運用信用擔保機制於供應鏈採購模式之研究

Abstract

在台灣之產業供應鏈中，上游常由許多中小企業所組成，而中小企業由於資本之因素，常會陷於融資困難之窘境。而此資金融通的問題也間接會影響供應鏈之運作。因此為使產業鏈能夠順利的向外推展，政府亦多方推動相關方案以幫助中小企業順利取得貸款，其中中小企業信用保證基金之火金姑專案更利用信用擔保機制，結合供應鏈中上、下游企業，一同為供應鏈整體效益努力。 本研究則以火金姑模式為情境，發展出信用擔保模式，以期建立一供應鏈採購之模型。模型中以下游製造商為機制推動者，引進銀行現有之信貸機制及當上游供應商無法完整交貨時可向緊急供應商採購之機制，探討如何透過對上游企業的信用擔保，結合上游企業、銀行達成違約時之分攤機制，藉此穩定上游供應商之資金來源並降低上游供應商違約之風險與其所帶來之損失。 而根據模式結果發現，當上游主供應商預期違約機率高，且自有資金缺乏時，信用擔保模式可發揮最大效用。且隨著主供應商之違約機率上升，製造商所需承擔之分攤比率相對提升。本研究並針對供應鏈中之重要因素進行實驗設計分析，提供企業運用信用擔保機制時之重要考量因素以及各因素對企業採購成本之影響。並提供企業與上游供應商或銀行間進行協議時，作為協商依據。

In the supply chain of Taiwan, the suppliers are usually formed by the small and medium enterprises (SME). Due to the difficulty of financial loaning in the SEM firms, SME firms may have problem to fulfill order from downstream customers in time which will influence the overall performance of the supply chain. In order to improve the supply chain performance, the government had implemented a program to help SMEs to obtain finance support more easily. Particularly, Small and Medium Enterprise Credit Guarantee Fund of Taiwan, Taiwan SMEG, and Firefly Counterpart Guarantee Fund, FCGF, setup a program to integrate all sections of the supply chain partners to work together for a stronger and healthier supply chain. Base on the practice of FCGF, the supply chain sourcing model is formulated to develop a credit guarantee mechanism. In our model, the downstream manufacturers is a starter of the entire mechanism, manufacturer will negotiate with bank who loan the money to the upstream supplier about ratio mechanism. Also, an emergency vendor included to provide enough materials to meet the demand if the upstream suppliers cannot deliver goods in time. The model discusses the issues of the credit guarantee mechanism to stabilize the sourcing process and provide enough funding for the upstream suppliers to lower the risk and loss. The result shows that when the major supplier’s expected default rate is high and lack of available funds, the credit guarantee mechanism will work effectively. As the major supplier’s expected default rate increases, the share ratio of loan needed to return to the bank by the manufacturers rises. The research also uses the Experimental Design method to identify the important factors in our model which provide the important implications for corporations if a manufacturer intents to implement credit guarantee mechanism. Finally, the shared ratio provides a negotiation base for manufacturers and banks.