代理選擇不配適與投資績效之實證研究

Abstract

As the literature of foreign market entry has long been accumulating, how the FDI firms choose service agents in the local government approval process remains theoretically and practically important. Departing from the discriminating alignment hypothesis of the transaction cost economics (TCE), I contend that the selection fit between an FDI firm and a local service agent not only generates a better ex post outcome but yields more ex ante merits from the perspective the authority granting approval. This study thus explores the project performance decay of agent selection misfit, particularly whether economic or social misfit of an FDI firm and the selected local agent creates more harm to the perceived merits of the government authority. In a sample of 415 Chinese firms’ outward FDI to Taiwan, we found that the cases of economic or social misfit of agent selection significantly underperform the fit ones, in terms of the project approval time. Furthermore, the economic misfit cases are subject to more project performance decay. Several managerial and policy implications are developed and discussed.