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http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/18914完整後設資料紀錄
| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 周雍強(Yon-Chun, