公司治理架構下經營判斷法則之分析與適用

Abstract

我國於民國九十年公司法修法引進忠實義務(fiduciary duty of loyalty)之概念。此一觀念係源自英美法，認為董事與公司的關係屬於一種信任關係。為使董事不違反信任關係，課與董事信賴義務。由於我國法中原無忠實義務之相關規定，且在九十年引進時並未清楚交代忠實義務之內涵及相關配套規定，是故在未來遇有此類訴訟時，勢必得參考英美法實務中的經營判斷法則(Business Judgment Rule)以審酌公司董事進行經營決策時是否已善盡信賴義務。 經營判斷法則是自美國法院中多年的判例衍生出來針對董事在做出經營決定時，判斷董事過失行為的一個判斷標準，其目地為希望各方能尊重董事基於善意為公司所做的決策，保障董事在其獨立決定該決策後，若招致公司有損失，可免於承擔個人責任的一種推定法則。在這法則之下，股東若要對董事提起訴訟，必須主張及承擔舉證董事違反經營判斷法則要件的責任。經營判斷法則的要件共有五項：1.經營決策 2. 無利害關係且獨立判斷 3.合理注意 4. 善意 5.無濫用裁量權。此外，尚有兩種不適用商業判斷法則的行為：1.詐欺、違法行為或越權行為 2.浪費。 管見以為，在注意義務方面，依我國目前公司法之規定，董事之注意義務在程度上係採抽象輕過失。在分析我國民法後，拙見以為我國民法上所謂的過失標準，乃是屬於侵權行為法下之概念，以結果為導向，與公司法上論及董事責任時，須視其做成決策之過程是否有所疏失，有所不同。因此若我國欲引進英美法下的忠實義務與注意義務，應改為從主客觀兩方面分別去探討公司負責人是否盡其注意義務，盡而與經營判斷法則相結合。 此外，對於有違反忠實義務可能之行為：公司董事的自我交易(self-dealing)行為、利用公司機會或利用公司資訊等參酌學者見解做更明確之闡釋與規範。同時尚可制定一般性宣示條款，例如，公司董事應善意的為公司最大利益執行業務，董事應於充分取得並了解與決議有關之資訊的情形下，基於自由裁量做出個人判斷。 董事雖對公司之利害關係人負有信賴義務，但此義務並不能無限上綱，否則公司負責人動輒得咎，於作經營判斷時將有可能過度保守，因而無法為公司謀取最大利益，因此，建議我國在考量賦與董事更重義務的同時，應同時引進經營判斷法則，減少公司董事之法律疑慮，增加其冒險之可能，在經濟效率及公司治理的兩端獲取較佳的平衡。

Abstract: Fiduciary duty derives from Anglo-American legal system and argues that the relationship between directors of the company and shareholders is one kind of fiduciary relationship. In order to make the directors not to violate this relationship, the directors are asked to take the fiduciary duty. Since we did not have any related articles and provisions about fiduciary duty in our law system, we should refer to business judgment rule from Anglo-American legal system in order to judge whether the directors fulfill their fiduciary duty when doing business judgment. Business judgment rule is a case-law derived concept from Anglo-American legal system, which is a rule judging the negligence of the directors of a company when doing business decisions. The objective of this concept is to make sure that every party should respect the decision the directors made for business purpose in good faith and exempt the directors from personal duty when they make the decision independently while the corporation suffered loss. Under this rule, if the shareholders want to charge the directors, they have responsibilities to point out that the directors violate the five elements of business judgment rules. The five elements are(1)a business decision(2) disinterested and independence(3) due care(4) good faith(5)no abuse of discretion. Moreover, even if the behavior of the directors and officers matches these elements, they still have judiciary duty if the decision they made is (1) fraud, illegality or ultravires conduct (2) waste. In my opinion, our corporate law uses the abstract negligence to judge if directors or officers fulfill duty of care. However, our criterion for the negligence in civil law is under the foundation of Tort Law, which is based on the results of the consequence. This concept is different from emphasizing on the process of making the business decision under corporate law. Hence, we should discuss the directors and officers’ duty of care under objective and subjective perspectives and business judgment rule. In addition, for those behaviors violating duty of loyalty, such as self-dealing, using company opportunity, and appropriating the asset and information of the corporate, law-makers can make more specific explanations and regulations making reference to some scholars’ opinion. Also, law-makers can establish some declarative articles, such as, directors should do run business for the max benefit of the shareholders, or directors should make business decisions independently after acquiring sufficient information related with the issues. Directors are liable to the person who has material interest with the company. This duty should have limit, or the directors and officers will be easily accused of every decisions they made and the decision directors or officers made will become too conservative and cannot make the max benefit to shareholders. Therefore, we should introduce business judgment rule to reduce the considerations of directors and officers in order to make balance between economic efficiency and corporate governance when we are considering put more responsibilities on directors and officers.