公司投資決策與高階經理人過度自信之關聯性研究

Abstract

過去文獻探討管理者過度自信與公司投資決策之間的關聯性，並證實高階經理人的過度自信可以解釋公司投資扭曲的現象。依據Campbell, Johnson, Rutherford, and Stanley (2009) 的方法，本研究將以修正過的代理變數來衡量管理者的過度自信，並再次檢視高階經理人過度自信與公司投資對現金流量敏感度之間的關係。更者，本研究將進一步探討由管理者過度自信所引起之投資扭曲現象對公司營運績效的影響。本研究主要篩選從1994年至2008年間S&P 1500大公司所有高階經理人的資料，來做為研究分析的樣本。實證結果顯示，過度自信的高階經理人其公司存在顯著之投資對現金流量的敏感度，尤其對於財務限制程度愈高的公司其結果更明顯。此外，過度自信的高階經理人在產生異常投資之後的表現較差，且公司的營運績效顯著劣於其他同業公司。

Prior studies examine the relation between executive overconfidence and corporate investment decisions, and demonstrate that CEO overconfidence effect can explain for investment distortions. In this study, we reexamine the impact of managerial overconfidence on the sensitivity of corporate investment to cash flow under a modified stock option exercise-based overconfidence measure derived from Campbell, Johnson, Rutherford, and Stanley (2009) and further investigate the effect of corporate investment distortion due to managerial overconfidence on subsequent operating performance. Our sample comprises all CEOs over the period, 1994-2008 in the universe of firms covering mainly the S&P 1500. The empirical analysis confirms that overconfident CEOs display the noticeably higher corporate investment-cash flow sensitivity, especially for firms with higher degree of financial constraints. Moreover, overconfident CEOs perform worse than non-overconfident CEOs and their firms reveal more operating performance deterioration than their peers following their abnormal capital investment year.