新金融秩序下金融控股公司監理法制之再建構

Abstract

金融商品創新之速度日新月異，傳統銀行、證券、保險之金融商品區隔亦日益模糊，創造出多元整合性金融商品及衍生性金融商品。若限制銀行兼營其他金融業務或過度隔離，不僅造成金融機構經營缺乏效率，亦無法滿足客戶之金融服務需求，於國際競爭上處於不利之地位。然金融機構採取綜合銀行、金融控股公司等方式跨業經營時，於金融業者之大型化及集團化下，此種經營亦伴隨風險增加。 穩定而健全之金融機構係經濟成長之基礎，因良好之金融機構，能使金融市場發揮其機能，而金融機構之良莠，其有賴於金融機構之自律與監理。出現金融控股公司後，雖其對金融服務業爭取綜效及業務範圍帶來新契機，然而跨業經營亦隱藏著過去未曾深入探討之風險領域，其逸脫現行機構別之監理架構，對金融監理機關之有效監理構成實質上挑戰。由於法律及市場環境之變化，導致金融控股公司對金融市場衝擊與日俱增，為健全金融體系、建構穩定並具競爭力之金融市場，如何在新金融秩序下，尋求一妥適之監理機制，厥為重要，本論文之目的在於分析比較金融控股公司之監理機制，冀尋求一適切之監理架構。 本論文之架構先就總論性質部份，探討金融監理法制之新趨勢、金融控股公司之概念與類型、各國金融機構跨業經營法制之新發展、金融控股公司之風險，以及對金融控股公司之監理法制進行經濟分析。 次就各論性質部份，探討金融控股公司各種監理面向，包括金融控股公司之防火牆，說明外部防火牆與內部防火牆，並探討相關法制。以及金融控股公司之財務監理，說明財務監理中最重要之資本適足性與轉投資規範，另探討金融控股公司之業務監理，就金融控股之前場共同行銷、後場共同行銷所涉及之法律爭點加以探討。以及金融控股公司之人事監理，就金融控股公司之薪酬制度、人事任用、兼任禁止、競業禁止規範等加以探討。 最後提出結論以2008年金融海嘯事件為主軸，說明該事件對金融控股公司監理法制之衝擊，再綜合前開各章論述提出結論。

The innovation of financial product changes rapidly, the boundary between traditional bank, securities and insurances are getting blurred, and this urges the creation of multiple-integration and derivative financial product. As if there is a restriction upon banks not to run other financial business or over-isolated, this not only causes ineffective operation of financial institution, but also unable to satisfy customer’s needs on financial service, which will put it in a disadvantaged position in international competition. However, if financial institution adopts cross-industry business of universal bank and financial holding company, such operation is also associated with increased risk during its process of expansion and grouping. Stable and strong financial institution is the foundation of economic growth as a good financial institution allows financial market to exert its function and it’s good and bad is based on self-discipline and supervision of itself. Though the emerge of financial holding company brings new opportunity to financial service business to strive for synergy and business scope, cross-industry business still hides risk that never has been discussed in-depth before. It is out of the boundary of contemporary financial institution’s supervision, which brings real challenge to financial supervision institution’s effective supervision. Because of the change of regulation and market, this leads to financial holding company to cause increasing impact to financial market. To secure a robust financial system and construct a stable and competitive financial market, it becomes important to seek a proper supervision system under new financial order. The purpose of this thesis is to analyze and compare the supervision system of financial holding company and seek a proper supervising structure. Starting from the general remarks based on the structure of this thesis, we discuss new trend of financial legal supervision, the concept and category of financial holding company, the new development of worldwide financial institution’s cross-industry operation legal system, the risk of financial holding company, and conduct economic analysis of financial holding company’s supervision legal system. Secondly, this paper discusses all faces of supervision of financial holding company, including financial holding company’s firewall, and we explain the external and internal firewall and discuss its related legal system. We also discuss financial holding company’s financial supervision, explaining the most important adequacy of capital in it and specification of reinvestment. Besides, we also discuss business supervision of financial holding company, and investigate in debate of regulation involving former co-marketing field and back co-marketing field. Also we investigate the personnel management of financial holding company in the following area of its pay system, personnel appointment, ban on concurrent post, and non-compete specification. Finally we conclude the 2008 financial crisis as the main focus to explain its impact to financial holding company’s supervision legal system and sum up with previous chapters to provide a conclusion.