承銷機制對股權結構與公司治理資訊內涵之影響

Abstract

本研究以股份盈餘偏離差代表業主與公司利益不一致的風險，作為需要被監督行為的代理變數，探討在臺灣在詢價圈購與現行競價拍賣兩種初次上市櫃承銷配售機制下，透過配售時形成的股權分配，承銷定價與市價是否反映引進法人或機構投資人對監督公司的效果。實證結果發現，無論是在詢價圈購還是競價拍賣制度下，引進法人或機構投資人對於承銷定價以及掛牌後股價表現的影響並不顯著。但是股份盈餘偏離差對於詢價圈購與競價拍賣樣本的影響有不同的表現，在詢價圈購樣本下的股份盈餘偏離差對於價格倍數有負面影響，與過去的實證結果一致；但是在競價拍賣機制下的樣本，股份盈餘偏離差對於價格倍數的影響在統計上並不顯著，這代表競價拍賣產生價格的過程相對詢價圈購而言，比較沒有到考慮企業主與公司利益不一致的風險並給予較低的評價。這個差異是由於承銷機制的不同，造成對初次上市櫃公司股權結構風險的反映情形不同。

This paper investigates the effect of ownership structure on initial public offering valuation in the Taiwanese stock market under two different underwriting mechanisms, bookbuilding method and the current auction method, and examine whether the potential benefit of monitoring from the institutional investors in the IPO stage can be demonstrated on its relative valuation. We find that the influence from the monitoring of institutional investors is not statistically significant for the valuation under both underwriting mechanisms. While our analysis indicates that a deviating voting-cash structure is negatively associated with the relative valuation at both the initial offer and after-market prices performance under the bookbuilding method, the valuation under the auction method does not reflect the risk of interest conflict for the firms with deviation between the voting and cash flow rights of controlling shareholders. It is the essence of underwriting mechanisms that result in the inconsistent demonstration for the risk of ownership structure.