公司治理與認列減損關聯性之研究

Abstract

本研究探討公司治理與認列減損之關聯性，樣本期間為2004年至2005年，分析方法採Logit Model與OLS Model。實證結果如下： 首先，有關探討「公司治理變數與有無認列資產減損可能性之關聯性」，發現管理階層有異動者，最終控制股東對公司之控制權與現金流量權偏離程度越大者，獨立董監席次比率愈低者，董監有效性持股比率愈低者，愈有可能認列減損損失。上述結果意謂著公司治理機制較差的公司，愈有可能認列減損損失。 再者，有關探討「公司治理變數與提前或準時認列資產減損可能性之關聯性」，發現管理階層有異動者，外資持股比率愈高者，最終控制股東對公司之控制權與現金流量權偏離程度越大者，獨立董監席次比率愈低者，董監有效性持股比愈低者，愈有可能提前認列減損損失。上述結果意謂著公司治理機制較差的公司，愈有可能提前認列減損損失。 此外，有關「公司治理變數與認列資產減損金額之關聯性」，發現管理階層有異動者，最終控制股東對公司之控制權與現金流量權偏離程度越大者，獨立董監席次比率愈小者，認列減損金額愈大。上述結果意謂著公司治理機制較差的公司，認列減損損失金額愈大。 最後，有關「公司治理變數與提前或準時認列減損金額之關聯性」，發現2005年準時認列減損之公司，其減損金額大小受公司治理變數之影響較2004年為大。

The research focuses on the association between corporate governance and asset impairment. The sample period is from year 2004 to year 2005. The analysis methods adopted in the research are Logit Model and OLS Model. Empirical results suggest what mentioned below. First, it is focused that the association between corporate governance and the probability of whether asset impairment is recognized or not. The result is that the management level replaced, the more deviation between final controlling holder’s controlling right and cash flow right, the less ratio of independent director number, and the less director’s effective holding rate, the more probability of asset impairment recognized. Above-mentioned implied that the less corporate governance mechanism, the more probability of asset impairment loss recognized. In addition, it is focused that the association between corporate governance and the probability of whether asset impairment is recognized in advance or not. The result is that the management level replaced, the more foreign investor’s holding rate, the more deviation between final controlling holders’ controlling right and cash flow right, the less ratio of independent director number, and the less directors’ effective holding rate, the more probability of asset impairment recognized in advance. Above-mentioned implied that the less corporate governance mechanism, the more probability of asset impairment loss recognized in advance. Besides, it is focused that the association between corporate governance and the amount of asset impairment recognized. The result is that the management level replaced, the more deviation between final controlling holder’s controlling right and cash flow right, and the less ratio of independent director number, the more asset impairment is recognized. Above-mentioned implied the less corporate governance mechanism, the more asset impairment loss recognized. Finally, focusing on the association between corporate governance and the amount of asset impairment whether is recognized in advance or not. The result is that the asset impairment loss recognized on time in 2005 is affected more by corporate governance variables than which recognized in 2004.