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| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 王大維(Ta-Wei Wang) | |
| dc.contributor.author | Chia-Jung Cho | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 卓佳蓉 | zh_TW |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-08T05:06:58Z | - |
| dc.date.copyright | 2011-07-18 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2011 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2011-06-28 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | 丁秀儀，2009，公司治理是否受到機構投資人的青睞，管理學報，第26卷第3期：233-253
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| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/23668 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | 本研究探討在資訊不對稱下，董事會組成對投資效率之影響。本研究透過資訊不對稱較為嚴重之家族企業及高科技產業公司，分析在資訊不對稱下所產生之代理問題及環境不確定性，其董事會功能將如何在代理理論及資源依賴理論之下幫助企業制定投資決策。實證結果顯示，相對非家族企業，家族企業董事席次愈多，愈能減緩投資無效率、有外部（獨立）董事及機構投資人持股情形則無法減緩投資無效率、家族企業董事兼任經理人及董事長兼任總經理，則與投資無效率存有關連性。相對傳統產業公司，高科技產業公司董事席次愈多，愈無法減緩投資無效率、有外部（獨立）董事較能減緩投資無效率、董事兼任經理人及董事長兼任總經理，則與投資無效率存有關連性、機構投資人持股時能減緩投資不足，但無法減緩過度投資問題。本研究建議企業在選任董事時應考量其所能提供企業之董事會資本，而非僅考慮董事監督能力，應能幫助企業提高制定投資效率，並增加企業績效。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract | This paper examines the association between board composition and investment inefficiency given the level of information asymmetry. Building on the agency theory and resource dependence theory, we empirically investigate how the board composition is associated with over- and under-investment for family and high-tech firms. Our results show that board size, percentage of independent directors, institutional ownership and board duality （or CEO duality） would affect investment efficiency from the perspective of resource provision. Our results shed light on how firms should hire competent directors to improve the firm’s investment decisions. | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-08T05:06:58Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-100-R98722032-1.pdf: 615957 bytes, checksum: cabacb1931d86c44ec0a3f3df825ee8f (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 謝辭 i
摘要 ii Abstract iii 目錄 iv 表目錄 v 壹、 緒論 1 貳、 文獻回顧與假說發展 4 第一節 企業投資效率 4 第二節 董事會組成之代理理論及資源依賴理論探討 7 第三節 假說發展 10 參、 研究設計 21 第一節 研究資料 21 第二節 研究方法 25 肆、 實證結果與分析 43 第一節 迴歸結果 43 第二節 增強測試 59 伍、 結論 79 參考文獻 81 表一 樣本年度及產業別分析表 23 表二 變數彙整表 31 表三 敘述性統計量－全部樣本 34 表四 敘述性統計量－家族與非家族企業（FAMILY1） 35 表五 敘述性統計量－家族與非家族企業（FAMILY2） 37 表六 敘述性統計量－高科技產業與傳統產業公司 39 表七 相關係數表 42 表八 全部樣本下董事結構與投資無效率關係之迴歸結果 46 表八之一 全部樣本下董事結構與投資無效率迴歸結果－過度或投資不足 47 表九 家族與非家族企業（FAMILY1）董事結構與投資無效率關係迴歸結果 50 表十 家族與非家族企業（FAMILY2）董事結構與投資無效率關係迴歸結果 52 表十一 高科技與傳統產業公司董事結構與投資無效率關係之迴歸結果 57 表十二 家族與非家族企業機構投資人持股小於20%之迴歸結果 61 表十三 家族與非家族企業機構投資人持股20%至45%之迴歸結果 62 表十四 家族與非家族企業機構投資人持股大於45%之迴歸結果 63 表十五 高科技與傳統產業公司機構投資人持股小於20%之迴歸結果 65 表十六 高科技與傳統產業公司機構投資人持股20%至45%之迴歸結果 66 表十七 高科技與傳統產業公司機構投資人持股大於45%之迴歸結果 67 表十八 家族與非家族企業政府未持股之迴歸結果 69 表十九 家族與非家族企業政府持股之迴歸結果 70 表二十 高科技與傳統產業公司政府未持股之迴歸結果 72 表二十一 高科技與傳統產業公司政府持股之迴歸結果 73 表二十二 家族與非家族企業考量審計品質之迴歸結果 76 表二十三 高科技與傳統產業公司考量審計品質之迴歸結果 77 | |
| dc.language.iso | zh-TW | |
| dc.title | 從資訊不對稱論析董事會組成對投資效率之影響 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | The Effects of Board Composition on Investment Efficiency under Information Asymmetry | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 99-2 | |
| dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 林嬋娟,詹凌菁 | |
| dc.subject.keyword | 資訊不對稱,投資無效率,家族企業,高科技產業,董事會組成,代理理論,資源依賴理論, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | Information asymmetry,Investment inefficiency,Family firm,High-tech industry,Board of directors,Agency theory,Resource dependence theory, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 94 | |
| dc.rights.note | 未授權 | |
| dc.date.accepted | 2011-06-28 | |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 會計學研究所 | zh_TW |
| 顯示於系所單位： | 會計學系 | |
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