.663分,2005年為3.862分,意即參與糖尿病醫療給付改善方案之醫師存在傾向選擇低嚴重度病患收案之行為。
三、在控制醫師年齡、性別、專科別、執業機構層級別、執業機構權屬別之變項後,參與糖尿病醫療給付改善方案之個別醫師下未收案組就診病患之DCSI平均分數較收案組高,2002年高出2.62分、2003年高出2.89分、2004年高出2.99分、2005年高出3.03分,且均達統計上顯著差異,意即控制醫師特質與醫療機構特質後,2002~2005參與糖尿病醫療給付改善方案之醫師存在傾向選擇低嚴重度病患收案之行為。另外,2002~2005參與糖尿病醫療給付改善方案之醫師其年齡、性別、專科別、執業機構層級別、執業機構權屬別均未達統計上顯著差異,但在控制其他變項後,執業機構權屬別呈現公立醫療機構之糖尿病患疾病嚴重度高於私立醫療機構之情形,且似乎有越來越顯著的傾向。此結果說明私立醫療機構較傾向收治疾病嚴重度低之糖尿病患之情形。但整體而言,此結果顯示參與此方案之醫師存在傾向選擇低嚴重度病患收案之行為並不顯著受醫師特質與執業機構特質所影響。
本研究之建議如下:
(一) 應審慎評估推行糖尿病醫療給付改善方案後對整體糖尿病患之成效,非僅關注收案病患之品質改善與資源耗用情形,畢竟仍有大多數糖尿病患未被納入此方案,且未被納入者多屬於疾病嚴重度較高之族群,更應設法提供此族群完善的醫療照護,以提升整提糖尿病患之照護品質。
(二) 建議糖尿病醫療給付改善方案之支付模式應引入適當之疾病嚴重度校正模式,疾病嚴重度較高之病患應給予醫療提供者較大之支付,鼓勵其提供嚴重度較高之糖尿病患完整之照護服務,進而維護病患健康、控制醫療費用。
(三) 建議糖尿病醫療給付改善方案應簡化各項行政流程以提高醫師收治嚴重度較高之糖尿病患之意願。
(四) 加強對嚴重度較高之糖尿病患的衛教服務以提升其回診率進而提高醫師收治嚴重度較高之糖尿病患之意願。
zh_TW
dc.description.abstractIn recent years, diabetes care has drawn much attention domestically and all over the world. Therefore, a pay-for-performance program for diabetes was implemented. Goal of the program conducts health care providers to supply the integrity of diabetes care services, thereby enhancing quality of medical care and control the disease. Method of the program pay bonus to health care providers, and link their performance as a basis for payment. However, according to physician behavior theory that the physician for the pursuit of profit maximization, the physician possible select patients of low severity, This situation will seriously distort the intention of this programme for enhancing the quality of care and disease control. Therefore, under this program, whether physicians tend to select patients of low severity needs to be further discussed.
The samples selected from National Health Insurance Research Database of claimed data during 2002 to 2005. Accede to pay-for-performance program for diabetes, there were total 220 physicians in 2002, 413 physicians in 2003, 620 physicians in 2004 and 810 physicians in 2005. This study use DCSI to evaluate the severity of patients and understand the difference of severity between patient participating and not patient participating under this program. These results will inference whether physicians tend to select patients of low severity and provide government organization with suggestions when making medical quality policy.
The main findings of the study were concluded as below:
1. The averages that the means of DCSI scores of the patient participating in this program or not are 2.977 and 6.176 in 2002, 2.655 and 6.037 in 2003, 2.334 and 5.998 in 2004, 2.325 and 6.186 in 2005 respectively. This result indicates that patient selection of physicians behaviors.
2. The difference of average that the means of DCSI scores of the patient participating in this program is 3.199 in 2002, 3.382 in 2003, 3.663 in 2004, 3.862 in 2005. This result indicates that physicians tend to select patients of low severity.
