論現金逐出中保護少數股東之事前程序機制建構

Abstract

107年11月30日，司法院大法官針對現金逐出合併所發生之爭議做出釋字770號解釋，在該號解釋作出後，於當年度喧騰一時之「榮化案」亦完成下市。而在更久以前，亦有廣為人知之「國巨案」發生。以上三則現金逐出案例，皆為公司大股東所主導，而產生利益衝突，蓋大股東可藉由持股上之優勢，取得公司內部資訊並主導交易進行之時點，最後可能提出不合理之收購價格、侵害少數股東之權益。針對此種情形，2015年新修正之企業併購法與釋字770號解釋中，雖對於資訊揭露制度與股份收買請求權有更進一步之規範與闡釋，卻似乎僅將重點置於事後法院救濟之尋求，保障並不足夠。因此，只要類似交易發生，往往不斷有小股東疾呼資訊揭露不透明、收購價格不公平。面對投資人與各界之反對聲浪，經濟部與金管會亦開始對企併法之修正進行討論。 美國法上對於現金逐出合併之管制方式，主要有聯邦法上資訊揭露之整合規定與判例法上雙重利益衝突淨化機制（特別委員會與少數股東多數決）之採取。資訊揭露之整合規範，使公司大股東無論採取何種現金逐出交易之型態，皆須為完整之說明；而利益衝突淨化機制之採取，則帶有法律經濟學中「財產法則」之特色，透過公司自我執行之內部程序，不依賴法院或主管機關之事後審查，達到降低利益衝突之效果。少數股東藉由獲取足夠之資訊以及參與少數股東多數決，對於現金逐出交易之實施與否有更大的決定可能。 就上開我國法有關現金逐出合併規範與解釋上之弊病，本文使用了比較法分析之方式，參考美國法之管制方式，分別就資訊揭露制度、特別委員會與少數股東多數決此三者為討論。在資訊揭露制度方面，應制定一整合而詳細之規範，使各種現金逐出交易中之少數股東皆可獲得充足資訊，保障其知的權利，使其得以對現金逐出交易為正確之判斷與決定。而在特別委員會之改革上，最為重要的莫過於釐清其有著少數股東代理人之功能性定位，同時考量我國並非如美國採取鼓勵設置之規範方式，而同中求異地建立後續諸如設置時點、選任方式、職權與責任義務等各項之改革。最後，本文透過分析控制股東、散戶與機構投資人於公開發行公司中之股權占比與法院處理現金逐出案件相關爭議之成效，搭配前述資訊揭露制度與特別委員會之改革，認為我國應有引進少數股東多數決之必要，且其亦可發揮實際有效之功能，達到保障少數股東權益之目的。

A cash-out merger is a direct method for controlling shareholders in a public corporation to force the minority shareholders to give up their equity position. Controlling shareholders may exploit minority shareholders through an inappropriate cash-out merger. It’s not an arm’s-length transaction and thus the minority shareholders’ rights need to be protected. In 2018, the J.Y. Interpretation No. 770 confirmed the minority shareholders’ right to bring an action under the appraisal right regarding the information disclosure system as a complementary measure and did not touch on Ex Ante procedures during the merger procedure, such as the duty of interested directors and shareholders to abstain from exercising voting rights and the special committee under Taiwan Business Mergers and Acquisitions Act. Thus, the thesis discusses the impact to the rights of minority shareholders that the approach contemplated in the Interpretation would bring about in cash-out merger, with a call to formulate the Ex Ante procedures in Taiwan. The thesis refers to the disclosure obligation set by federal securities regulations and Delaware common law doctrines in the United States of America, analyzes the information disclosure system, special committee and the duty of interested directors and shareholders to abstain from exercising voting right related to cash-out merger under current Taiwanese law from U.S. law’s perspective, and arrives at three main conclusions. First, whether it is one-step or two-step merger, all of the minority will be cashed-out from the company. Thus, there should be a uniform information disclosure regulation for all kinds of cash-out merger in Taiwan. Second, instead of the current Taiwanese law regarding special committee as a functional committee beneath the board of directors, which can only provide suggestions to the directors and the minority shareholders, the special committee should be the bargain agent on behalf of the minority shareholders and has the power to negotiate and the veto right to deny the controlling shareholders’ proposal to pursue the best purchase price for the minority shareholders. Third, if Taiwanese law intends to introduce the special committee, the mechanism of the majority of minority shareholder approval should go together with the special committee. The special committee alone addresses the collective action problem facing shareholders and the majority-of-the-minority vote provides shareholders a chance to vote on a merger proposed by a controller-dominated board. These two protections are incomplete and not substitutes, but are complementary and effective in tandem.