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完整後設資料紀錄
DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.advisor | 吳淑鈴(Shu-Ling Wu) | |
dc.contributor.author | Chen-Yu Yeh | en |
dc.contributor.author | 葉晨昱 | zh_TW |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-08T01:54:42Z | - |
dc.date.copyright | 2016-07-26 | |
dc.date.issued | 2016 | |
dc.date.submitted | 2016-07-13 | |
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dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/19345 | - |
dc.description.abstract | 美國股東對薪酬的諮詢性投票制度(Say on Pay, SOP) 係指股東能就公司高階主管報酬表示贊成與否之投票。而過去多數研究結果預期股東對薪酬的投票制度能有效提升公司的監督管理機制,因此本篇研究之目的在於探討股東對薪酬的投票制度對高階管理階層之薪酬績效敏感度(Pay-Performance Sensitivity, PPS)之影響。
本篇研究樣本取自ExecuComp2007至2014之薪酬資料(排除2010及2011年),研究結果顯示薪酬績效敏感度在SOP制度通過後有顯著的提升。本研究進一步將薪酬區分成現金基礎獎酬計畫及權益基礎獎酬計畫,發現兩者與績效之間的關聯性都有顯著的提升,研究結果證實股東對薪酬的投票制度通過能有效改善管理階層薪酬結構。 此外,Appel, Gormley, and Keim (2016)以SOP制度通過前之樣本研究發現被動機構投資人(Quasi-indexer)能夠有效的提升公司治理,但其並未發現被動機構投資人能夠提升薪酬與股價之間的關聯性,顯示被動機構投資人對於影響薪酬結構的影響力是有限的。然本研究結果發現,SOP制度通過後,被動機構投資人持股比例較高的被投資公司,其薪酬績效敏感度增加幅度高於持股比例較低的被投資公司,研究結果更支持SOP制度能有效的提升股東監督公司長遠利益發展的權力以及薪酬結構的制定。 | zh_TW |
dc.description.abstract | Say on Pay (SOP) is a term used for a rule in corporate law whereby a firm's shareholders have the right to vote on the emuneration of executives. SOP potentially increases scrutiny over top management’s compensation and therefore, this study investigates how SOP affects the pay-performance sensitivity of US firms.
Based on ExecuComp data from 2007 to 2014 (and excluding the years 2010 and 2011), the results show that pay-performance sensitivity increased significantly after SOP became effective. When further decomposing executive pay into its cash-based and equity-based components, this study finds evidence of an increase in the link between performance and these executive compensation components as well. Further, using pre-SOP data, even though Appel, Gormley, and Keim (2016) find that ownership by passive fund increases several corporate governance of a firm, they did not find that ownership by passive fund increases the sensitivity of pay to stock price movements. Their results suggest that passive fund ownership’s ability to influence pay structures is limited before SOP became effective. However, this study finds that the increase in pay-performance sensitivity after SOP is larger in firms with higher passive fund ownership relative to firms with lower passive fund ownership. The results suggest that SOP do increase the executive compensation monitoring ability for investors who care about the long-term value of a firm but who are lack of the ability to influence executive compensation structure before SOP. Thus, in contrast to most prior studies on the impact of SOP on executive incentives and compensation, the evidence shown in this study is consistent with SOP improves rather than weakens the alignment of managerial wealth and shareholder interests. | en |
dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-08T01:54:42Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-105-R03722036-1.pdf: 590929 bytes, checksum: 6666149efd0d2ac09916dace86d9d070 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016 | en |
dc.description.tableofcontents | 摘要 I
Abstract II 目錄 IV 表目錄 VI 圖目錄 VII 第一章 緒論 1 第一節 研究背景與動機 1 第二節 研究目的 2 第三節 研究架構 6 第二章 文獻回顧 7 第一節 代理理論與獎酬制度 7 第二節 肥貓現象 8 第三節 Say on Pay沿革 9 第四節 Say on Pay相關的實證研究 11 第五節 機構投資人與PPS 12 第三章 研究方法 14 第一節 研究假說 14 第二節 實證模型 16 第三節 變數衡量 17 第四節 樣本選取 22 第四章 實證結果與分析 23 第一節 敘述性統計 23 第二節 SOP前後之薪酬績效敏感度分析 29 第三節 被動機構投資人SOP前後之薪酬績效敏感度分析 31 第五章 研究結論與限制 36 第一節 研究結論 36 第二節 研究限制 37 參考文獻 38 | |
dc.language.iso | zh-TW | |
dc.title | Say on Pay制度前後薪酬績效敏感度分析 | zh_TW |
dc.title | The Pay Performance Sensitivity Before and After Say on Pay Regulation | en |
dc.type | Thesis | |
dc.date.schoolyear | 104-2 | |
dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 廖芝嫻(Chih-Hsien Liao),洪聖閔(Sheng-min Hung) | |
dc.subject.keyword | 股東決定薪酬制度,薪酬績效敏感度,被動機構投資人,薪酬結構, | zh_TW |
dc.subject.keyword | Say on Pay,Pay-Performance Sensitivity,Quasi-index Ownership,Compensation Structure, | en |
dc.relation.page | 42 | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.6342/NTU201600897 | |
dc.rights.note | 未授權 | |
dc.date.accepted | 2016-07-14 | |
dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.author-dept | 會計學研究所 | zh_TW |
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