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| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 孫立群 | |
| dc.contributor.author | wei-lung huang | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 黃偉倫 | zh_TW |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-08T05:33:02Z | - |
| dc.date.copyright | 2005-06-06 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2005 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2005-05-30 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | 1. 干學平、黃春興(1994)《經濟學原理》，新陸書局。
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| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/24607 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | 我國的水資源短缺，亟需水資源管理組織適切的「水資源管理」，所以本論文嘗試以經濟理論分析我國水資源管理組織之問題及解決方案，希望能提供我國政府有效的建議。
為了確立本論文的探討主體，第一章分析水功能循環之所有制，也就是釐清水資源應由誰管理。由第一章結論可知，水功能循環的所有制大多應以公有制管制(政府管制)，所以本論文選擇政府為各章所探討的水資源管理組織。 本論文將水資源管理組織的問題，依中央政府、地方政府及廠商間的互動，歸納為中央政府與地方政府間的代理機制問題、兩地方政府間的協商機制問題及政府與廠商間的配合機制問題等。在代理機制部分，第二章以四個經濟模型探討其問題及解決方案。模型結果證明，水資源管理組織之代理機制問題可能是由於中央政府與地方政府的目標不同及訊息不對稱，且證明「流域管理機構」與「誘因機制」是可能的解決方案。 在協商機制部分，第三章利用兩地方政府協商水資源管理量之合作賽局探討，不同協商機制(中央政府介入與否)對賽局結果的影響。模型結果證明，地方政府會選擇中央政府做代理人協商「跨區域水資源管理」，但協商所得之水資源管理量及社會淨效益較差。因此，本論文建議水資源管理組織的「跨區域水資源管理」協商機制應為外生決定為兩地方政府直接協商。 在廠商配合機制部分，第四章利用廠商自發性提供水污染防治的賽局模型，來了解自發性方案的道德約束對廠商行為的影響。模型結果證明，自發性方案可使廠商間存在一個符合道德評價相同及理性的康德準則(廠商互動的道德約束)－各廠商提供林德爾均衡量，且為柏拉圖效率解。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract | Due to the lack of water resources, an administration organization is needed to manage them appropriately. Therefore, by means of economic theories, the purpose of this study is to discuss some issues and find the solutions for water resources administration organization in Taiwan. It is hoped that this study will provide the government with effective alternatives.
In order to confirm which organization should be discussed, this study started from diagnosing the ownership systems of different stages in water function circulation. Doing so is to clarify which organization should be responsible for managing water resources. According to the conclusion of the first chapter, this study asserted that the public ownership system in which water resources are managed by the government should be adopted at most stages of water function circulation. Thus, the government was considered the administration organization of water resources and discussed in the other chapters. Afterwards, from the participants of water resources management - central authority, local authorities and firms, this study generalized that the issues of the governmental administration organization of water resources are delegation mechanism, negotiation mechanism, and cooperation mechanism with firms, discussing these mechanisms in the following chapters. To analyze delegation mechanism, in ch.2 four economic models were developed to clarify its questions and solutions. The results proved that the problems of delegation mechanism are due to the asymmetrical information and the different objectives between central authority and local authorities. Besides, the study also proved that “basin management organization” and “incentive mechanism” are alternative solutions. To analyze negotiation mechanism, in ch.3 a cooperative game of two local authorities negotiating their quantity of water resource management was set to analyze the influence of two negotiation mechanisms, one involved by central authority and the other not. The results proved that the local authorities prefer the central authority to be the agent negotiating “inter-regional water resource management”, but receive smaller quantity of water resource management and less net social welfare. Thus, this study suggested that negotiation mechanism should be exogenously set and two local authorities should directly negotiate “inter-regional water resource management”. To analyze cooperation