經理人薪酬制度與經理人追求短期效益關聯性之實證研究

Abstract

本研究主要在探討經理人既得薪酬時間的長短與經理人追求短期效益之關聯性。 本研究使用ISS incentive lab之1998年至2015年的美國上市櫃公司為樣本，並以經理人薪酬存續期間作為衡量經理人薪酬制度的變數，以實質活動盈餘管理作為衡量經理人追求短期效益的變數，實證結果顯示，公司給予經理人薪酬既得期間長短，與經理人追求短期效益呈現負向的顯著相關，而此種負向關係，在股票流動性較低的公司更加強烈，而在小公司、年輕公司方面則呈現不顯著的關係。 本研究結論認為，經理人取得薪酬的時間越短，會讓經理人有更強烈的傾向去拉抬短期盈餘、做盈餘管理，也就是追求短期效益。 本論文認為，由於大公司財務資訊的品質較佳、通常委由四大查核、擁有較高的查核品質，且大公司受到較多政府的控管與檢查，大公司的董事成員有較高比例的獨立董事等等，使得小公司的經理人比較容易進行盈餘管理、追求短期效益，因此預期經理人薪酬存續期間與經理人追求短期效益的負向關係，在小公司會更加強烈，然而本研究實證結果顯示，此負向關係並不顯著。 本研究認為，股票流動性較低的公司，由於受到比較少政府的控管與檢查，因此經理人比較容易進行盈餘管理、追求短期效益，因此經理人取得薪酬的時間長短與經理人追求短期效益的負向關係，在股票流動性較低的公司會更加強烈。 本研究結果認為，年輕的公司較仰賴、給予經理人較多股票選擇權作為薪酬，較高比例的權益薪酬會使得經理人更有動機進行盈餘管理、追求短期效益，因此預期經理人薪酬的存續期間與經理人追求短期效益的負向關係，在年輕公司會更加強烈，然而本研究實證結果顯示，此負向關係並不顯著。

This paper examines the relationship between executives’ compensation and executives’ short-termism. Using a sample of listed companies in U.S. from 1998 to 2015, I find that the duration of executives’ compensation is negatively related to executives’ short-termism, which is proxied by real activities management. In addition, this negative relationship is more salient in younger firms. The relationship between duration and short-termism is not statistically significant in firms with smaller size and less liquid stocks. I show that when the duration of executive compensation is shorter, executives have stronger incentives to inflate short-term earnings through earnings management. Because large firms have better quality of financial information and better audit quality, receive more scrutiny from government, and have higher proportion of independent director, their earnings are less likely to be managed. On the contrary, executives in small firm are more likely to engage in earnings management. I expect that the negative relationship between duration and short-termism will be more significant in small firms. However, empirical results do not support this hypothesis. I predict and find that because firms with less liquid stock receive less scrutiny from government, executives are more likely to manage earnings. Hence, the negative relationship between duration and short-termism is more pronounced in firms with less liquid stocks. Because young firms give executives more equity compensation, a higher proportion of equity compensation gives executives more incentives to manage earnings. Therefore, I expect that the negative relationship between duration and managerial short-termism will be more salient in young firms. However, empirical results do not support this hypothesis.