請用此 Handle URI 來引用此文件:
http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/24723
完整後設資料紀錄
DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.advisor | 洪一薰 | |
dc.contributor.author | Yu-Chen Liu | en |
dc.contributor.author | 劉毓真 | zh_TW |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-08T05:38:28Z | - |
dc.date.copyright | 2011-08-01 | |
dc.date.issued | 2011 | |
dc.date.submitted | 2011-07-26 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Boland, J. J. and Whittington, D, 2000. “Water Tariff Design in Developing countries: Disadvantages of Increasing Block Tariffs(IBTs) and Advantages of Uniform Price with Rebate(UPR) Designs.” World Bank Water and Sanitation Program, Washington, DC, 37.
Cachon, G. P., 2003. “Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts.” Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science: Supply Chain Management. North-Holland, Amsterdam. Cachon, G. P. and Lariviere, M. A., 2005. “Supply chain coordination with revenue-sharing contracts: strengths and limitations.” Management science, 51(1) 30 - 44. Cachon, G. P. and Kok, A. G., 2010. “Competing manufacturers in a retail supply chain: on contractual form and coordination.” Management science, 56(3) 571 – 589. Ciarreta, A. and Gutierrez-Hita, C., 2006. “Supply function vs. quantity competition in supergames.” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 24 773 – 783. Dolan, R. J., 1987. “Quantity discounts: managerial issues and research opportunities.” Management science, 6(1) 1 – 22. Deshpande, V., and Schwarz, L. B., 2005. “Optimal capacity choice and allocation in decentralized supply chains.” Purdue University working paper. Ertek, G. and Griffin, P. M, 2002. “Supplier- and buyer-driven channels in a two-stage supply chain.” IIE Transactions, 34(8) 691 - 700. Electric Power Supply Association. 2011. Electricity Primer. Available at: http://www.epsa.org/industry/primer. Accessed 1 June 2011. Fishman, C., 2006. The Wal-Mart effect: how the world’s most powerful company really works—and how it’s transforming the American economy. Penguin Press, New York. Giannoccaro, I. and Pontrandolfo, P, 2004. “Supply chain coordination by revenue sharing contracts.” International Journal of Production Economics, 89 131 – 139. Klemperer, P. D. and Meyer, M. A, 1989. “Supply function equilibria in oligopoly under uncertainty.” Econometrica, 57(6) 1243 – 1277. Krishna, V., 2002. “Auction theory.” Academic Press, San Diego. Liu, X. and Cetinkaya, S., 2009. “Designing supply contracts in supplier vs buyer-driven channels: The impact of leadership, contract flexibility and information asymmetry.” IIE Transactions, 41(8) 687 - 701. McClure, J. and Kumcu, E., 2008. “Promotions and product pricing: Parsimony versus Veblenesque demand.” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 65(1) 105 - 117. Olson, M., Rassenti, S., Rigdon, M. and Smith, V., 2003. “Market Design and HumanTrading Behavior in Electricity Markets.” IIE Transactions, 35(9) 833 - 849. Pasternack, B., 1985. “Optimal pricing and returns policies for perishable commodities.” Marketing Science. 4(2) 166 – 176. Taylor, T, 2002. “Coordination under channel rebates with sales effort effect.” Management Science. 48(8) 992 – 1007. Tsay, A., S. Nahmias, N. Agrawal, eds. 1998. “Modeling supply chain contracts: A review.” Quantitative Models for Supply Chain Management. Kluwer, Boston, MA. Tsay, A., 1999. “The quantity flexibility contract and supplier-customer incentives.” Management Science. 45(10) 1339 – 1358. Ventosa, M., Baillo, A., Ramos, A. and Rivier, M., 2005. “Electricity market modeling trends.” Energy Policy, 33 (7) 897 – 913. Wilson, R., 1993. Nonlinear pricing. Oxford University Press, New York. Wilson, R., 2001. “Activity Rules for an Iterated Double Auction.” Game theory and business applications. Kluwer, Boston, MA. ITIS智網。2005。多晶矽原料缺貨對矽晶圓材料產業的影響。網址:http://www.itis.org.tw/index.jsp。上網日期:2010-10-11。 許振邦。2007。採購與供應管理。再版。台北,智勝文化出版。 郭婷瑋、王京明。2008。我國電業自由化後電力現貨市場電價之模擬。初版。台北,中華經濟研究院。 王京明、郭婷瑋。2001。主要國家電業自由化之發展與經驗。初版。台北,中華經濟研究院。 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/24723 | - |
dc.description.abstract | 合約設計之型態往往因不同產業型態而有所不同。本研究主要針對採購價格與交易數量呈現正向關係的情況,如熱門商品、關鍵零組件材料因天災或其他因素造成短缺供不應求之情形或在電力批發現貨市場拍賣方式都可以發現。本研究以Stackelberg模型為基礎,建構兩階層供應鏈的賽局模型,將上游設定為先行者,提供採購價格與交易數量間關係之合約;下游為跟隨者,參考市場需求及合約後再向上游表示其願意支付之採購價格。為描述上游所提出之單位採購價格及採購數量呈現正向關係的清單(schedule)模式,本研究所提出兩個模型,分別為線性合約模型與階梯合約模型,在此兩個模型中,分別探討上游供應商以單一價格收費和區段價格收費等收費方式,了解不同收費方式所會造成之結果。最後針對這些結果做敏感度分析,了解各種參數對供應鏈各成員的利潤、決策所造成之影響。 | zh_TW |
