考慮客戶自有產能之供應契約設計

Abstract

本研究探討供應鏈下游客戶具自有產能時，供應鏈上下游廠商間之供應契約設計。當下游客戶開始具有製造技術並開始涉及生產，上下游產能利用率將受到需求不確定影響而重新分配：具有自有產能之下游能夠優先以自有產能滿足市場需求，不足的部分才向上游訂購，造成下游客戶產能利用率變動不大，並且需求變動風險將轉嫁至上游供應商，造成上游產能利用率變異增加。 本研究以上游供應商的角度思考，妥適設計供應鏈契約以因應下游廠商生產能力與自有產能數量變化，並討論多家下游競爭產能時，如何利用風險共擔及產能限制以保障上游之利潤。研究結果顯示上游供應商可藉由兩階選擇權契約，使下游必頇出資保留上游產能，並藉此使得上游在接受產能利用率風險轉嫁時，進行合理收費，以減少利潤的變異性，達到對下游客戶自有產能的制衡。此外，數值分析結果顯示，下游自有產能的數量將顯著影響供應鏈內廠商之決策制定與利潤分配。

This research studies contract design problems in a two-echelon supply chain This research studies contract design problems in a two-echelon supply chain under demand uncertainties and downstream retailer in-house capacity considerations. Without in-house capacity, the retailer relies only on the supplier for fulfilling market demand. After building in-house capacity, the retailer uses external capacity only when in-house capacity is insufficient. Owing to this situation, the risk of uncertain demand would be reallocated between the supplier and retailer; the variances of the capacity utilization would be unfair to supplier because downstream retailer utilizes the power of allocating the demand orders. This research takes the supplier’s point of view and assumes the supplier has higher market power to lead the contract negotiation. The objective is to modify a supply chain contract, which defines pricing and cooperation mode between the supplier and the retailer, to address the problem of supplier’s capacity investment risk. This research adopts two-part option contract with multiple-retailer setting which lead to the effect of risk pooling and capacity competition, hence both mechanisms bring advantage to supplier. Our results suggest that profit sharing between supplier and retailer is heavily affected by in-house capacity level of the retailer. With retailer’s reservation fee, the supplier reduces the profit variances while the capacity utilization is affected by downstream retailer.