集團企業結構特性與公司績效之探討：台灣地區之實證

Abstract

資本市場之蓬勃發展，無可避免地發展出一些大型企業，而隨著企業之成長，往往亦伴隨著衍生一些以其為中心的若干企業，彼此在經營策略與決策模式上互有關連，進而形成明顯之「集團企業」。此外，隨著國際化腳步的加快，集團規模大型化及國際化將更形快速，從長遠的角度看，集團企業對我國政府的財政收入與未來國家整體的發展影響皆將與日俱增，故集團企業之績效是值得探討之研究議題。本研究主要係欲探討集團企業「結構特性」與「公司績效」之關連性。就吾人所知，本研究為首篇同時探討集團企業「業務聯結」及「公司治理」等結構特性與各分子公司績效關連性之研究。針對「結構特性」部分，將由「業務聯結」與「公司治理」二層面加以探討；公司績效部分，則以各分子公司之會計績效與資本市場績效衡量之。 就整體迴歸結果觀之，無論是以pooled fixed year effects估計測試或以分年估計測試之實證結果皆顯示，「業務聯結」結構特性之垂直整合度（VI）、「公司治理」結構特性之董事持股質押比率（PDIRH）等變數對於各分子公司當期績效之影響，在各種應變數之衡量下，皆可得一致之實證結果支持。亦即，集團企業之垂直整合度愈大，集團企業分子公司績效愈高；董事持股質押比率愈大，集團企業分子公司績效愈低。 「公司治理」結構特性之控制股東控制權與現金流量權偏離（DEV（RDEV））變數之迴歸結果則因控制權之衡量而不同，當控制權係以股權控制權（CR）作衡量時，DEV（RDEV）變數之係數方向多與預期一致，惟顯著性不一。而當控制權係以董事會控制權（DCR）作衡量時，DEV（RDEV）變數之係數方向則皆與預期一致且皆達傳統顯著水準。亦即，集團企業分子公司之控制股東控制權（DCR）與現金流量權偏離程度愈大，集團企業分子公司績效愈低。 「業務聯結」結構特性之專業集中度（CON）與「公司治理」結構特性之董事會規模（DSIZE）及董事長兼總經理（DUAL）等三項變數之迴歸結果在各種情境下則顯著性不一，未有一致之實證結果，此三項變數對於分子公司當期績效之影響難有定論。

The capital market in Taiwan has been growing rapidly. As a result, many large enterprises are developed. Some enterprises not only have a sizable scale themselves, but also go along with several subsidiaries, which are related to the parent company through business strategies and decision-making processes. Together, they formed the so-called “Business Groups”. In addition, along with the acceleration of globalization, the scale of business groups has been growing rapidly. In the long run, business groups will have an significant influence on the government’s annual revenue and the country’s overall development. Therefore, it is important to understand the structural characteristics that affect business groups’ performance. The main purpose of our study is to explore the relationship between the business groups’ structural characteristics and the performance of their member firms. It is our understanding that our study is the first in its class to discuss the influence of structural characteristics of business groups on the performance of their member firms. Structural characteristics refer to structural characteristics of business ties and structural characteristics of corporate governance, while performance refers to accounting performance and capital market performance. The major empirical results of our study are robust, from both the pooled fixed year effects regression and the separate-year regression estimation. Our findings indicate that vertical integration has a positive and significant impact on corporate performance. We also found that high stock collateral ratio from directors results in poor corporate performance. When the control rights of controlling stockholders are measured by the board control rights, the deviation of control rights from cash-flow rights has a positive and significant impact on corporate performance in all scenarios. However, if the control rights are measured by ownership control rights, the impact of the deviation is still positive, but its significance varies with scenarios. As for specialization, size of the board, and the dual role of chairman and general manager, we obtain mixed results about their impact on corporate performance