Skip navigation

DSpace

機構典藏 DSpace 系統致力於保存各式數位資料(如:文字、圖片、PDF)並使其易於取用。

點此認識 DSpace
DSpace logo
English
中文
  • 瀏覽論文
    • 校院系所
    • 出版年
    • 作者
    • 標題
    • 關鍵字
    • 指導教授
  • 搜尋 TDR
  • 授權 Q&A
    • 我的頁面
    • 接受 E-mail 通知
    • 編輯個人資料
  1. NTU Theses and Dissertations Repository
  2. 管理學院
  3. 財務金融學系
請用此 Handle URI 來引用此文件: http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/20064
完整後設資料紀錄
DC 欄位值語言
dc.contributor.advisor王衍智(Yanzhi Wang)
dc.contributor.authorShun-Chieh Changen
dc.contributor.author張舜傑zh_TW
dc.date.accessioned2021-06-08T02:39:30Z-
dc.date.copyright2018-06-29
dc.date.issued2018
dc.date.submitted2018-06-25
dc.identifier.citationBaysinger, B. and Hoskisson, R. E (1990), The Composition of Boards of Directors and Strategic Control: Effects on Corporate Strategy. The Academy of Management Review , pages 72-87.
Blose, L. E. and Shieh, J. C. (1997), Tobin's q‐Ratio and Market Reaction to Capital Investment Announcements. Financial Review, pages 449-476.
Brickley, J. A., Coles, J. L. and Jarrell, G. (1997), Leadership Structure: Separating the CEO and Chairman of the Board. Journal of Corporate Finance, pages 189-220.
Brickley, J. A., Lease, R. C. and Smith, C. (1988), Ownership Structure and Voting on Antitakeover Amendments. Journal of Financial Economics, pages 267-291.
Chen, X., Harford, J. and Li, K. (2007), Monitoring: Which Institutions Matter?. Journal of Financial Economics, pages 279-305.
Coles, J. L., Daniel, N. D. and Naveen, L. (2008), Boards: Does one size fit all?. Journal of Financial Economics, pages 329-356.
Core, J. E., Holthausen, R. W. and Larcker, D. F. (1999), Corporate Governance, Chief Executive Officer Compensation, and Firm Performance. Journal of Financial Economics, pages 371-406.
Cotter, J. F., Shivdasani, A. and Zenner, M. (1997), Do Independent Directors Enhance Target Shareholder Wealth During Tender Offers?. Journal of Financial Economics, pages 195-218.
Denis, D. J., Denis, D. K. and Sarin, A. (1997), Agency Problems, Equity Ownership, and Corporate Diversification. The Journal of Finance, pages 135-160. 
Fama, E. F. (1980), Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm. The Journal of Political Economy, pages 288-307.
Fich, E. M., Harford, J. and Tran, A. L. (2015), Motivated Monitors: The Importance of Institutional Investors’ Portfolio Weights. Journal of Financial Economics, pages 21-48.
Fishman, A. and Rob, R. (1999), The Size of Firms and R&D Investment. International Economic Review, pages 915-931.
Gilson, S. and Villalonga, B., “Adelphia Communications Corp.'s Bankruptcy,” in Harvard Business School Case 208-071, Boston, MA, Harvard Business School Publishing.
Giroud, X. and Mueller, H. M. (2010), Does Corporate Governance Matter in Competitive Industries?. Journal of Financial Economics, pages 312-331.
Gompers, P. A., and Ishii, J. L. and Metrick, A. (2003), Corporate Governance and Equity Prices. Quarterly Journal of Economics, pages 107-155.
Jensen, M. C. and Meckling, W. H. (1976), Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, Journal of Financial Economics, pages 305-360.
Jenter, D. and Lewellen, K. (2015), CEO Preferences and Acquisitions. The Journal of Finance, pages 2813-2852.
John, P. (1988), Proxy Contests and the Efficiency of Shareholder Oversight, Journal of Financial Economics, pages 237-265.
Kaplan, S. N. and Reishus, D. (1990), Outside Directorships and Corporate Performance. Journal of Financial Economics, pages 389-410.
Kiel, G. C. and Nicholson, G. J. (2003), Board Composition and Corporate Performance: How the Australian Experience Informs Contrasting Theories of Corporate Governance. Corporate Governance: An International Review, pages 189-205.
La Porta, R., Lopez‐De‐Silanes, F. and Shleifer, A. (1999), Corporate Ownership Around the World. The Journal of Finance, pages 471-517.
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. (2000), Investor Protection and Corporate Governance. Journal of Financial Economics, pages 3-27.
Linck, J. S., Netter, J. M. and Yang, T. (2008), The Determinants of Board Structure. Journal of Financial Economics, pages 308-328.
Lipton, M. and Lorsch, J. W. (1992), A Modest Proposal for Improved Corporate Governance. The Business Lawyer, pages 59-77
McConnell, J. J. and Muscarella, C. J. (1985), Corporate Capital Expenditure Decisions and the Market Value of the Firm. Journal of Financial Economics, pages 399-422.
Morck, R., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. W. (1988), Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An Empirical Analysis. Journal of Financial Economics, pages 293-315.
Oswald, S. L. and Jahera, J. S. (1991), The Influence of Qwnership on Performance: An Empirical Study. Strategic Management Journal, pages 321-326.
