股權結構與盈餘管理之關聯：以中國上市公司為例

Abstract

本研究以中國深圳和上海上市公司為觀察對象，探討政府股東以及機構投資人股東於公司治理中所扮演之角色。使用Modified Jones Model，以裁量性應計項目，來衡量公司經理人盈餘管理之行為，探討政府與機構投資人持股比例，是否會對盈餘管理之程度有所影響。另外，在中國證券監督管理委員會制定的法規影響下，上市公司有其特殊誘因，進行盈餘管理來達到特定的盈餘目標以避免受到懲罰或限制，本研究藉此將面對不同誘因的公司做分組，探討政府以及機構投資人對公司面對該誘因時，對其盈餘管理之影響。實證結果發現，上市公司其政府股權比例越高，會有越高程度的盈餘管理行為。而機構投資人股權比率與盈餘管理程度並非單純的線性關係，而是呈現凸型：隨著機構投資人股權比率的上升，盈餘管理程度亦隨之上升，但是上升速率逐漸降低，直到股權比例達到特定程度，盈餘管理程度開始下降。而在公司面對強烈盈餘管理誘因時，機構投資人股權比率與盈餘管理程度變為正向關係，盈餘管理程度不隨之到達特定比率而下降。綜觀所述，可以推測政府與機構投資人非但沒有扮演公司治理監督之角色，反而強化了公司作盈餘管理的行為。

This study investigates the roles of government and institutional investors playing in corporate governance in China capital markets. In addition, China listed firms have strong incentives achieving certain ROE targets to avoid punishments or restrictions. I categorize firms with different incentives to see whether institutional investors strengthen or alleviate the earnings management. Using discretionary accounting accruals as the measure of earnings management, I find that the percentage of shareholding held by government is positively associated with the positive discretionary accruals, and the relation between the percentage of shareholding held by institutional investors and the positive discretionary accruals is convex: as the percentage of shareholding held by institutional investors increases, discretionary accruals increases at a decreasing rate up to a certain level, and then begins to decrease. Also, when firms face the strong incentive using discretionary accruals, the relation between the percentage of shareholding held by institutional investors is positively associated with the positive discretionary accruals, not the convex curve. These findings imply that government and institutional investors strengthen the earnings management rather than act as monitors for the minority.