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  1. NTU Theses and Dissertations Repository
  2. 管理學院
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請用此 Handle URI 來引用此文件: http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/21550
完整後設資料紀錄
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dc.contributor.advisor王泰昌(Taychang Wang)
dc.contributor.authorYou-Ting Chiangen
dc.contributor.author江佑庭zh_TW
dc.date.accessioned2021-06-08T03:37:37Z-
dc.date.copyright2019-07-24
dc.date.issued2019
dc.date.submitted2019-07-22
dc.identifier.citation壹、 中文文獻
[1] 王文宇,公司法論,第三版, 2006年,元照出版有限公司
[2] 柯芳枝,公司法論(上),修訂八版,2006年,三民書局
[3] 廖大穎,公司法原論,2003年,三民書局
[4] 劉連煜,現代公司法,增訂九版,2013年,自版
[5] 王志誠,資本三原則之理論與實踐,月旦法學教室,2005年7月,第33期,96頁
[6] 林仁光,資本維持原則之重新檢視,台灣法學雜誌,2002年,第33期,48-50頁.
[7] 陳彥良,資本原則之再思考-兼論德國最低資本額之調整,中正財經法學,2015年7月,第11期,8-13頁
[8] 黃銘傑,公司法資本規範再生的救世主-從閉鎖性股份有限公司引進無票面金額股制度談起,月旦法學雜誌,2015年12月,第247期,69頁
貳、 外文文獻
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dc.identifier.urihttp://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/21550-
dc.description.abstract資本維持原則(capital maintenance rule)係指公司存續中,應維持相當於資本額之財產,以具體財產充實抽象資本之原則。對於資本維持原則之妥適性,無論係於我國或國外,均存在許多論辯。支持資本維持原則之論者,認為此原則可以透過限制公司之資金運用緩解股東與債權人之間利害衝突所生之「籌資代理成本」,進而保障公司債權人,尤其是針對無締約籌碼之弱勢債權人,予以最基本之保障,而其限制資金運用之手段,即係以資本額作為其限制之標準;反對資本維持原則之論者,則認為股東與債權間之利害衝突,可以透過債權人與公司之締約內容自行獲得緩解,無需法律介入,且縱然承認應有法律介入,透過法規之統一規範模式,實忽略債權人與公司之個別異質性,如此欠缺彈性之規範方式,不但無法有效保障債權人,尚造成公司資金運用上之障礙。
有鑒於我國公司法中,亦存有許多以資本維持原則為其立法基礎之規範,本研究以有息負債利率作為債務資金成本之代理變數,分別測試其與該等規範中之限制手段之相關性,其中包含債務資金成本是否受公司資本額、股利支付率、法定盈餘公積資訊之影響。研究結果顯示,我國實收資本額對於債務資金成本之影響並不顯著,故我國公司法中對於實收資本額之規範,似有檢討之必要;股利支付率、法定盈餘公積對於債務資金成本則為顯著,惟此是否即得認為該等制度能有效保障債權人,則尚有待後續研究進一步分析。
zh_TW
dc.description.abstractThere has been an ongoing dispute throughout the world regarding the Capital Maintenance Principle. Some suggest that through the restrictive measure on the usage of company capital established under this principle will have some effect on reducing the “financial agency cost” generated by the conflict of interest among creditors and shareholders. This would also in some extent provide a minimum protection to the creditors especially for creditors with a weaker bargaining power. However, others suggest that the conflict of interest among the creditors and shareholders can be reduced merely through contracting and the need of regulation intervention will be unnecessary. Even if the need of regulation has been approved, the unified measure taken under the Capital Maintenance Principle would not be a relevant protection to the creditors, since both creditors and companies comes in heterogeneous forms. Ignoring this critical aspect of the contracting bodies by implementing a regulation lacking elasticity, not only is it irrelevant to most of the creditors, it also increases the barrier for companies that are in need of capital usage.
Since the Taiwanese company law has also adopted numerous restrictive measures under the Capital Maintenance Principle, this paper wish to test the feasibility of certain items used under these restrictions, namely Capital Stock, Dividend Declare Rate and Legal Reserve. By comparing these items to the cost of debt measured by the INTEXP, we discovered that the effect of Capital Stock is not significant, thus a regulation reform concerning the Capital Stock restriction should be in place;whereas Dividend Declare Rate and Legal Reserve has a significant effect on cost of debt, however whether these restrictive measures are adequate remain unresolved and would require further research to shed light on these issues.
en
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Previous issue date: 2019
en
dc.description.tableofcontents口試委員會審定書 #
中文摘要 II
ABSTRACT III
目錄 IV
表目錄 VII
圖目錄 VIII
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景與動機 1
第二節 研究目的 3
第三節 論文結構 4
第二章 文獻探討與假說發展 6
第一節 文獻探討 6
一、 資本維持原則之概念 6
二、 學說見解 7
三、 我國相關規範 11
第二節 假說建立 13
一、 股本對於債權人有無影響 13
二、 盈餘分派之比率高低是否會對債權人風險評估產生影響? 14
三、 法定盈餘公積之限制是否真的能保障債權人? 15
第三章 研究方法與資料來源 17
第一節 研究模型 17
一、 應變數: 17
二、 主要自變數 17
三、 控制變數 18
四、 研究模型 22
第二節 資料來源與樣本選取 24
第四章 實證結果 26
第一節 敘述統計分析 26
一、 敘述統計量 26
二、 相關係數 33
第二節 迴歸結果說明 37
一、 股本對於債務資金成本之影響 37
二、 股利支付率對於債務資金成本之影響 37
三、 法定盈餘公積對於債務資金成本之影響 37
四、 各控制變數 38
五、 剔除資本總額對於迴歸模型之影響 39
第三節 分析與推論 42
第五章 結論及建議 43
參考文獻 45
附錄一 資本維持原則下之相關之法規 52
表目錄
表 1 變數說明 23
表 2 樣本選取 25
表 3 觀察值中之產業分布 28
表 4 各變數之統計量 29
表 5 各產業之有息負債利率 30
表 6 敘述性統計之各變數相關性 32
表 7 相關係數矩陣 34
表 8 多重共線性檢驗 36
表 9 多元線性迴歸結果分析 40
圖目錄
圖1 研究方法 5
dc.language.isozh-TW
dc.title從債務資金成本角度重新審視資本維持原則之合理性zh_TW
dc.titleRe-examining the Rationality of the Capital Maintenance Principle from the Perspective of Cost of Debten
dc.typeThesis
dc.date.schoolyear107-2
dc.description.degree碩士
dc.contributor.coadvisor劉嘉雯(Chiawen Liu)
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee邱士宗,林瑞青
dc.subject.keyword實收資本額,債務資金成本,資本維持原則,法定盈餘公積,債權人保護,zh_TW
dc.subject.keywordCapital stock,Cost of debt,Capital maintenance principle,Legal Reserve,Creditor protection,en
dc.relation.page58
dc.identifier.doi10.6342/NTU201901609
dc.rights.note未授權
dc.date.accepted2019-07-22
dc.contributor.author-college管理學院zh_TW
dc.contributor.author-dept會計學研究所zh_TW
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