股權結構、平衡計分卡與企業績效之關聯

Abstract

鑑於以往股權結構與企業績效間關聯性之相關文獻，學者的實證結果至今仍舊無一定論，本論文提出可能係因學者們大都直接針對股權結構與企業績效間之關聯性進行分析，而未考慮公司控管機制間的交互作用。因為企業為求貫徹其公司治理理念，除需訂有明確的發展方向與營運目標外，尚須配合採行平衡計分卡這類策略性績效衡量系統，以協助企業將抽象策略有效轉化為具體行動，否則空有策略而無實做，亦仍徒勞無功。因此，前人研究發現上的分歧，很有可能肇因於其樣本公司策略落實程度的不一致。 為補其不足，本論文之研究主題，便欲探討國內企業的股權結構及董監事股權質押行為等，與平衡計分卡實施程度間之交互作用，是否會對企業績效造成影響。 以台灣地區1,060家上市上櫃公司為研究對象，本論文透過公開資訊取得各樣本公司股權結構及經營績效等資料，並以問卷調查方式蒐集平衡計分卡實施程度之資料，最後獲得95筆有效樣本進行統計分析。研究結論如下： 管理者持股比例與平衡計分卡實施程度之交互作用，與企業績效間存在顯著關聯，而其交互作用之型態，則屬替代性交互作用。當管理者持股比例較低時，平衡計分卡的實施程度提高，將有助企業提升其經營績效；但當管理者持股比例較高時，平衡計分卡的實施程度提高，雖亦有助企業提升其總資產報酬率，惟其增額效益較為有限，且若以股東權益報酬率為績效指標，平衡計分卡的實施程度提高，對企業績效反將帶來不利影響。 至於大股東持股、法人股東持股及董監事股權質押行為等，與平衡計分卡實施程度之交互作用，則未與企業績效間存在顯著關聯。

This thesis examines the interactive effect of ownership structure and the balanced scorecard implementation on firm performance. Prior research investigating the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance appears to provide inconclusive results. A major reason for these mixed findings may be that most empirically based studies focus on the direct relationship between ownership structure and firm performance without considering the interactive effects between various corporate control mechanisms. An effective corporate control requires not only formulation of objectives and strategies but also enforceable implementation of the strategies. Board of directors seems to emphasize more on the former than on the latter. The balanced scorecard has been suggested to provide an enforceable mechanism to implement corporate strategies. Given that corporate control mechanisms do not exist by themselves, we expect an interactive effect of corporate governance mechanism and the balanced scorecard implementation on firm performance. Specifically, the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance may be moderated by the extent to which balanced scorecard is implemented. A moderated regression model containing a product term as an additional independent variable is developed, and the expectations in the model are explored with data collected from the Market Observation Post System (MOPS) and the annual report of listed companies in Taiwan. Meanwhile, a survey with 1,060 listed companies in Taiwan on their usage of balanced scorecard in practice is conducted. The results based on 95 useable responses are as follows: Ownership of insiders (including directors, supervisors and managers) and balanced scorecard implementation have a significant interactive effect on firm performance. When the insiders hold lower proportion of shares, firm performance increases with the implementation of balanced scorecard. On the other hand, when the insiders hold higher proportion of shares, the increase in the balanced scorecard implementation will have a minor favorable impact on ROA, but an unfavorable impact on ROE. As for the large shareholders’ ownership and institutional investors’ ownership, their interactions with balanced scorecard implementation do not have significant effects on firm performance. The interaction between directors and supervisors’ collateralized shares and balanced scorecard implementation does not have significant impacts on firm performance either. Implications and limitations are offered.