3. After controlling hospital’ and physician’ characteristics, the averages of DCSI scores of the the patient not participating in this program is significant higher 2.62 in 2002, 2.89 in 2003, 2.99 in 2004 and 3.03 in 2005 than the patient participating.This result indicates that after controlling hospital’ and physician’ characteristics, physicians tend to select patients of low severity. In addition, hospital’ and physician’ characteristics are not significant but patients have lower DCSI scores in private medical institutions than public medical institutions. This result indicates that private medical institutions tend to select patients of low severity. Overall, under this program, hospital’ and physician’ characteristics do not have significant influence on patient selection of physicians behaviors.
Based on the results of this study, a few suggestions were proposed as the following:
1. Effectiveness of pay-for-performance program for diabetes for paitents should be evaluated carefully. This is because the most patient with diabetes were not included in this program and these patients with high severity. Therefore, policy should provide these patients comprehensive medical care to enhance the quality of care.
2. To suggest this program use a severity of illness adjusted model. Higher severity of patients should be given a larger payment to health care providers to encourage their to supply the integrity of diabetes care to higher severity of the diabetic patients, thereby enhancing quality of medical care and control medical costs.
3. To suggest this program should simplify administrative processes to improve physicians treated patients of high severity.
4. To raise the patients’ compliance to improve physicians treated patients of high severity.
en
dc.description.provenanceMade available in DSpace on 2021-06-08T07:01:04Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1
ntu-97-R95843015-1.pdf: 645315 bytes, checksum: 6de5319e68872b2b11f085b93ab7d015 (MD5)
Previous issue date: 2008
en
dc.description.tableofcontents摘要I
AbstratIII
目錄V
表目錄VI
圖目錄VII
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景與動機 1
第二節 研究目的 4
第二章 文獻探討 5
第一節 醫師行為理論-利潤極大化模式 5
第二節 醫療提供者選擇病患行為之相關研究 7
第三節 財務誘因與醫療提供者行為之關係 11
第四節 論質計酬(pay-for-performance,P4P)支付制度 12
第五節 糖尿病疾病管理 15
第三章 研究材料與方法 19
第一節 研究設計與研究架構 19
第二節 研究假說 21
第三節 變項名稱及操作型定義 22
第四節 資料處理及統計分析方法 24
第四章 研究結果 30
第一節 描述性統計結果 30
第二節 配對T檢定之檢定結果 35
第三節 迴歸分析之結果 36
第五章 討論 39
第一節 參與糖尿病醫療給付改善方案之醫師是否有選擇病患之行為 39
第二節 研究限制 41
第六章 結論與建議 42
第一節 結論 42
第二節 建議 43
參考文獻 44
中文部分 44
英文部分 46
網路資料 48
附錄一49
附錄二52
dc.language.isozh-TW
dc.subject選擇病患zh_TW
dc.subject糖尿病zh_TW
dc.subject醫師行為zh_TW
dc.subjectDiabetesen
dc.subjectPatient Selectionen
dc.subjectPhysician Behavioren
dc.title探討糖尿病醫療給付改善方案之病患選擇zh_TW
dc.titleInvestigating Patient Selection in the
Pay-for-Performance Program for Diabetes
en
dc.typeThesis
dc.date.schoolyear97-2
dc.description.degree碩士
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee鄭守夏(Shou-Hsia Cheng),謝啟瑞(Chee-Ruey Hsieh)
dc.subject.keyword糖尿病,醫師行為,選擇病患,zh_TW
dc.subject.keywordDiabetes,Physician Behavior,Patient Selection,en
dc.relation.page53
dc.rights.note未授權
dc.date.accepted2009-05-12
dc.contributor.author-college公共衛生學院zh_TW
dc.contributor.author-dept醫療機構管理研究所zh_TW
顯示於系所單位:健康政策與管理研究所

文件中的檔案:
檔案 大小格式 
ntu-97-1.pdf
  未授權公開取用
630.19 kBAdobe PDF
顯示文件簡單紀錄


系統中的文件,除了特別指名其著作權條款之外,均受到著作權保護,並且保留所有的權利。

社群連結
聯絡資訊
10617臺北市大安區羅斯福路四段1號
No.1 Sec.4, Roosevelt Rd., Taipei, Taiwan, R.O.C. 106
Tel: (02)33662353
Email: ntuetds@ntu.edu.tw
意見箱
相關連結
館藏目錄
國內圖書館整合查詢 MetaCat
臺大學術典藏 NTU Scholars
臺大圖書館數位典藏館
本站聲明
© NTU Library All Rights Reserved