Rechner, P. L. and Dalton, D. R. (1991), CEO duality and organizational performance: A longitudinal analysis. Strategic Management Journal, pages 155-160.
Schmidt, K. M. (1997), Managerial Incentives and Product Market Competition. The Review of Economic Studies, pages 191-213.
Titman, S., Wei, K. C. J. and Xie, F. (2004), Capital Investments and Stock Returns. The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, pages 677-700.
Vogt, S. C. (1997), Cash Flow and Capital Spending: Evidence from Capital Expenditure Announcements. Financial Management, pages 44-57.
Yermack, D. (1996), Higher Market Valuation of Companies with a Small Board of Directors. Journal of Financial Economics, pages 185-211.
Zahra, S. and Pearce, J. (1989), Boards of Directors and Corporate Financial Performance: A Review and Integrative Model. Journal of Management, pages 291-334. 
廖采如、陳涵苡,「公司治理與績效之關係:比較家族與非家族企業」,多國籍企業管理評論,8(2),181-204頁,2004。
dc.identifier.urihttp://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/20064-
dc.description.abstract本研究蒐集2005至2016年間的曾於台灣上市櫃之公司為樣本,試圖檢驗公司投資決策(以營運資金、長期投資及資本支出等三個項目衡量)與公司治理程度(超額公司治理指數)之間的關係。本研究中的超額公司治理指數,係沿用Jenter and Lewellen(2015)和Fich, Harford and Tran(2015)的方法進行建置,希望藉由超額公司治理指數的建立,相較過往文獻多以單一指標表衡量公司治理效果,能捕捉更為全面的公司治理程度及效果。
主要實證結果發現,超額公司治理指數與營運資金投資變數之間,存在統計顯著的負向關係。另外,本研究尚探討以赫芬達競爭指數及股東權益市值的分群迴歸模型。其中股東權益市值分群樣本的迴歸結果,則顯示營運資金及資本支出投資變數與超額公司治理指數,分別呈現統計顯著的負向及正向關係。
 本研究最後小節更納入La Porta(1999)之投票權與現金流量權偏離的計算方式,以「股份盈餘偏離衡量指標」作為控制變數,試圖檢驗本研究建立之超額公司治理指數,能否保有前述迴歸模型顯現之解釋能力。迴歸結果與先前主要實證統計差異不大,顯示超額公司治理指數確實能對部分投資決策變數提供解釋能力。
zh_TW
dc.description.abstractThe purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between a company's investment decision and its corporate governance using samples of Taiwan listed firms during the period from 2006 to 2016. Investment decision by a company is measured by working capital, long-term investment and capital expenditure respectively. We expect to capture a more comprehensive degree and effectiveness of corporate governance under the abnormal governance index.
The study provides empirical evidence that there exists a statistically significant negative correlation between abnormal governance index and working capital investment. Also, under market capitalization-clustered regression model, capital expenditures are positively related to the abnormal governance index respectively, which could be explained by common phenomenon for high-cap companies with more access to outer funding by higher confidence on their internal governance than those in low-cap.
The last subsection of this study includes another control variable, the deviation of cash flow and voting rights followed by La Porta (1999). This variable is aimed at gauging whether the abnormal governance index established in this study can retain its explanatory power of the aforementioned regression model. The results suggested small differences from the previous empirical statistics, showing that the abnormal governance index does indeed provides the ability to explain the changes of working capital investment variables.
en
dc.description.provenanceMade available in DSpace on 2021-06-08T02:39:30Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1
ntu-107-R05723006-1.pdf: 1355607 bytes, checksum: c30b264b3f3ec5158044b9b46054c662 (MD5)
Previous issue date: 2018
en
dc.description.tableofcontents口試委員會審定書 i
誌謝 ii
中文摘要 iii
Abstract iv
目錄 v
表目錄 vi
第一章 緒論 1
第二章 文獻回顧 2
第三章 假說建立 4
第四章 研究方法及樣本 5
第一節 實證模型與變數衡量 5
第二節 樣本選取與資料來源 10
第三節 樣本基本統計量與相關係數 10
第五章 實證模型與分析 14
第一節 公司投資決策與超額公司治理指數關係實證結果 14
第二節 超額公司治理指數組成因子之迴歸結果 15
第三節 調整超額公司治理指數組成因子之迴歸結果 16
第四節 赫芬達競爭指數分群模型之迴歸結果 16
第五節 股東權益市值分權模型之迴歸結果 17
第六節 年度分群模型之迴歸結果 17
第七節 加入股份盈餘偏離衡量指標之迴歸模型 18
參考文獻 20
dc.language.isozh-TW
dc.title公司治理與公司投資決策zh_TW
dc.titleCorporate Governance and Firm Investmentsen
dc.typeThesis
dc.date.schoolyear106-2
dc.description.degree碩士
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee何耕宇,陳志鈞
dc.subject.keyword超額公司治理指數,公司投資決策,營運資金,長期投資,資本支出,zh_TW
dc.subject.keywordAbnormal Governance Index,Company investment decision,Working capitals,Long-term investments,Capital expenditures,en
dc.relation.page46
dc.identifier.doi10.6342/NTU201801074
dc.rights.note未授權
dc.date.accepted2018-06-25
dc.contributor.author-college管理學院zh_TW
dc.contributor.author-dept財務金融學研究所zh_TW
顯示於系所單位:財務金融學系

文件中的檔案:
檔案 大小格式 
ntu-107-1.pdf
  未授權公開取用
1.32 MBAdobe PDF
顯示文件簡單紀錄


系統中的文件,除了特別指名其著作權條款之外,均受到著作權保護,並且保留所有的權利。

社群連結
聯絡資訊
10617臺北市大安區羅斯福路四段1號
No.1 Sec.4, Roosevelt Rd., Taipei, Taiwan, R.O.C. 106
Tel: (02)33662353
Email: ntuetds@ntu.edu.tw
意見箱
相關連結
館藏目錄
國內圖書館整合查詢 MetaCat
臺大學術典藏 NTU Scholars
臺大圖書館數位典藏館
本站聲明
© NTU Library All Rights Reserved