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完整後設資料紀錄
DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.advisor | 孫效智 | |
dc.contributor.author | Chih-Ying Huang | en |
dc.contributor.author | 黃芝盈 | zh_TW |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-08T05:57:44Z | - |
dc.date.copyright | 2007-09-19 | |
dc.date.issued | 2007 | |
dc.date.submitted | 2007-09-04 | |
dc.identifier.citation | 參考書目
一、英文部分 Bennett, Jonathan. ”Morality and Consequences,” The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, second edited by Sterling McMurrin, Cambridge:Cambridge University press, 1981:45-166. Brook, Richard. ”Dischargeability, Optionality, and the Duty to Save,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 8, 2 , 1979:194-200. Chandler, John. ”Killing and Letting Die—Putting the Debate in Context,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 68 ,1990:420-31. Cartwright, Will. ”Killing and Letting die: a Defensible Distinction,” British Medical Bulletin. 52, 2 ,1996:354-61. Davidson, Donald. Essay on Actions and Events. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1980. David Ross, The Right and the Good. Oxford University Press, 1930:1877-1971. Devine, Philip E. ”Tooley on Infanticide,” December 1973 Dinello, Daniel. “On Killing and Letting Die,” in Analysis, 31 ,1971:84-86. Draper, Kai. ”Rights and the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing,” Philosophy and Public Affairs. 33, 2005:255-57. Fischer, John Martin and Mark Ravizza, eds. Ethics: Problems and Principles. Wadsworth Publishing Company press, 1992. ----”Quinn on Doing and Allowing,” The Philosophical Review 101, 2 , April 1992:343-52. Foot, Philippa. “The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect,” Ethics: Problems and Principles, edited by John Martin Fisher and Mark Ravizza, Wadsworth Publishing Company press, 1992:59-67. ---- “Killing and Letting Die,” Moral Dilemmas. Oxford University Press. 2003a:79-87. ---- “Morality, Action and Outcome,” Moral Dilemmas. Oxford University Press.2003b:88-104 G. M. N., Anscombe. Intention. Oxford:Blackwell Press.1963:45-7. Kagan, Shelly. “Does Consequentialism Demand Too Much?” Philosophy and Public Affairs.13 ,1984:239-54. ----“The Additive Fallacy,” Ethics.99 ,1,1988:5-31. ---- The Limits of Moraliity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.1989. ----Normative Ethics. Westview Press, 1998. Kamm, Frances Myrna.“Killing and Letting Die:Methodological and Substantive Issues,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 64, 1983. ---- “Harming, Not Aiding, and Passive Euthanasia,” Philosophy and Public Affairs.15 ,1986:5-11. ----“Harming Some to Save Others,” Philosophical Studies. 57 1989:227-60. ----“Non-Consequentialism, the Person as an End-in-Itself, and the Significant of Status,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 21 ,1992):354-89. ----”Killing and Letting Die: Argument for Inequivalence and the Problem of Contextual Interaction, ” Morality, Morality II, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1996:43-62. ---- Morality, Mortality II .Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1996. Helga Kuhse. ”Why Killing is Not Always Worse-and Sometimes Better-Than Letting die,” Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 7, 4 ,1998:371-4. Malm, Heidi. ”In Defense of the Contrast Strategy,” Ethics: Problems and Principles. edited by Fischer and Ravizza, 1992:271-77. McMahan, Jeff. “Killing, Letting Die and Withdrawing Aid,” Ethics 103, 2, 1993:250-79. Murphy.Jeffrie G. ”Is Killing the Innocent Absolutely Immoral,” second edited by Bonnie Steinbock and Alastair Norcross, Fordham University Press, 1994:197-209. Nesbitt, Winston. ”Is Killing no Worse Than Letting Die,” Journal of Applied Philosophy.12, 1, 1995:105-5. Oddie, Graham, “Killing and Letting Die: Bare Differences and Clear Differences,” Philosophical Studies. 88, 1997:267-87. Quinn, Warren S.. “Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing,” Philosophical Review. 98, 3 , July 1989:287-312. Rachels, James.“Active and Passive Euthanasia,” New England Journal of Medicine. 292 ,1975:78-80. Rickless, Samuel. ”The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing,” Philosophical Reviews.106, 4, 1997:556-8. Russell, Bruce. “On the Relative Strictness of Negative and Positive Duties,” Ethics: Problems and Principles. Wadsworth Publishing Company press, 1992:121-33. Scheffler, Samuel. The Rejection of Consequentialism. Oxford: Clarendon Press.1982. ---- “Doing and Allowing,” Ethics, 114, 2004:215-39. Steinbock, Bonnie and Norcross, Alastair ed. Killing and Letting Die, Fordham University Press, 1994. Thomson, Judith Jarvis. “Killing, Letting Die and the Trolley Problem,” The Monist 59, 1976:204-17. ----“The Trolley Problem,” Yale Law Journal. 94 ,Spring 1985:1395-1415. Tooley, Michael. “Abortion and Infanticide,” Philosophy and Public Affairs. 2, 1, 1972:37-65. ---- ”An Irrelevent Consideration: Killing Versus Letting Die,” in Killing and Letting Die, second edited by Bonnie Steinbock and Alastair Norcross, Fordham University Press, 1994:103-11. Trammell, Richard Louis. “Saving and Taking Life,” The Journal of Philosophy 72 , 5, 1975:131-7. ----”Tooley’s Moral Symmetry Principle”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 5, 3, Spring,1976:303-313. ----“The Nonequivalency of Saving Life and Not Taking Life.” The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy. 4, 3 , September 1979 . 二、中文部分 孫效智 〈從倫理學行為理論談結果主義〉,《哲學雜誌》,第十二期,1995:86-113。 ----〈兩種道德判斷—論「道德善惡」與「道德正誤」的區分〉,《國立台灣大學哲學評論》,第十九期,1996:223-254。 林火旺 《倫理學》五南出版社,1911。 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/24880 | - |
dc.description.abstract | 摘 要
「即使傷害一人是救其他人唯一的方法,我們仍認為傷害無辜的行為比起聽任人受傷更應受到譴責」。這樣的觀念,在日常倫理觀中,似乎是不容置疑且相當普遍的看法。這不僅可以在法律與宗教的思維中發現,更反映在當代醫學倫理的決策與討論中。然而,即使如此,仍有許多倫理學者質疑造成傷害和聽任傷害之間,意即為害和允害之間是道德相關的區分,並否定這區分是一項在規範層次上與道德相關的規範因素。 本篇論文的目的即是要探討,為害與允害是否是一項能參與決定行為道德狀態的區分。文分為三大部分進行: 首先,便是要探問如何定義的問題。思考如何能適當的區分為害與允害?應該採取什麼樣的判準來表述為害與允害的區別,以期能符合日常語言的使用?其二,則是在確立區分判準後,針對幾則反駁這區分具道德意涵的案例進行剖析,說明反例所引發的相關爭論與論點。第三部分則關注為害與允害區分的證成問題。指出這區分具有道德意涵可能訴諸的原由與根據,以及這些理由是否足以支持與為害和允害這區分在道德上的意涵。文末指出,為害與允害的區分雖然在適當地理解與有限條件下具有道德意涵,但卻不足以支持為害行為成為「為害限制」、形成凌越結果考量的規範因素。 | zh_TW |
dc.description.abstract | In commonsense morality, it seems to be an undeniable and widespread view that doing harm to the innocent is more reprehensible than merely allowing harm, even if harming one individual is the only way to save many others from being harmed. Such a belief is not only reflected in our law and religious thought, but also in many discourses of contemporary medical ethics. There are, however, many ethicists who call into question that the distinction between doing harm and allowing harm is morally significant, and argue against it as a normative factor that possesses moral relevance at the normative level.