dc.description.abstract | Different transaction contract types are formed in different industries. This study focuses on a special case that the downstream entity needs to offer a higher unit acquisition price in order to obtain a higher volume of products from the upstream entity. Such phenomenon may occur in the industry where there is a strong demand in the market or the capacity constraints in the upstream. We propose a two-tier supply chain based on the Stackelberg model to analyze members’ behaviors in such supply chains. In order to formulate the positive relationship between the acquisition price and product volume, we propose two models name linear contract and step function contract. And in each model we discuss different ways of charge by the upstream entity. In our model, the leader is the upstream entity who provides the downstream entity with the contract, the relationship between the acquisition price and selling quantity, and the follower is the downstream entity who determines the acquisition price. After the downstream entity determines the acquisition price or chooses the acquisition price with respect to the quantity, the upstream observes the price and offers the corresponding quantity to the downstream entity. We conduct a sensitivity analysis to examine how each parameter influences the derived results. | en |
dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-08T05:38:28Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-100-R98546028-1.pdf: 563342 bytes, checksum: 9af757471d35cb0f0a39bd77293f8f72 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011 | en |
dc.description.tableofcontents | 口試委員審定書 ............................................................................................................... I
誌謝 ................................................................................................................................. II 中文摘要 ........................................................................................................................ III ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................... IV 目錄 ................................................................................................................................. V 圖目錄 ........................................................................................................................... VII 表目錄 .......................................................................................................................... VIII 第一章 緒論 .................................................................................................................. 1 1.1 研究動機與背景 .................................................................................. 1 1.2 研究目的 .............................................................................................. 3 第二章 文獻回顧 .......................................................................................................... 5 2.1 供應鏈合約模型探討 .......................................................................... 5 2.2 線性及非線性定價與價格數量正斜率現象 ...................................... 8 第三章 線性合約模型 ................................................................................................. 11 3.1 問題背景描述 ..................................................................................... 11 3.2 模型假設及符號表示定義 ................................................................ 12 3.3 在單一價格收費下之線性合約模型 ................................................ 15 第四章 階梯合約模型 ................................................................................................ 21 4.1 在單一價格收費下之階梯合約模型 ................................................ 22 4.2 在區段價格收費下的階梯合約模型 ................................................ 30 第五章 數值敏感度分析與結果比較 ........................................................................ 34 5.1 各模型結果比較 ................................................................................ 34 5.2 線性合約模型數值敏感度分析 ........................................................ 35 5.3 階梯合約模型數值敏感度分析 ........................................................ 38 5.4 線性合約模型與階梯合約模型結果綜合比較 ................................ 40 第六章 結論與未來研究方向 .................................................................................... 43 參考資料 ........................................................................................................................ 44 | |
dc.language.iso | zh-TW | |
dc.title | 廠商間價格數量呈現正比合約模型設計之研究 | zh_TW |
dc.title | Contract Design for B2B: a Case That Price is Positively Related to Quantity | en |
dc.type | Thesis | |
dc.date.schoolyear | 99-2 | |
dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 吳政鴻,陳文智,黃奎隆 | |
dc.subject.keyword | 合約設計,定價,採購價格數量正比,Stackelberg模型, | zh_TW |
dc.subject.keyword | Contract design,pricing,positive relationship between price and quantity,Stackelberg model, | en |
dc.relation.page | 46 | |
dc.rights.note | 未授權 | |
dc.date.accepted | 2011-07-26 | |
dc.contributor.author-college | 工學院 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.author-dept | 工業工程學研究所 | zh_TW |
顯示於系所單位: | 工業工程學研究所 |
文件中的檔案:
檔案 | 大小 | 格式 | |
---|---|---|---|
ntu-100-1.pdf 目前未授權公開取用 | 550.14 kB | Adobe PDF |
系統中的文件,除了特別指名其著作權條款之外,均受到著作權保護,並且保留所有的權利。