mechanism, in ch.4 the game in which firms spontaneously prevent or control water pollution was set to understand how the moral restraint of voluntary agreement influences the behaviors of firms. The results proved that voluntary agreement makes firms agree with the moral restraint of firm interaction, Kantian Maxim, which meets the same moral evaluation and ration assumption. In Kantian Maxim, all firms provide Lindahl equilibrium quantity and Plato efficiency solution. | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-08T05:33:02Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-94-D90627005-1.pdf: 826204 bytes, checksum: 0253f9a9d868eef4d389c47cd3a466f5 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2005 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 目 錄
中文摘要 i 英文摘要 ii 第一章 總論 1–1 第一節 研究緣起 1–1 第二節 文獻回顧 1–4 第三節 水功能循環各階段的最適所有制 1–10 第四節 水之所有制的經濟史觀 1–17 第五節 章節架構 1–19 第二章 水資源管理組織之代理機制 2–1 第一節 緒言 2–1 第二節 文獻回顧 2–3 第三節 水資源管理模型 2–9 第四節 流域管理機構與誘因機制 2–14 第五節 小結 2–19 第三章 水資源管理組織之協商機制 3–1 第一節 緒言 3–1 第二節 協商機制外生的賽局模型 3–4 第三節 協商機制內生的賽局模型 3–13 第四節 小結 3–21 第四章 水資源管理組織之自發性方案 4–1 第一節 緒言 4–1 第二節 政策比較 4–2 第三節 自發性方案的文獻回顧 4–5 第四節 自發性方案的賽局模型 4–8 第五節 小結 4–16 第五章 結論 5–1 註釋 註釋–1 第一章註釋 註釋–1 第二章註釋 註釋–7 第三章註釋 註釋–11 第四章註釋 註釋–12 附錄 附錄–1 第三章附錄 附錄–1 附錄一 不同數學函數對賽局結果之影響 附錄–1 附錄二 地方政府比例增減對中央政府介 入協商之合作解及社會淨效益的 影響 附錄–4 附錄三 地方政府比例增減對中央政府不 介入協商之合作解及社會淨效益 的影響 附錄–8 第四章附錄 附錄–13 附錄四 推論二的證明 附錄–13 附錄五 推論三的證明(證明康德準則 存在於本章賽局) 附錄–14 附錄六 推論四的證明 附錄–16 附錄七 推論五的證明 附錄–17 附錄八 推論六的證明 附錄–19 參考文獻 文獻–1 表 目 錄 表1–1 物質價值的組成 1–9 表1–2 環境和資源階段以不同所有制管制的願 付價值及交易成本 1–11 表1–3 Friedman(2000) 的(農地資源功能)報酬 矩陣 1–12 表1–4 農地的環境功能之報酬矩陣 1–13 表1–5 水在我國各時期各階段的所有制 1–17 表2–1 各國流域管理機構之介紹 2–15 表3–1 內生化協商機制的威脅解 3–15 表3–2 第二階段可能的賽局結果 3–18 表3–3 協商破裂機率外生決定的賽局結果 3–19 表3–4 協商破裂機率內生決定的賽局結果 3–20 表4–1 工廠 i 水污染防治決策的報酬矩陣 4–3 表4–2 工廠 i 與其他所有工廠水污染防治決策 的報酬矩陣 4–10 表5–1 自發性方案設計或執行時應考量之重點 5–4 附錄表1 內生化協商機制的威脅解 ( ) 附錄–2 附錄表2 內生化協商機制的威脅解 ( ) 附錄–3 圖 目 錄 圖1–1 水功能循環圖 1–1 圖1–2 物質性質認定圖 1–4 圖1–3 章節架構圖 1–21 圖2–1 我國水資源管理組織 2–6 圖3–1 中央政府介入協商及中央政府不介入協 商的示意圖 3–6 圖3–2 中央政府介入協商之合作解的示意圖 3–10 圖3–3 中央政府不介入協商之合作解的示意圖 3–11 圖4–1 水污染防治自發性方案賽局的策略平面 圖 4–14 附錄圖1 中央政府介入協商的合作解 (兩地方政府之比例和固定) 附錄–4 附錄圖2 中央政府介入協商的合作解 (某地方政府之比例固定) 附錄–5 附錄圖3 中央政府介入協商的社會淨效益 (兩地方政府之比例和固定) 附錄–6 附錄圖4 中央政府介入協商的社會淨效益 (某地方政府之比例固定) 附錄–7 附錄圖5 中央政府不介入協商的合作解 (兩地方政府之比例和固定) 附錄–8 附錄圖6 中央政府不介入協商的合作解 (某地方政府之比例固定) 附錄–9 附錄圖7 中央政府不介入協商的社會淨效益 (兩地方政府之比例和固定) 附錄–10 附錄圖8 中央政府不介入協商的社會淨效益 (某地方政府之比例固定) 附錄–12 | |
| dc.language.iso | zh-TW | |
| dc.subject | 所有制 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 水資源管理組織 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 自發性方案 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 協商機制 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 代理機制 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | negotiation mechanism | en |
| dc.subject | water resources administration organization | en |
| dc.subject | ownership system | en |
| dc.subject | voluntary agreement | en |
| dc.subject | delegation mechanism | en |
| dc.title | 水資源管理組織的四項經濟議題 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | Four Economic Issues of Water Resources Administration Organization | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 93-2 | |
| dc.description.degree | 博士 | |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 官俊榮,高安邦,汪靜明,莊慶達,楊明憲,魏國棟 | |
| dc.subject.keyword | 所有制,水資源管理組織,自發性方案,協商機制,代理機制, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | delegation mechanism,negotiation mechanism,voluntary agreement,ownership system,water resources administration organization, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 143 | |
| dc.rights.note | 未授權 | |
| dc.date.accepted | 2005-05-30 | |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 生物資源暨農學院 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 農業經濟學研究所 | zh_TW |
| 顯示於系所單位： | 農業經濟學系 | |
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