如何落實我國公司治理獨立性之研究－以歐盟及德國為例

Abstract

本文之核心係在探討如何落實我國公司治理獨立性。我國為提升董事會之效能、落實監督以及與世界各國之公司治理接軌，自2005年證券交易法引進獨立董事與審計委員會之制度，我國上市上櫃公司業已於2017年起須設置至少二名以上獨立董事，並須設置相關功能委員會，我國上市上櫃公司之架構即從公司法下設置董監事的雙軌制，過渡到設立獨立董事及相關功能委員會的單軌制。此外，近年發生樂陞案、兆豐金遭美國紐約州金融服務署罰款及兆豐金之三寶案，實務及學界都在思考如何使獨立董事落實其獨立性及職能。又由於獨立董事具有召開股東會之權限，又得於審計委員會中針對公司之重大議案提出意見，於經營權爭奪時，市場派將極力爭取獨立董事之席次，諸如：台新金控與彰化銀行及台新金控與寶佳集團的經營權爭奪，即是公司派與市場派與獨立董事之席次的角力。特別是我國的股權結構，大多數為家族企業，公司之董事會亦多由對公司具有控制力之家族成員占有多數席次。如何在控制股東與公司的獨立性達到一個平衡狀態，是本文欲探討的核心。 本文將從2000年之高科技泡沫至2008年的次貸危機發現公司治理失靈的情形，並探討獨立董事的重要性日漸提升之原因。而歐盟自1999年起亦針對公司治理作成許多報告、綠皮書及行動計劃，除了為了增進歐盟會員國的公司治理外，也為了使歐洲公司法於各國間的適用可以達到趨同的情形，如單軌制與雙軌制之選擇即為一實例，而本文亦藉此以弭平我國對於單軌制與雙軌制之爭論。此外，我國的股權結構與歐盟多數國家較為雷同，皆屬家族企業的情形，本文將針對德國、瑞士、比利時及法國，不同的公司治理架構下探討家族企業對於公司治理制度之影響，最後並提出增強型獨立董事，並就我國公司治理架構提出建議。

The core of this thesis is to study how to fulfill the independence of corporate governance in Taiwan. To make the operation of board of directors more efficiency, fulfill the supervision mechanism in the company, and catch up with corporate governance in other countries around the world, the regime of independent directors and audit committees was introduced, and relevant provisions are set out in the amendment of Securities Exchange Act in 2005. From 2017, at least two independent directors and relevant functional committees shall be set up in the listed companies. The supervision mechanism in the listed companies in Taiwan is changed from the two-tier board to one-tier board. In recent years, due to the case of XPEC Entertainment and Mega Bank, there is a wild discussion about how to fulfill the independence and functions of independent directors in theory and practice. Further, the independent directors is entitled to convene a shareholder meeting, and they may provide the opinion to the major resolutions of the company in the audit committee. When the shareholders fight for corporate control, those who are not the member of the board of director will strive to take the seats of independent directors, such as: corporate control fights between Taishin Financial Holding and Changhua Bank, and the fight between Taishin Financial Holding and PJ Asset Management. In particular, most companies in Taiwan are family-owned, and the board of directors is consisted of family members. How to maintain a balance between controlling shareholder and company independence is the core of this thesis. This thesis studies the failure of corporate governance from the Technology Boom in 2000 to the subprime mortgage crisis in 2008, and analyze the importance of independent directors through these cases. Since 1999, the European Union published reports, green papers and action plans for corporate governance to promote corporate governance in EU member states, and to reduce the inconsistency in the laws and regulations adopted by European countries, such as one-tier or two-tier board. This thesis intents to use matter adopted by EU to eliminate the debate on the one-tier and two-tier board in Taiwan. Furthermore, shareholding structure in Taiwan is similar to most of EU countries (i.e. most of them are family-owned firms). This thesis will discuss the impact of family-owned firms on corporate governance systems in Germany, Switzerland, Belgium and France, and, finally, proposes the resolutions such as setting up the enhanced-independence directors or changing the corporate governance structure in Taiwan.