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| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 吳琮璠(Chung-Fern Wu) | |
| dc.contributor.author | Bing-Siou Chuang | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 莊秉修 | zh_TW |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-08T02:57:36Z | - |
| dc.date.copyright | 2017-08-14 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2017 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2017-07-31 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | Abood, D., and R. Kasznik. 2008. Executive stock-based compensation and firms’ cash payout: the roleof shareholders’ tax-related payout preferences. Review of Accounting Studies 13 (2-3):216-251.
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| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/20663 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | 本研究主要探討美國執行長是否有頃向短期決策的現象，以執行長薪酬加權平均既得期間(Executive Compensation Duration)代表個人遞延性薪酬利益是否在短期內即將實現為短期決策的誘因，並且以企業是否有透過給予不正常的銷貨折扣或銷貨條件提升營收、過度生產以降低固定成本分攤至銷貨成本金額與裁減裁決性支出等可能傷害企業長期經濟利益以換取短期會計利益的實質盈餘管理(Real Earning Management)方式來檢視執行長是否有的實際行為。實證結果發現執行長再有誘因之下，確實會傾向短期決策以成就自身利益的行為，當薪酬加權平均既得期間愈短時，正向實質盈餘管理的幅度則愈大。此外也發現，在裁決性應計基礎之負向盈餘管理(Negative Discretionary Earning Management)中，洗大澡(Big Bath)的現象在薪酬加權平均既得期間較短時，幅度會相對較小。而對於那些損失趨避(Loss Avoidance)的企業，也發現薪酬加權平均既得期間對正向實質盈餘管理有交互作用，會減緩薪酬既得期間對盈餘管理程度的影響。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract | We focus on CEOs short-termism by using Executive Compensation Duration and Real Earning Management as representative to CEOs incentive of maximizing upcoming profit and to real action of CEOs short-termism respectively. We find negative relation between Executive Compensation Duration and representatives of Real Earning Management. That is, the shorter Executive Compensation Duration the bigger Positive Real Earning Management scale. In addition, CEOs tend to not take big bath, which Discretionary Accrual Earning Management is negative, as their Executive Compensation Duration is shorter than 1 year. We also find that Executive Compensation Duration has interactive effect with Loss-avoidance company on Positive Real Earning Management. That is, in Loss-avoidance company, CEOs have more incentive to manage earnings despite the length of Executive Compensation Duration. | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-08T02:57:36Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-106-R04722049-1.pdf: 1780285 bytes, checksum: ce1cd755c1e608a3eda06aaee9b04d21 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 摘要 i
Abstract ii 目錄 iii 表目錄 v 圖目錄 v 第一章 前言 1 第二章 文獻回顧 6 第一節 美國企業薪酬結構 6 1. 美國企業薪酬種類 6 2. 薪酬給予的性質—股權性與非股權性薪酬 7 3. 獎酬給予的衡量方式—依績效或時間 10 第二節 執行長加權平均薪酬剩餘既得期間 12 第三節 盈餘管理誘因 16 第四節 實質盈餘管 18 第三章 假說形成 21 第一節 假說一: 執行長薪酬既得期間與正向實質盈餘管理程度有關 21 第二節 假說二: 損失規避特性與薪酬既得期間對盈餘管理影響的關聯性 22 第四章 研究方法與樣本 24 第一節 樣本來源與取樣標準 24 第二節 遞延性報酬既得期間代理變數 24 第三節 盈餘管理代理變數 26 1. 裁決性應計基礎盈餘管理(Accrual-based earning management) 26 2. 實質盈餘管理(Real earning management) 27 第四節 假說模型與預期方向 30 1. 假說一模型與預期方向說明 30 2. 假說二變數預期方向說明 32 第五章 實證結果分析 34 第一節 敘述統計分析 34 1. 盈餘管理與執行長加權平均薪酬剩餘既得期間代理變數敘述統計 34 2. 其他變數敘述統計 35 第二節 變數間相關性分析 36 1. 主要變數相關性分析 36 2. 其他變數間相關性分析 36 第三節 假說一實證結果 37 第四節 假說二實證結果 39 第六章 結論與建議 41 參考文獻 56 | |
| dc.language.iso | zh-TW | |
| dc.title | 加權平均薪酬剩餘既得期間與實質盈餘管理程度之關聯性—標普五百指數企業執行長為例 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | The Association of Executive Compensation Duration and Real Earning Management—An Empirical Study of CEOs for S&P 500 | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 105-2 | |
| dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 許文馨(Wen-Hsin Hsu),劉心才(Hsin-Tsai Liu) | |
| dc.subject.keyword | 薪酬既得期間,執行長薪酬,盈餘管理,實質盈餘管理,損失規避, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | Words: Compensation Duration,CEO compensation,Earnings Management,Real Earnings Management,Loss Avoidance, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 61 | |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.6342/NTU201702303 | |
| dc.rights.note | 未授權 | |
| dc.date.accepted | 2017-07-31 | |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 會計學研究所 | zh_TW |
| 顯示於系所單位： | 會計學系 | |
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