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| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 湯明哲 | |
| dc.contributor.author | Chi-Ting Su | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 蘇祺婷 | zh_TW |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-08T04:28:48Z | - |
| dc.date.copyright | 2010-02-04 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2010 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2010-01-27 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | Alchian, A. and H. Demsetz (1972). 'Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization.' American Economic Review 62: 777-795.
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| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/22803 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | 本研究藉由一個台灣的休閒茶飲連鎖公司個案，結合代理理論與產權理論探討連鎖店經營時面對快速成長與品質管理的兩難選擇。本研究指出，定位在高品質的連鎖系統較常採用內部培養的經理人，作為主要的成長資源，因為內部培養的經理人/店長有助於整個連鎖系統的品質維繫，也有助於新產品的開發，使整體連鎖系統在面對市場不斷快速變化的過程中，仍然可以持續保有競爭力。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract | This study proposes that the units owned by the franchisor incubate new outlet managers that are critical resources of franchise growth when the franchised system is positioned on high quality and faced with volatile consumer demands. The economic agency or property-rights arguments for franchising are market-oriented (Lafontaine and Slade 2007), and the early managerial studies on franchising either separate the roles of resources and incentive alignment (Combs and Ketchen Jr 1999; Combs and Ketchen Jr 1999), or emphasize only financial resources (Kaufmann and Dant 1996; Combs and Ketchen Jr 1999). This research discusses how the internally developed managerial resources incorporated with incentive design influence the growth of franchised systems. | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-08T04:28:48Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-99-R93724004-1.pdf: 1167647 bytes, checksum: bd401cec639005e373b6c321b14f0f52 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | I. Introduction 5
II. Theoretical Framework and Propositions 7 III. Methodology 18 IV. Case: Come Buy 19 V. Conclusion 42 VI. Reference 44 VII. Appendix 46 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | |
| dc.subject | 成長資源 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 連鎖系統 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 休閒茶飲產業 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 代理理論 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 產權理論 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | Franchising | en |
| dc.subject | growth | en |
| dc.subject | property right theory | en |
| dc.subject | agency theory | en |
| dc.subject | Takeaway tea shop industry | en |
| dc.title | 休閒茶飲連鎖店的成長資源選擇 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | The Choice of Take-away Tea shop's Growth Resources | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 98-1 | |
| dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 吳學良,陳俊忠 | |
| dc.subject.keyword | 連鎖系統,休閒茶飲產業,代理理論,產權理論,成長資源, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | Franchising,Takeaway tea shop industry,agency theory,property right theory,growth, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 42 | |
| dc.rights.note | 未授權 | |
| dc.date.accepted | 2010-01-27 | |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 國際企業學研究所 | zh_TW |
| 顯示於系所單位： | 國際企業學系 | |
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|---|---|---|---|
| ntu-99-1.pdf 未授權公開取用 | 1.14 MB | Adobe PDF |
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