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完整後設資料紀錄
DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.advisor | 郭震坤 | |
dc.contributor.author | Wei-Wen Lin | en |
dc.contributor.author | 林韋玟 | zh_TW |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-08T04:29:40Z | - |
dc.date.copyright | 2010-02-04 | |
dc.date.issued | 2010 | |
dc.date.submitted | 2010-01-16 | |
dc.identifier.citation | 一、中文文獻
1.林宛瑩、許崇源,2008,「臺灣集團企業之控股型態及公司治理衡量指標之研究與建」議,交大管理學報28(1),269-312 2.許崇源、李怡宗、林宛瑩、鄭桂蕙,2003,「控制權與盈餘分配權偏離之衡量(上)」,貨幣觀測與信用評等42,15-31 3.許崇源、李怡宗、林宛瑩、鄭桂蕙,2003,「控制權與盈餘分配權偏離之衡量(下)」,貨幣觀測與信用評等43,11-26 4.高蘭芬、陳振遠、李焮慈,2006,「資訊透明度及席次控制權與現金流量權偏離對公司績效之影響-以台灣電子業為例」,臺灣管理學刊6(2),81-104 二、英文文獻 1.Agrawal, A., and G. N., Mandelker, 1990, “Large Shareholders and the Monitoring ofManagers: The Case of Antitakeover Charter Amendments.” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 25, 143-161. 2.Bolton, P., and Ernst-Ludwig Von Thadden, 1998,”Blocks, liquidity and corporate control,” Journal of Finance 53, 1-25. 3.Berle, Adolf and Gardiner Means, 1932,” The Modern Corporation and Private Property,” Macmillan, New York, N.Y. 4.Claessens,s., Djankov, and L.H.P. Lang, 1999, “Who Controls East Asian Corporations?,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, No. 2054. 5.Claessens, S., S. Djankov, and L. H. P. Lang, 2000, “The separation of ownership and control in East Asian Corporations,” Journal of Financial Economics 58, 81-112. 6.Claessens, S., S. Djankov, and L. H. P. Lang, 2002, “Disentangling the incentive and entrenchment effects of large shareholdings,” Journal of Finance 57, 2741-2771. 7.Demsetz, H., 1983, “The structure of ownership and the theory of the firm,” Journal of Law and Economics 26, 375-390. 8.Demsetz, H., and K. Lehn, 1985, “The structure of corporate ownership: Causes and consequences,” Journal of Political Economy 93, 1155-1177. 9.Edwards, J. and K. Fisher, 1994,”Banks, Finance and Investment in West Germany since 1970,” Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, U.K. 10.Faccio, M., & Lang, L.H.P., 2002,”The ultimate ownership of Western European corporations,” Journal of Financial Economics, 653, 365-395. 11.Holderness and Sheehan, 1988, “the Role of Majority Shareholders in Publicly held Corporations”, Journal o Financial Economics 20, 317-346. 12.Jensen and W.H. Meckling, 1976,”Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure,” Journal of Financial Economics 3, 305-360. 13.Jensen, Michael C. and Jerold B. Warner, 1988,'The Distribution of Power among Corporate Managers, Shareholders, and Directors,' Journal of Financial Economics 20, 3-24. 14.Jensen, Michael C., 1989,'Eclipse of the Public Corporation,' Harvard Business Review 67, 61-74. 15.Kang, J.K., Shivdasani, A., 1995,”Firm performance, corporate governance. And top executive turnover in Japan,” Journal of Financial Economics 38, 29-58. 16.Lanfeng Kao, Jeng-Ren Chiou and Anlin Chen, 2004,” The Agency Problems, Firm Performance and Monitoring Mechanisms: The Evidence from Collateralized Shares in Taiwan”, Corporate Governance: An International Review 12, 389-402. 17.La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A. Vishny, R., 1998,” Law and finance,” Journal of Political Economy 106, 1113-1155. 18.La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer A., 1999, “Corporate Ownership around the world”, Journal of Finance 54, 471-517. 19.La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R., 2002, Investor protection and corporate valuation. Journal of Finance 57, 1147-1170. 20.Lehn, K., J. Netter, and A. Poulsen, 1990, Consolidating corporate control: Dual-class recapitalizations versus leveraged buyouts”, Journal of Financial economics 27, 557-580. 21.Lucian Aye Bebchuk, Reinier Kraakman, George Triantis, 1999,”Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership and Dual Class Equity: The Mechanisms and Agency Costs of Separating Control From Cash-Flow Rights,” Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No.6951 22.Morck, R., A. Shleifer, and R.W. Vishny, 1988, “Management ownership and market valuation: an empirical analysis,” Journal of Financial Economics 20, 293-315. 23.Morck, R., D. Strangeland, and B. Yeung, 2000,” Inherited Wealth, Corporate Control, and Economic Growth, in Concentrated Corporate Ownership,” Randall Morck, Ed., (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press), 319-369. 24.Prowse, Stephen, 1992, “The structure of corporate ownership in Japan,” Journal of Finance47, 1121 - 1140. 25.Shleifer, A., R. W. Vishny, 1986, Large Shareholders and Corporate Control. Journal of Political Economy 94, 461-488. 26.Shleifer, A., R. W. Vishny, 1997,”A survey of corporate governance,” Journal of Finance 52, 737-783. 27.Yeh, Yin-Hua and Lee, Tsun-Siou, 2001, “Family Control and Corporate Governance: Evidence from Taiwan” International Review of Finance 2, 21 -48. | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/22825 | - |
dc.description.abstract | 本研究分析企業股權結構對公司價值的影響。Berle與Means(1932)文中指出公司股權大多分散在各個小股東之間。其後,多數研究都假設公司所有權是分散在眾多小股東的手中。但是最近的研究顯示,公司的所有權常常集中在一位或是少數幾位的股東手中。當股權集中時,大股東會比較有能力與動機去監控管理階層,避免經理人做出對公司不利的行為,這些因素可能提升公司價值。但是,伴隨著股東手中的控制權越來越大,控制股東極有可能利用自己手中的權力為自己謀取私利,挪用公司資產,犧牲其他股東權益,導致公司價值下降。因此本研究利用臺灣上市公司股權資料來分析此種存在大小股東之間的代理問題。
本研究以2007年的臺灣上市公司做為研究對象,進行相關研究。對於股東的所有權,以現金流量權來衡量:在控制權衡量上,在除了使用傳統的股份控制權之外,還加入國內學者建議的席次控制權。 實證結果發現臺灣上市公司多屬於家族控制公司,股權分散者屬於少數。公司價值會隨著控制股東手中掌握的現金流量權增加而增加,符合正向誘因效果;但是公司價值也會因為控制股東手中的控制權與現金流量權的偏離程度擴大而降低,符合負面侵佔效果。 | zh_TW |
dc.description.abstract | This thesis analyzes the effect of ownership structure on firm value. A large number of studies reveal that ownership is concentrated on the hands of a single or a few shareholders, in contrast to the assumption of Berle and Means (1932) of widely dispersed ownership. Big shareholders have strong incentives to oversee managers and maximize the firm value. This is called the positive incentive effect. However, with control right concentration, the large shareholder may use their power to expropriate small shareholders. Thus the firm value may decline. The risk of expropriation of small shareholders by big shareholders is a vital agency problem in many countries. This is called negative entrenchment effect
The data on ownership structures of publicly traded corporations in Taiwan are used for study. This result show that most of Taiwan listed companies are ownership concentrated and controlled by a small group of individuals or family. Firm value increases with cash-flow right in the hands of controlling shareholders. This result is consistent with positive incentive effect. Large deviation of control from ownership rights lowers firm value. This result is consistent with negative entrenchment effect. | en |
dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-08T04:29:40Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-99-R96724004-1.pdf: 866842 bytes, checksum: 02794343fdc3d30e762601ba26fcbb10 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010 | en |
dc.description.tableofcontents | 謝辭 I
中文摘要 II Abstract III 第一章 緒論 1 第一節 研究動機與目的 1 第二節 研究流程與架構 5 第二章 文獻探討 7 第一節 公司治理 7 第二節 股權結構—股權集中 11 第三節 現金流量權與控制權衡量指標 20 第三章 研究方法 25 第一節 研究假說 25 第二節 研究對象、期間與資料來源 27 第三節 控制權與現金流量權之衡量 28 第四節 變數定義與模型建立 40 第四章 實證結果與分析 46 第一節 基本敘述統計分析 46 第二節 迴歸模型實證結果分析 55 第五章 結論與研究建議 63 第一節 實證結果與結論 63 第二節 研究建議 67 第三節 研究限制 68 參考文獻 70 附錄一 73 | |
dc.language.iso | zh-TW | |
dc.title | 企業股權結構對公司價值的影響 | zh_TW |
dc.title | The effect of ownership structure on firm value | en |
dc.type | Thesis | |
dc.date.schoolyear | 98-1 | |
dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 雷立芬,李志偉 | |
dc.subject.keyword | 控制權,現金流量權,控制股東,股權結構, | zh_TW |
dc.subject.keyword | control right,cash-flow right,controlling shareholder,ownership structure, | en |
dc.relation.page | 77 | |
dc.rights.note | 未授權 | |
dc.date.accepted | 2010-01-18 | |
dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.author-dept | 國際企業學研究所 | zh_TW |
顯示於系所單位: | 國際企業學系 |
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