共同零售通路下，雙佔製造商選擇產業廣告與品牌廣告的誘因差異探討

Abstract

本研究旨在探討共同零售通路中，品牌力量大小不同的雙佔製造商的廣告最適策略。強勢製造商相較於弱勢製造商有較強的品牌廣告力，並有較多的忠誠顧客。市場當中存在兩製造商的忠誠顧客與游移顧客。製造商可以透過執行產業廣告吸引新的游移顧客來擴大市場規模，或是執行品牌廣告使部份游移顧客轉變為忠誠顧客。首先，由製造商選擇完廣告策略後，再由零售商制定兩產品的零售價格，最終利潤的分配根據廠商對總通路利潤的邊際貢獻與議價能力而定。 我們採用Hotelling 模型得到以下重要結果：(一) 當強勢製造商執行品牌廣告時，除了強勢製造商自身利潤提升外，整體通路利潤與對手的利潤皆提升；當弱勢製造商執行品牌廣告，整體通路利潤、對手利潤、零售商利潤皆下降；(二) 當廣告成本小且產業廣告吸引的人數不夠多時，在均衡時強勢製造商執行品牌廣告而弱勢製造商執行產業廣告；然而，隨著產業廣告吸引的人數增加且廣告成本較高時，強勢製造商在預期對手執行品牌廣告時，選擇執行產業廣告來擴大市場；(三) 當消費者對於產品的願付價格越高，製造商執行品牌廣告的誘因越強。

This paper analyzes the optimal advertising strategies for duopolistic manufacturers with brands of different powers in a common retailer channel. We consider a market consists of two segments of consumers who are loyal to the two manufacturers respectively and a segment of switchers whose ideal points are uniformly distributed over a line with the two manufacturers’ products located at the two end points. The two manufacturers can choose whether to conduct generic advertising or brand advertising. Generic advertising can expand the whole market, while brand advertising can help a manufacturer convert some fraction of switchers into its loyal customers. Assuming the leading manufacturer has a larger loyal base and a stronger brand than the weaker manufacturer, we find the following results: (i) Brand advertising conducted by the leading manufacturer can increase both the channel profit and the two manufacturers’ profit. However, brand advertising conducted by the weaker manufacturer reduces the channel profit and the retailer’s profit. (ii) Generic advertising conducted by either manufacturer can increase the profits of its rival and the retailer. (iii) When consumers’ willingness-to-pay is high, manufacturers have higher incentives to conduct brand advertising.