臺北市議員在地方建設建議事項之分配行為研究

Abstract

議員提出地方建設建議事項是在各縣市政府中運作已行之有年而未法定化之機制，每位議員可享有實質的建議動支權限，制度設計原意應為藉由民眾主動向議員表達其實際需求，以提升施政效率，惟實際運作卻可能產生弊端為人所詬病，例如可能有利於議員在基層選舉綁樁而成為政治性酬庸。 本研究以分配政治研究的理論為基礎，欲探究政治人物之分配行為，採個案研究法，以第11屆臺北市議員選舉之第三選舉區範圍，即松山區、信義區等2區內之市議員所提建議事項為主要研究對象，根據過往研究結果，假設議員在任期期間，會在選區內屬於議員自身地盤區域提出較多地方建設建議事項，以及選民支持程度高的區域，會獲得較多之分配利益。 本研究有幾點研究發現：首先，多數議員均呈現有特別照顧選民支持程度較高、屬於自己強地盤里區域之傾向；第二，得票程度較為集中之議員，均投注較多資源予對其有高支持度之選民（選區）；第三，各里地區客觀需求並未如預期影響提案分配情形，顯示在影響政策利益分配的因素中，選民對政治人物之影響力大於客觀需求條件。

It is a common practice in the operation of county (city) government that councilors lobby earmark grants on local construction. Councilors are entitled to have power to make substantive recommendations in government expenditure allocations. Such institution is designed to enhance the efficiency of governance since the public reflect their needs via councilor. However, some loopholes may exist in the real world. For example, councilors are likely to propose earmark grants for their electoral bases to gain political reward. This research is based on the theory of distributive politics. Case study method is adopted with the aim to explore politician distribution behavior. The object of research is councilors of 10th terms of the Taipei City Council in the third electoral district, including Songshan District and Xinyi District. The previous studies show that councilors tend to distribute more earmark grants to where they gained higher vote support. There are several interesting findings in this research. First of all, most councilors tend to distribute more grants to their own electoral bases. Secondly, those councilors who gain higher vote support from some electoral districts have distributed more resources in these areas. Thirdly, the objective demand in each region did not reflect on the distribution of earmark grants as expected. The implication is that the impact of voters on politician is greater than that of objective demand when considering factors that influence the distribution of political benefits.