沙特早期哲學之存有學及其倫理隱涵

Abstract

本論文旨在澄清，對於沙特《存有與虛無》中的結論，應將其歸於它的存有學位置；並指出一個建立在這個存有學之上的倫理學。 由於《存有與虛無》論述的主題涉及諸多倫理領域的內容，使得它實質上原是存有學的描述，常被拿來以倫理學的角度加以評判；同時，也造成《存有與虛無》所得的結論，與沙特其他倫理相關作品的立場不一致的結果。當中，尤以「自由」以及「與他者關係」的內容最為明顯。 本論文從沙特存有學中最原初的二分──「存有」與「非存有」開始，提領出貫穿整個存有學的二元性。這個二元性將串連起從世界的二分、到人的存在與活動、到人與他者的關係，清晰地呈現出它們均是完整的存有學的一環。而真正的倫理學，必須是這個系統以外的另一項工作，兩者不能混淆。 接著，本論文再指出，建立於此存有學上的倫理學，是一個「轉向後」的本真的倫理學。人透過「純粹反思」，使得基礎計畫得以轉向，將「自由」列為新的首要價值，進而達到本真的存在。最後，論述沙特在《何謂文學》一書中對寫作的分析，是這個倫理學的具體體現。

This thesis is aimed to argue that the conclusion of Sartre’s Being and Nothingness should be viewed as Sartre’s ontology, rather than his ethics, and to infer an ethics based on this ontology. Since the content of Being and Nothingness involves lots of ethical subjects, the ontological descriptions of this work were often judged as ethical requirements. This results in the conclusion that Being and Nothingness were inconsistent with Sartre’s other ethical works. The concepts of “freedom” and “relation with others” are the most obvious examples. This thesis begins with the most primitive distinction in Sartre’s ontology, that of “being” and “nothingness”, which discloses the duality running through his whole ontology. This duality has to do with the two elements of the world, the existence and activity of men, and the relations of one to the others. All of these are parts of Sartre’s complete ontology. The true ethics of Sartre’s philosophy should be another thing. This thesis furtherly argues that the ethics based on this ontology is an authentic ethics “after radical conversion”. Through pure reflection, men enable primary project turn around, putting freedom as its ultimate value, and consequently acquire their own authentic existence. The final part of this thesis shows that Sartre’s analyze of writing in What Is Literature? is the concrete realization of this ethics.