2008金融海嘯及金融改革對貸款成長的衝擊：從銀行資本及流動性的角度探討

Abstract

2008年金融海嘯重創美國及全球經濟，銀行的營運及相關監理機制因而遭受許多批評，促使有關監理機構進行一系列的檢討及金融改革，當中以美國的Dodd-Frank 法案及巴塞爾資本協定 III最為大家所熟知。本研究以2008年金融海嘯前後時期為焦點，採用2001年第2季至2015年第1季的美國銀行控股公司資料做為樣本探討在金融海嘯後銀行的放款行為是否有所改變。研究結果顯示相較於2008年金融海嘯發生之前，銀行的資本適足率對銀行貸款成長的影響在金融海嘯之後顯著減少，另一方面銀行流動性對銀行貸款成長的影響則顯著增加。整體而言，本研究結果顯示在金融海嘯之後，銀行的放款行為較金融海嘯發生之前更為謹慎保守，應和銀行本身的自我約束及更為嚴格的法規影響有關。

In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, bank behavior and banking supervision have been criticized, prompting a series of regulations, such as the Dodd–Frank Act and Basel III reforms. Focusing on the periods before and after the 2008 financial crisis, this study examines whether the lending behavior of banks changed after the 2008 crash. We use a sample composed of U.S. bank holding companies during the period from 2001Q2 to 2015Q1 and find that the effect of capital ratio on loan growth declines dramatically after the financial crisis while the effect of liquidity increases compared to the pre-crisis period. Our results suggest that after the financial crisis, lending behavior may be restricted by the banks themselves and by the stricter regulations.