偏私的產權保護：政治繼承時期的威權議會與經濟菁英

Abstract

威權國家中的經濟菁英如何回應統治聯盟的重組？威權研究文獻大幅關注名義上的民主制度將增強威權韌性或是引領民主化，卻缺乏針對威權國家中經濟菁英行為的實證研究。在政治不穩定的時期，威權議會將扮演提供公共財的產權保護制度，還是專屬內部人的尋租平台？本文關注中國企業主在胡錦濤到習近平政治繼承時期的行為，並發現有議會關係的企業主在領導人繼承時期有更高的機率留在市場中，但該現象並未發生在領導人續任時期，這隱含了歧視性的產權保護與一朝天子一朝商的菁英自我篩選。

How do economic elites respond to the ruling coalition realignment in authoritarian regimes? While the existing literature on authoritarian politics pays immense attention to whether the nominally democratic institutions strengthen authoritarian resilience or lead to democratization, empirical research on economic elites’ behavior under authoritarian settings is lacking. During politically unstable times, do authoritarian legislatures serve as property protection institutions as a public good or as rent-seeking forums for insiders? This article focuses on how entrepreneurs acted during China’s political transition from Jintao Hu to Jinping Xi and demonstrates that entrepreneurs with legislature connections have a higher probability of staying in the market during the leadership succession period, but this effect was not significant while the leader continued in office, which is suggestive of discriminatory property protection and elites’ self-selection.