德性語意學

Abstract

在當代，語言哲學家對於語言能力之說明，主要採取的是一種「語言能力之意義理論說」（meaning-theoretic account of linguistic competence），主張語言能力根植於說話者隱含地知道一套形式化、系統性的意義理論或是語意規則，例如戴維森式（Davidsonian）意義理論。在此觀點下，哲學家試圖進一步指出這種隱含知識（implicit or tacit knowledge）的起源、性質、以及如何被使用。在這篇論文中，我試圖指出這樣的語言能力觀點是錯的，並進一步以詮釋德性（interpretative virtues）作為分析語言能力、語言溝通，以及語言理解的核心概念。這樣的一套語言哲學理論，我稱之為「德性語意學」（virtue semantics），或稱為「以行為者為本的語意理解理論」（agent-based theory of linguistic understanding）。 在第一章中，我說明為何語言能力之擁有需要一套關於意義理論的隱含性知識。第二章至第四章，我分析隱含性知識的兩種主要說明方式：一是達美特（Michael Dummett）的展示論說明（manifestationist construal），另一是以皮卡克（Christopher Peacocke）等人為主的心理實在論說明（psychologically realistic construal）。我將指出這兩種說明都有其難以克服的困難。緊接著在第五章，我論證上述兩種說明所面臨的難題並不只是在實踐上，更重要的是在原則上，它們假定了一套錯誤的語言能力說。我將論證，知道一套關於某語言的意義理論，並非是懂得此語言的充分必要條件。在第六章，我轉向分析放棄語言能力之意義理論說之後的另一可能理論：非建基於規則的語言能力說（non-rule-based theories of linguistic competence），並提出一個我稱之為The Humpty-Dumpty Problem來此質疑上述理論的說明能力。我建議以德性進路解決此一問題；此即引入德性語意學的重要關鍵。第七章即是德性語意學之理論基礎建構。我將說明德性語意學之主要想法、性質、內容、優點；最後，從德性語意學的角度重新檢視語言知識之構成。在第八章結論中，我簡要地為德性語意學在各家意義理論中做一定位，並回應德性語意學將如何回答「何謂意義？」此一哲學問題。

