市場評價與員工分紅配股之關聯性

Abstract

本文探討市場評價是否為台式員工股票紅利決定因素之ㄧ，審視市場評價如何影響台式員工股票紅利之決策、發放數量及發放價值，更進一步檢視員工股票紅利在高階經理人與一般員工間之分派情形，以及外部專業投資人對決策之可能影響。 實證結果發現，公司在受到市場高估時，一般而言將傾向於採行員工股票紅利制度，並傾向於發放較多的員工股票紅利；再者，基於自利之觀點，高階經理人在公司受到市場高估時，會傾向於發放較高之比例予自身；而在外部專業投資人的監控下，採行員工股票紅利之決策將受到抑制。本文結果亦支持員工股票紅利可能為一出售高估權益之方式。

This thesis investigates a market-valuation-based hypothesis for employee stock grant. It examines how market valuation has affected the decision to grant employee stocks, the amount of stocks granted, and the value of stocks granted. It also examines the distribution of stocks among executives and rank-and-file employees and the influence that professional investors might have on employee stock grant decision. The empirical evidence shows that firms with high market valuation are more likely to adopt employee stock grants and grant more stocks to their employees. Furthermore, top executives tend to grant a larger portion of stocks to themselves relative to rank-and-file employees when they perceive the current market valuation is high. Under th monitoring of professional investors, the possibility of adopting employee stock grant is diminished. This thesis also support that employee stock grant can be used as a method to sell overvalued equity.