特別股與雙層股權結構之評析

Abstract

由於雙層股權結構在形式上違反了一股一權的股份平等原則，因此部分國家或地區對此持否定立場。我國公司法一直以來嚴守一股一權原則，實踐中絕對不允許公開發行股票公司發行不同表決權之股票。但是，從國外相關法律觀察之，大多數國家已逐漸放寬關於一股一權的限制，讓股權結構之設計更加多元化，而這個國際趨勢更是一個值得令人深思的問題。 因此本文美國及香港關於雙層股權結構之相關法令談起，再介紹我國關於雙層股權結構的立法演進以及相關規定，且兼論關於實施雙層股權結構之應注意事項，尤其是雙層股權結構之落日機制，最後提出關於實務上之相關觀察心得以及提出結論與修法建議。

Since the Dual Class Share Structure formally violates the principle of the Equitable Treatment of Shareholders, some countries have a negative position on this. The Company Act of Taiwan has always adhered to the Equitable Treatment of Shareholders. In practice, the public issued companies in Taiwan are absolutely not allowed to issue shares with different voting rights. However, it can be observed from relevant foreign laws, that most countries have gradually relaxed restrictions on one-to-one rights so as to make the design of equity structure more flexible. I think it is worth thinking deeply about whether the Dual Class Share Structure is applicable to Taiwan. This thesis starts from the Dual Class Share Structure in the United States and Hong Kong. Then, it discusses the legislative evolution, related regulations of the Dual Class Share Structure in Taiwan and some noticeable points about enforcing the Dual Class Share Structure, especially the sunset provision. In the end, this thesis concludes by setting forth, suggestions and prospects of the Company Act of Taiwan based on practical observation.