實質盈餘管理與董事改選連任之間的關係

Abstract

企業從事盈餘管理的動機、行為與工具為學術與實業界重視的議題。本研究核心為企業藉由操縱經營活動時機與規模調節帳列績效數值的實質盈餘管理對於企業改選年度董事替換率的影響；探討是否隨著改選日將近，企業欲幫助董事連任而利用實質盈餘管理美化財務報表，使股東誤認為其表現良好而在董事改選年度的股東會中繼續選任之。此外，由於實質盈餘管理為企業用偏離正常營業準則的方式來操縱財務報表，企圖使股東們相信公司達成盈餘目標，故也會對企業的未來價值會產生負面的影響。本研究也探討以每三年為一期改選的董事會，是否會因為改選前一年須採取實質盈餘管理，而在改選前兩年減少實施實質盈餘管理，為改選前一年的實質盈餘管理做準備。本研究實證結果發現：(1) 股東不因企業利用實質盈餘管理美化財務報表指標數值顯著而降低其票選現任董事意願；而隨著實質盈餘管理的程度越大，董事越容易在股東會中獲取票數以連續就任。(2) 企業傾向在董事改選年度前兩年，降低實質盈餘管理之操作，以為董事改選年度之前一年之實質盈餘管理操作做準備，也避免對操作實質盈餘管理當年度的績效有負面影響而增加實質盈餘管理操作之困難。(3) 績效表現越差及前次改選董事替換率高的企業，會更傾向操作高程度的實質盈餘管理。

The motives behind, behaviors towards and tools for corporate earnings management have been a focus area of extant finance and accounting studies. This thesis paper explores the extent to which a company’s real earnings management (REM), namely, a company’s manipulation of the timing and/or the amount of its earnings via real business activities, affects the re-election rate of its incumbent board directors in shareholders’ meeting. If a company’s use of real earnings management increases the odds of its board directors to be re-elected, the findings would suggest that the shareholders fail to fully undo the bias in reported earnings in spite of the potential negative impacts of REM on the future prospect of the business entity. Specifically, this study explores whether the firms with their board members serving a three-year term adopt real earnings management schemes in the year before the board director re-elections. The empirical results of this study are as follows. First, the shareholders do not reduce their willingness to vote for the incumbent directors of the firm that adopts real earnings management schemes to boost the financial statement earnings. The greater the magnitude of the company’s earnings-increasing REM, the more likely its incumbent directors are re-elected at the shareholders meeting. Second, with respect to the second last annual earnings announcement before the board director re-election, the estimate for the real manipulations appears to be less. The finding is consistent with the notion that the firm avoids the adversarial effect of REM on the reported earnings that will be announced prior to the re-election. Third, the worse the pre-manipulation earnings and the higher the turnover of directors in the previous board director election, the greater would be the magnitude of a firm’s upward real earnings manipulation.