The main purpose of this thesis is to undertake this controversial issue, to discuss whether the doing harm/allowing harm distinction is relevant to the determination of the moral status of actions. This thesis can be divided into three parts to elucidate: The first one of the central aims is to ask how to adequately distinguish doing harm from allowing harm, that is, to inquire what criterion should be adopted to characterize the distinction which can correspond with our ordinary linguistic usage. The second point will be to analyze some cases constructed to refute the assumption that this distinction makes a difference in moral assessment, and to illustrate the relevant disputes and arguments arising from those counterexamples. The third is concerned with the justification for this distinction’s moral significance. To find out how one justifies the moral relevance of this distinction, we will undertake some probable reasons, from which this assumption is derived, to examine whether those reasons are satisfactory to defend that doing harm is morally worse than allowing harm. In conclusion, I point out that through proper interpretation of “moral significance”, the doing harm/allowing harm distinction is conditionally justified as morally relevant, but it is not strong enough to support “doing harm” to become a “constraint against doing harm”, a normative factor outweighing the promotion of good. | en |
dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-08T05:57:44Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-96-R90124009-1.pdf: 666766 bytes, checksum: 7ecc0f06a44096c0f445d39c0395cf57 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2007 | en |
dc.description.tableofcontents | 導論………………………………………………………………… 1
一、問題意識……………………………………………………… 1 二、研究方法與各章綱要………………………………………… 8 第一章 區分判準………………………………………………… 10 第一節 第一種區分判準及其批評………………………… 11 一、第一種區分判準:作為與不作為………………… 11 二、第一種區分判準之批判…………………………… 14 第二節 第二種區分判準及其批評………………………… 17 一、第二種區分判準:傷害與行為之間的五類關係… 17 二、第二種區分判準之批判…………………………… 22 第三節 第三種區分判準及其批評………………………… 26 一、第三種區分判準:「作為與不作為」以及「意圖」的結合…… 26 二、第三種區分判準之批判…………………………… 32 第四節 不一致的行為判斷………………………………… 35 一、案例統整…………………………………………… 35 二、結語………………………………………………… 37 第二章 反例研究………………………………………………… 40 第一節 案例討論…………………………………………… 41 一、對比案例…………………………………………… 41 二、衝突案例…………………………………………… 46 第二節 道德等同原則……………………………………… 48 一、道德等同原則之說明……………………………… 48 二、道德等同原則之批判……………………………… 52 第三節 對比策略…………………………………………… 55 一、 對比策略之應用……………………………………… 55 二、 對比案例的建構……………………………………… 56 三、 對比論證的有效性…………………………………… 57 四、對比策略在兩種道德意涵下的有效性……………………… 60 第四節 案例類型與道德意涵之關係……………………… 62 一、在對比案例中採取「強意義」的道德意涵………………… 62 二、在對比案例中採取「弱意義」的道德意涵………………… 63 三、 在衝突案例中採取「強意義」的道德意涵…………… 64 四、 在衝突案例中採取「弱意義」的道德意涵…………… 64 第三章 為害與允害區分具道德意涵之根據…………………… 66 第一節 消極義務與積極義務…………………………………… 66 一、嚴格性的區分……………………………………… 66 二、義務與權利的證成效力與疑義……………………………… 67 三、義務嚴格性之證成………………………………… 69 第二節 維持社會和平安全………………………………… 78 第三節 最樸素關係下的區別 ……………………………… 80 結論………………………………………………………………… 84 參考書目…………………………………………………………… 86 | |
dc.language.iso | zh-TW | |
dc.title | 論為害與允害區分之道德意涵 | zh_TW |
dc.title | On The Moral Significance of Doing Harm/Allowing Harm Distinction | en |
dc.type | Thesis | |
dc.date.schoolyear | 95-2 | |
dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 謝世民,張培倫 | |
dc.subject.keyword | 為害,允害,殺人,聽任死亡,道德意涵, | zh_TW |
dc.subject.keyword | Doing harm,Allowing harm,killing,letting die,moral significance, | en |
dc.relation.page | 89 | |
dc.rights.note | 未授權 | |
dc.date.accepted | 2007-09-07 | |
dc.contributor.author-college | 文學院 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.author-dept | 哲學研究所 | zh_TW |
顯示於系所單位: | 哲學系 |
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