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完整後設資料紀錄
DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.advisor | 黃銘傑(Ming-Jye Huang) | |
dc.contributor.author | Wan-Ling Teng | en |
dc.contributor.author | 鄧婉伶 | zh_TW |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-08T03:34:59Z | - |
dc.date.copyright | 2019-08-13 | |
dc.date.issued | 2018 | |
dc.date.submitted | 2019-07-31 | |
dc.identifier.citation | 一、 中文參考文獻
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dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/21469 | - |
dc.description.abstract | 「雙邊平台」是一種存在已久但在近年來才被賦予此名之事業型態,其供給對象為兩種不同而仰賴平台作為管道與對方連結的客群,這兩種不同之客群間,就平台之參與使用具有「相互依存性」,二者間存在著「間接網路效應」,且平台之價格結構(即平台對兩組消費者之價格分配方式)具有特殊性。
雙邊平台之核心功能在於整合不同客群的需求,其經營模式、在經營上面臨之難題、競爭箝制力來源、消費者需求之價格彈性、追求利潤最大化之策略,以及消費者價值創造之行為模式都與單邊事業有所差異。然而,傳統的競爭法思維、分析工具以及執法經驗基本上是建立在單邊事業之架構上,若將其直接應用至雙邊平台事業上,恐會導致錯誤之積極或錯誤之消極執法。為避免競爭法之執法對市場造成不良影響,勢有必要瞭解雙邊平台之箇中意涵,以為必要之因應。 本文自雙邊市場之經濟學理論以及網路效應之學理衍變出發,解析雙邊平台經營模式之經濟學意涵與特性,再分別於各個競爭法概念下進行涵攝與分析,包含相關市場範圍界定、市場力量評估、結合競爭效果評估、掠奪性定價及垂直交易限制之分析,以此呈現雙邊平台事業與單邊事業之差異處,並說明競爭法之分析應如何因應雙邊平台與單邊事業之差異、對於雙邊平台為競爭法分析時應特別考量之特性為何。 最後,本文將審視各國主管機關因應雙邊平台所為之行政及立法變革、我國公平交易委員會之處理經驗,比較學理及實務上之異同,再將本文之研究發現歸結為可供執法上參酌之建議。 | zh_TW |
dc.description.abstract | Two-sided platforms serve two distinct but interdependent groups of customers who rely on the platform to connect them to each other, and the demand from one group of customers depends on the demand from the other group. Indirect network effects exist across the groups of consumers. The pricing structure of a platform—the way prices are distributed between consumers on the two sides of the platform—is an important feature different from that of other business models. The key role of two-sided platforms is to coordinate the demands of distinct groups of customers. The business model, operational problems needing to be solved, competitive constraints, price elasticities of demand, and the profit-maximizing strategies, the value creation of two-sided platforms are different from that of traditional one-sided firms. However, conventional wisdom and traditional analytical tools in the field of competition law and experiences on competition law enforcement are derived basically from the one-sided business model. Applying one-sided logic to two-sided platforms while overlooking the two-sided nature might lead to false positives or false negatives which are harmful to markets and always need to be avoided. For the purpose of preventing such negative results, it is necessary to identify the differences between two-sided businesses and one-sided businesses.
This thesis begins with a review of the theory of two-sided markets and the theoretical evolution of network effects and examines the economics of two-sided platforms. Secondly, this thesis applies the economics of two-sided markets to several areas of competition law, including market definition, analysis of market power, competitive effects of mergers, predatory pricing, and effects of vertical restraints to demonstrate the differences between two-sided platforms and one-sided firms and illustrate how to adapt analytical approaches to the cases involving two-sided platforms and what should be taken into consideration in the analysis of platforms. Lastly, this thesis examines the explanatory guidelines involving two-sided markets released by the competent authorities, the relevant laws in several jurisdictions, and the decisions involving two-sided markets made by Taiwan Fair Trade Commission to analyze the differences between theories and practices. The findings of this thesis are summarized into useful recommendations for competition law enforcement. | en |
dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-08T03:34:59Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-107-R03a21079-1.pdf: 1985458 bytes, checksum: 6675bd322b2406196c42931dbd6775f4 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018 | en |
dc.description.tableofcontents | 謝詞 2
摘要 3 ABSTRACT 4 目錄 6 圖目錄 11 表目錄 11 第一章 緒論 12 第一節 研究動機 12 第二節 研究方法與範圍 13 第三節 論文架構 14 第二章 雙邊市場理論與雙邊平台經營模式 15 第一節 雙邊市場(Two-Sided Market)理論 15 第一項 理論概述 15 第二項 雙邊市場與雙邊平台 17 第二節 雙邊平台經營模式 18 第一項 雙邊平台經營模式之應用 18 第二項 雙邊平台之類型 19 第一款 依產業區分 20 第二款 依跨邊網路效應屬性區分 23 第三款 依是否直接發生交易區分 24 第四款 依使用族群相互間之關係區分 26 第三節 雙邊市場理論對網路效應內涵帶來之發展 27 第一項 網路效應之原理 27 第一款 理論緣起 27 第二款 直接網路效應與間接網路效應 28 第二項 雙邊市場理論及平台事業模式下之網路效應 29 第一款 跨邊網路效應 30 第二款 關鍵規模客戶群 32 第三款 多棲性 32 第四款 轉換成本 33 第五款 差異化經營及需求多樣性 33 第三章 雙邊市場理論在競爭法分析上之應用 34 第一節 相關市場範圍界定 34 第一項 相關市場界定原則 36 第一款 SSNIP測試/假設性獨占者檢測法 37 第二款 臨界損失法 39 第二項 雙邊市場理論衍生之議題與分析建議 40 第一款 雙邊平台之競爭型態 41 第二款 零元價格之定價策略 42 第三款 相關市場個數:雙邊交易平台與雙邊無交易平台 48 第四款 間接網路效應及反饋效果 51 第五款 平台各邊均應被納入考量 52 第六款 平台用戶之多棲與單棲使用型態 53 第七款 小結 54 第二節 市場力量評估 55 第一項 市場力量之概念與評估原則 55 第二項 雙邊市場理論於市場力量評估階段之應用 57 第一款 雙邊平台之特殊事業結構/獲利模式 57 第二款 間接網路效應之分析 59 第三款 網路效應與市場參進障礙 62 第三節 結合競爭效果分析 74 第一項 結合管制概述 74 第二項 網路效應/外部性與平台結合之效率評估 77 第三項 平台結合之單方效果評估 80 第四項 平台結合之共同效果與垂直結合效果 82 第四節 掠奪性定價 82 第一項 規範掠奪性定價之目的與判斷原則 82 第二項 雙邊平台定價行為之審查 83 第三項 小結 88 第五節 垂直交易限制 88 第一項 垂直交易限制概說 88 第二項 排他交易契約/獨家交易契約 91 第三項 搭售行為 94 第四項 價格限制行為:最優惠價格條款 97 第五項 案例分析—信用卡組織之禁止引導條款(Anti-Steering Rules) 100 第一款 本案事實 100 第二款 地方法院之認定 103 第四款 最高法院Ohio v. American Express之認定 106 第五款 最高法院Ohio v. American Express之不同意見 108 第六款 本案判決評析 109 第六項 小結 113 第六節 各國因應雙邊市場理論之行政及立法變革 114 第一項 英國:結合評估指南 114 第二項 德國:限制競爭法、結合管制指南 116 第三項 澳洲:媒體結合指南 117 第四項 日本:有關獨占禁止法對於流通、交易習慣之指導方針 118 第五項 綜合整理 119 第七節 小結 120 第一項 本章總結 121 第四章 公平交易法關於雙邊平台之執法經驗 124 第一節 國內之雙邊平台相關案例 124 第一項 早期案例:雅虎公司與無名小站申報結合案 124 第二項 前期案例:從新設數位線上音樂服務公司申報結合案到華藝數位以不正方法使他事業不為價格競爭處分案 127 第三項 近期案例:租屋App擅自擷取租屋資訊案 129 第二節 國內相關案例總評 132 第五章 結論 133 參考文獻 136 | |
dc.language.iso | zh-TW | |
dc.title | 平台事業之競爭法問題研究—以雙邊市場理論為中心 | zh_TW |
dc.title | Competition Law and Platform Enterprises:
The Issues Raised by Two-Sided Markets | en |
dc.type | Thesis | |
dc.date.schoolyear | 107-2 | |
dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 王立達(Li-dar Wang),顏雅倫(Ya-Lun Yen) | |
dc.subject.keyword | 雙邊市場,雙邊平台,多邊市場,多邊平台,網路效應,間接網路效應,競爭法,反托拉斯,公平交易法, | zh_TW |
dc.subject.keyword | two-sided markets,two-sided platforms,multi-sided markets,multi-sided platforms,network effects,indirect network effects,competition law,antitrust,Fair Trade Act, | en |
dc.relation.page | 148 | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.6342/NTU201902271 | |
dc.rights.note | 未授權 | |
dc.date.accepted | 2019-08-01 | |
dc.contributor.author-college | 法律學院 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.author-dept | 法律學研究所 | zh_TW |
顯示於系所單位: | 法律學系 |
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