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| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 陳業寧 | |
| dc.contributor.author | Ting-Ting Chang | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 張婷婷 | zh_TW |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-08T06:56:37Z | - |
| dc.date.copyright | 2009-07-30 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2009 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2009-07-22 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | Almazan, A., Hartzell, J. C. and Starks, L. T. 2004. Conflicts of Interest and Monitoring Costs of Institutional Investors:. s.l. : Working Paper, University of Texus, 2004.
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| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/25883 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | 本文目的在於研究公司治理對於『超額薪酬與公司績效之連結性』的影響。以台灣1996-2007年上市櫃公司之總經理酬勞資料做為研究對象，發現在董事會持股百分比越高的情況下，超額薪酬與公司績效之間呈現正向相關；然而若經理人對於薪酬訂定過程具有影響力(經理人持股百分比越高及董事身兼經理人百分比越高)，則超額薪酬與公司績效之間呈現負向連結。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract | The purpose of this article is to deal with the problem of how corporate governance will affect “the relationship between of excess compensation and firm performance.” Companies listed in TSE and OTC from 1996 to 2007 are included in the sample data. And we find that when board holding percentage is higher, the excess compensation and firm performance are positively correlated, vice versa. Also, when managers have some control over the process of compensation determination, the excess compensation and firm performance are negatively correlated, and vice versa. | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-08T06:56:37Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-98-R96723013-1.pdf: 444416 bytes, checksum: f3de861a2799026ffc29a33202f39970 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 謝詞..................................................i
中文摘要.............................................ii Abstract............................................iii 目錄.................................................iv 圖目錄................................................v 表目錄...............................................vi 第一章 緒論..........................................1 1.1研究動機...........................................1 1.2研究架構...........................................3 第二章 文獻探討......................................4 2.1誘因契約相關文獻...................................4 2.2公司治理相關文獻...................................5 2.2.1. 董事會持股.....................................6 2.2.2. 獨立董監.......................................6 2.2.3. 大股東持股.....................................6 2.2.4. 機構投資人持股.................................6 2.2.5. 管理階層持股...................................7 2.3誘因契約與公司治理相關文獻.........................7 2.4預期貢獻...........................................8 第三章 研究方法.....................................10 3.1研究期間及範圍....................................10 3.2資料來源..........................................10 3.3選用變數..........................................10 3.3.1經理人薪酬......................................10 3.3.2影響薪酬之變數..................................11 3.3.3公司治理變數....................................13 3.3.4衡量公司表現變數................................16 3.4實證模型..........................................16 3.5研究架構與假說....................................18 第四章 實證結果和解釋...............................21 4.1敘述性統計........................................21 4.2實證模型結果......................................25 4.2.1超額薪酬結果....................................25 4.2.2超額薪酬與公司治理..............................26 4.2.3超額薪酬、公司治理與公司績效....................29 第五章 結論.........................................38 參考文獻.............................................39 | |
| dc.language.iso | zh-TW | |
| dc.title | 公司治理、高階經理人超額薪酬與公司績效間的關聯性 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | Relationship between Corporate Governance, CEO Excess Compensation and Firm Performance | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 97-2 | |
| dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 胡星陽,陳明園 | |
| dc.subject.keyword | 公司治理,經理人薪酬,超額薪酬,公司績效表現, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | corporate governance,CEO compensation,excess compensation,firm performance, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 44 | |
| dc.rights.note | 未授權 | |
| dc.date.accepted | 2009-07-23 | |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 財務金融學研究所 | zh_TW |
| 顯示於系所單位： | 財務金融學系 | |
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