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完整後設資料紀錄
DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.advisor | 吳淑鈴(Shu-Ling Wu) | |
dc.contributor.author | Tzu-Chin Tsai | en |
dc.contributor.author | 蔡姿勤 | zh_TW |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-08T03:05:44Z | - |
dc.date.copyright | 2017-07-20 | |
dc.date.issued | 2017 | |
dc.date.submitted | 2017-07-05 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Abarbanell, J. S., and Bushee, B. J. 1997. Fundamental analysis, future earnings, and stock prices. Journal of Accounting Research, 35(1): 1-24.
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dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/20830 | - |
dc.description.abstract | 本研究以1993至2015年美國S&P500的公司為研究對象,探討當高階經理人的薪酬計畫中包含營業活動現金流量、資本支出或研究發展費用、股利,或經濟附加價值等績效衡量指標時,對於自由現金流量與過度投資的關聯性是否有加重或減緩的效果。實證結果顯示當自由現金流量為正時,企業採用營業活動現金流量為高階經理人薪酬計畫中的績效衡量指標時,確實會減緩過度投資的行為發生。而當選擇納入經濟附加價值為薪酬制度中的績效衡量指標時,則反而會加重過度投資的情況。至於以資本支出或研究發展費用,或是股利作為績效衡量指標則為不顯著結果。 | zh_TW |
dc.description.abstract | This study investigates whether using operating cash flows, capital expenditure/ R&D, dividends, or economic value added (EVA) as performance measure in CEO’s compensation plan affects firm-level over-investment of free cash flow. Focusing on S&P 500 firms from 1993 to 2015, this paper demonstrates that firms using operating cash flows as performance measures in CEO’s compensation plan are less likely to over investment their free cash flows. However, using EVA as CEO performance measures boosts over-investment. However, I find no evidence showing that using capital expenditure/ R&D, or dividends as performance measures affect firms’ over-investment. | en |
dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-08T03:05:44Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-106-R04722018-1.pdf: 634000 bytes, checksum: 971576642089fb3271a0575c39d7d6c4 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017 | en |
dc.description.tableofcontents | 摘要 i
Abstract ii 目錄 iii 表格目錄 iv 第一章、前言 1 第二章、文獻回顧 4 第一節、現金流量對於公司投資效率的影響 4 第二節、過度投資行為的相關調節變數 6 第三節、以現金流量做為績效指標的管理意涵 7 第四節、以資本支出或研究發展費用做為績效指標的管理意涵 10 第五節、以股利做為績效指標的管理意涵 13 第六節、以經濟附加價值做為績效指標的管理意涵 14 第七節、假說發展 15 第三章、研究方法 21 第一節、樣本選取與資料蒐集 21 第二節、實證模型及變數定義 23 (一) 投資預測模型之定義 23 (二) 高階經理人薪酬績效指標與無效率投資模型之定義 26 第四章、敘述性統計與實證結果分析 33 第一節、投資預測模型 33 (一) 敘述性統計 33 (二) 迴歸結果分析 35 第二節、高階經理人薪酬績效指標與無效率投資模型 36 (一) 敘述性統計 36 (二) 迴歸結果分析 37 第五章、研究結論、限制及建議 40 參考文獻 42 附錄 49 | |
dc.language.iso | zh-TW | |
dc.title | 以現金流量、資本支出與研究發展費用、股利,或經濟附加價值作為經理人績效衡量指標對於公司投資效率之影響 | zh_TW |
dc.title | The Effect of Using Operating Cash Flows, Capital Expenditure and R&D, Dividends, or Economic Value Added as Performance Measures on Firm-Level Investment Efficiency | en |
dc.type | Thesis | |
dc.date.schoolyear | 105-2 | |
dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 廖芝嫻(Chih-Hsien Liao),洪聖閔(Sheng-Min Hung) | |
dc.subject.keyword | 過度投資,自由現金流量,高階經理人薪酬,績效衡量指標, | zh_TW |
dc.subject.keyword | Over-investment,Free cash flow,CEO compensation,Performance measure, | en |
dc.relation.page | 53 | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.6342/NTU201701342 | |
dc.rights.note | 未授權 | |
dc.date.accepted | 2017-07-05 | |
dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.author-dept | 會計學研究所 | zh_TW |
顯示於系所單位: | 會計學系 |
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