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| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 吳淑鈴(Shu-Ling Wu) | |
| dc.contributor.author | Su-Chen Hsu | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 徐素晨 | zh_TW |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-08T03:06:42Z | - |
| dc.date.copyright | 2017-07-07 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2017 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2017-06-30 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | Alissa, W. (2009). Boards’ Response to Shareholders’ Dissatisfaction: The Case of Shareholders’ Say on Pay in the UK. European Accounting Review, 24(4), 727-752.
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| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/20849 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | 自Say-on-Pay後，美國部分公司開始自願揭露高階主管已實現薪酬(Realized Pay)以作為說明薪酬績效關聯性(Pay-for-Performance)的補充資訊。過去文獻提出該揭露資訊可能為投機性揭露，公司可能藉著低列已實現薪酬，來增加公司薪酬績效關聯性之合理性及說服力。由於認股權執行金額為已實現薪酬之重要組成成份，本論文進一步探究高階主管於揭露已實現薪酬年度，是否存在減少行使認股權行為以達成低列已實現薪酬之目標。
以2011年至2015年S&P 1500公司做為樣本，並考量自願揭露已實現薪酬公司可能存在自我選擇偏誤，在此除採用原始未配對樣本之外，則另採取配對法樣本及傾向分數配對法(Propensity-Score Matching)進行羅吉斯迴歸分析，實證結果發現自願揭露已實現公司之高階主管，於揭露已實現薪酬之年度，顯著存在減少認股權行使的行為，以達成投機性揭露之目的。本研究進一步探討薪酬顧問獨立性是否影響自願揭露已實現薪酬與高階主管減少行使認股權間之關聯性，發現薪酬顧問不獨立將增加自願揭露已實現薪酬公司之高階主管減少行使認股權行為之可能性。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract | Since 2011, mandatory shareholder Say-on-Pay has become effective in the U.S. An increasing amount of companies have begun to voluntarily provide “Realized Pay” information of their executive compensation in the compensation disclosures. While these companies claim that the purpose of providing such information is to enhance the informativeness of executives’ pay-for-performance, prior literature found that “Realized Pay” might be the result of opportunistic disclosure. Companies have incentives to report a lower level of “Realized Pay” to facilitate their explanation on the pay versus performance relation in the compensation disclosures. Because the value of stock option exercise is an important component of executive’s realized pay, this study investigates whether top managements reduce their stock option exercises during the years in which the companies report realized pay in their compensation disclosures.
Focusing on S&P1500 companies from 2011 to 2015, the empirical results suggest that executives are more likely to reduce stock option exercises during the year in which the companies disclosed realized pay in their compensation disclosures. The results suggest that managers manipulate the reported realized pay by reducing the stock option exercises. Moreover, this paper also finds that when compensation consultant is not independent, the positive relation between realized pay disclosure and the likelihood of reducing stock option exercises is stronger. The results suggest that dependent compensation consultants are more likely to facilitate this opportunistic disclosure practices. | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-08T03:06:42Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-106-R04722013-1.pdf: 1306720 bytes, checksum: e817704aa1104ff4c1523dd3139a726d (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 中文摘要 I
ABSTRACT II 目錄 III 表目錄 V 第一章 緒論 1 第一節 研究背景與動機 1 第二節 研究目的 2 第三節 論文架構 3 第二章 文獻回顧 4 第一節 代理問題 4 第二節 Pay-for-Performance Sensitivity薪酬績效敏感度 5 第三節 Say-On-Pay制度 7 第四節 已實現薪酬(Realized Pay)與認股權 10 第三章 研究方法 14 第一節 研究假說 14 第二節 實證模型及變數定義 16 一、 羅吉斯迴歸模型及變數定義(針對假說H1之測試模型) 16 二、 Pair-matching 配對法 23 三、 考量薪酬顧問獨立性調節變數之羅吉斯迴歸模型(針對假說H2之 測試模型) 24 第三節 樣本選取及資料蒐集 25 第四章 實證結果與分析 27 第一節 敘述統計 27 第二節 迴歸結果 31 一、 一般羅吉斯迴歸分析-未配對及配對法下之實證結果 31 二、 考量薪酬顧問獨立性作為調節變數後的羅吉斯迴歸結果 33 第三節 穩健性測試-傾向分數配對法(Propensity-Score Matching) 37 第五章 研究結論與限制 42 第一節 研究結論 42 第二節 研究限制 43 參考文獻 44 | |
| dc.language.iso | zh-TW | |
| dc.subject | 認股權行使 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 已實現薪酬 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 薪酬績效關聯性 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | stock option exercise | en |
| dc.subject | Pay Versus Performance | en |
| dc.subject | Realized Pay | en |
| dc.title | 已實現薪酬之揭露對高階主管行使認股權行為的影響 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | Realized Pay and Exercise Behavior of Executive Stock Options | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 105-2 | |
| dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 廖芝嫻(Chih-Hsien Liao),洪聖閔(Sheng-Min Hung) | |
| dc.subject.keyword | 已實現薪酬,薪酬績效關聯性,認股權行使, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | Realized Pay,Pay Versus Performance,stock option exercise, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 51 | |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.6342/NTU201701222 | |
| dc.rights.note | 未授權 | |
| dc.date.accepted | 2017-07-02 | |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 會計學研究所 | zh_TW |
| 顯示於系所單位： | 會計學系 | |
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