It is widely held in contemporary philosophy of language and linguistics that linguistic competence requires knowledge of a formal semantical theory, such as a Davidsonian truth-conditional semantics or a Chomskyan linguistic theory. Call this received view the meaning-theoretic account of linguistic competence. The primary task of the account is to tell us what knowledge of language consists in, or to put it more accurately, to characterize the epistemic relation mediated between the contents of a formal semantical theory for a natural language and a competent speaker of the language. Various characterizations of such epistemic relation—or, various construals of implicit or tacit knowledge of language—have emerged, but there is little agreement as to what construal should be taken. This dissertation is about the role of implicit or tacit knowledge of language in both the construction of natural language semantics and the explanation of linguistic competence, communication, and understanding. I argue that the direction of analysis of knowledge of language should be changed: it is misguided to try to figure out what a speaker’s implicit or tacit knowledge of language is, if the aim of the analysis is to explain the notions of linguistic competence, verbal communication, and language understanding. This is because a speaker’s implicit or tacit knowledge does not play any constitutive role in the explanation of various aspects of language (especially the creative and rational aspects of language), but is merely an epiphenomenon of speaking a language. In turn, I propose what I call the virtue-theoretic theory of meaning and language (virtue semantics), which takes “interpretative virtue” as the central notion in the study of language. The dissertation is constituted of two parts. Part I, including Chapters 2 to 4, is a critique of metalinguistic knowledge constitutivism, the view that an actual speaker’s (implicit or tacit) knowledge of formal semantics constitutes the speaker’s linguistic competence. Part II is the argument(s) for the shift of the direction of the analysis of knowledge of language (Chapters 5-6) and the construction of virtue semantics (Chapters 7-8). In Chapter 1, “Introduction: Semantics and Speakers’ Knowledge”, I intend to form a framework for the discussion in this dissertation. I shall explain in what sense formal semantics must relate to linguistic competence and hence linguistic knowledge. I then distinguish two kinds of linguistic knowledge (thin linguistic knowledge and metalinguistic knowledge) and show a competition between three major positions on metalinguistic knowledge, which I shall call metalinguistic knowledge skepticism, constitutivism (including epistemicism and cognitivism), and instrumentalism. In Chapter 2, “Implicit Knowledge and Manifestation: Dummett’s Notion of Knowledge of Language”, I examine Dummett’s manifestationist construal of implicit knowledge. Dummett’s position on knowledge of language is peculiar among constitutivists for (a) his imposing constraints on a construal of knowledge of language (i.e., knowledge of language cannot be purely theoretical, purely practical, and unconscious), and (b) his blunt refusal of any psychological construal of knowledge of language such as Chomsky’s. I reconstruct Dummett’s arguments for the constraints on an adequate construal of knowledge of language, and explore his own construal of knowledge of language. Although Dummett’s construal can meet the constraints, I argue that the very construal fails to be a constitutive one. The failure of Dummett’s metalinguistic knowledge epistemicism, I suggest, opens room for meta- linguistic knowledge cognitivism. In Chapter 3, “Tacit Knowledge and Computation: Psychologically Realistic Meaning-Theories”, I focus on Peacocke’s construal of tacit knowledge. Peacocke’s construal is based upon a computational theory of mind, or a Marrian explanation of cognition. I try to undermine Peacocke’s construal by criticizing the very notion “computation”. I examine the issue whether a subpersonal computational state can be a mental state which is defined in terms of intentionality in a Searlean sense. This issue, however, brings us to another intricate issue whether a subpersonal computational state can be a mental state because it has subdoxastic content, a kind of nonconceptual content. I leave this issue in the succeeding chapter. In Chapter 4, “Explanation and Rationality: What Sort of Action Explanation Should We Seek?”, it is argued that subpersonal computational states have nothing to do with a reason-giving explanation of linguistic behavior. The issue left in Chapter 3 makes philosophers struggle to settle the problem whether subdoxastic content is genuine, or merely as-if (or metaphorical). I think their struggle misses the point, and argue that, no matter whether subdoxastic content is genuine or not, such kind of content makes no constitutive contribution to the realm of reasons. In Chapter 5, “Communication and Interpretation: Davidson’s ‘A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs’”, it is argued that the failure of metalinguistic knowledge constitutivism is not in practice, but in principle. I formulate Davidson’s thesis in his 1986 paper as the Dispensability Thesis, that is, knowledge of a formal semantical theory is neither necessary nor sufficient for linguistic competence and communication. The thesis, if correct, disproves the meaning-theoretic account of linguistic competence, and then undermines the philosophical significance of pursuing an adequate construal of knowledge of language. Several philosophers suspect that there is a conflict between Davidson’s thesis in “A Nice Derangement” and his early truth-conditional semantic programme, the conflict between the Wittgensteinian Davidson and the Tarskian Davidson. I argue that there is no need to abandon the Dispensability Thesis due to this irreconcilable conflict. In Chapter 6, “Non-Rule-Based Theories of Meaning and Language: Towards and Beyond”, it is argued that the virtue-theoretic analysis of linguistic behavior is required. I first formulate Davidson’s latter account of linguistic competence as the non-rule-governed account of linguistic competence, and then propose a problem, the Humpty Dumpty Problem, for it. I suggest solving the problem by analyzing a speaker’s character trait, or a speaker’s interpretative virtue, by which I mean “a stable disposition of the mind that originates from the general motivation for linguistic communication and reliable success in attaining the ends of these motives”. In Chapter 7, “Virtue Semantics: Foundations and an Application”, I develop my own version of virtue semantics, both at the methodological level (i.e., exploring the general idea and nature of virtue semantics) and the level of theory construction (including identifying the components of interpretive virtues, introducing the varieties of interpretative virtues, and organizing interpretive virtues into a hierarchy). In the last section of this chapter, I return to the problem that began this whole discussion: what does knowledge of language consist in? I try to view the problem from a virtue-semantic perspective. In the final chapter, “Conclusion: Locating Virtue Semantics”, I try to dispel a possible doubt about how virtue semantics can deal with the question of what meaning is by showing the scope—or limit—of virtue semantics.