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| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 許文馨(Wen-Hsin Hsu) | |
| dc.contributor.author | " Chih-Ying,Liao" | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 廖芝瑩 | zh_TW |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-08T04:50:34Z | - |
| dc.date.copyright | 2009-07-28 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2009 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2009-07-27 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | Abbott, L. J., S. Parker, G. F. Peters. 2002. “Audit committee characteristics and financial misstatement- a study of the efficacy of certain blue ribbon committee recommendations.” Working Paper.
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| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/23265 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | 摘要
本研究係探討台商投資大陸之複雜度與其盈餘品質之關聯性及台灣政府所設的投資大陸限額規定是否會減緩公司盈餘管理之情況。 兩岸間特殊之政治關係增加台商投資大陸部分之不透明及資訊不對稱性，因此本研究預期台商之投資大陸複雜度與其盈餘品質呈現負相關。本研究亦預期台灣政府對台商投資大陸上限的監督可以減緩投資大陸與盈餘品質間之負向關係。 實證結果發現投資大陸複雜度與盈餘品質呈現負相關，顯示投資大陸複雜度越高的公司越有空間去做盈餘操控；實證結果亦發現投資大陸限額規定減緩投資大陸和盈餘品質的負向關係，確實發揮其監督功能。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract | The thesis would like to examine the association between investments in China and earnings quality and whether the upper limit on investment in China set by Taiwanese government can alleviate earnings management.
I argue that Taiwanese firms investing in China will increase opaque and information asymmetry because of the political tensions between China and Taiwan and those firms are likely to have higher discretionary accruals and lower earnings quality. I also hypothesize that the regulation of upper limit on the amount of investment in China by Taiwanese government can mitigate the negative relationship between earnings quality and investment in china. Consistent with my hypothesis, I find that the intensity of investment in China is negatively related to earnings quality. I also find that the upper limit on investment in China mitigate the negative association between investment in China and earnings quality. | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-08T04:50:34Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-98-R96722040-1.pdf: 580624 bytes, checksum: 9edf7aa723e66f5edc476ff4cde2e054 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 口試委員審定書 i
誌謝 ii 摘要 iii Abstract iv Content v Tables vii 1 INTRODUCTION 1 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 4 2.1 Earnings Management and Agency Problem 4 2.1.1 Earnings Management and contracting 4 2.1.2 Estimation of discretionary accruals 6 2.2 Agency problem and investments 10 2.2.1 Organizational Complexity 10 2.2.2 Organization Structure of Investment in Different Countries 13 3 INSTITUTION 16 3.1 Politics 16 3.2 History of Economic Policy Toward Mainland China 17 3.3 Current Economic Policy Toward Mainland China 20 4 HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENTS 22 4.1 Investments in China and Earnings Quality 22 4.2 Upper limit on investment in China 23 5 RESEARCH DESIGN 25 5.1 Sample selection 25 5.2 Measures of Earnings Quality：Discretionary Accrual 25 5.3 Regression Model 26 5.3.1 Model 1：Investment in China and Earnings Quality 26 5.3.2 Model 2：Upper limit on investment in China and Earnings Management 28 6 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 30 6.1 Descriptive Statistics 30 6.2 Correlation 30 6.3 Empirical Results for Hypothesis 1. 32 6.4 Empirical Results for Hypothesis 2. 33 7 Additional Tests 35 7.1 Control for Corporate Governance 35 8 CONCLUSION 38 REFERENCE 39 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | |
| dc.subject | 投資大陸 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 資訊不對稱 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 盈餘品質 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 裁決性應計數 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 投資大陸上限規定 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | Information asymmetry | en |
| dc.subject | Discretionary accruals | en |
| dc.subject | Earnings quality | en |
| dc.title | 投資大陸與盈餘管理之關聯性研究 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | Investment in China and Earnings Quality | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 97-2 | |
| dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 杜榮瑞(Rong-Ruey Duh),王韶濱(Shao-Pin Wang) | |
| dc.subject.keyword | 盈餘品質,裁決性應計數,資訊不對稱,投資大陸,投資大陸上限規定, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | Earnings quality,Discretionary accruals,Information asymmetry, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 55 | |
| dc.rights.note | 未授權 | |
| dc.date.accepted | 2009-07-28 | |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 會計學研究所 | zh_TW |
| 顯示於系所單位： | 會計學系 | |
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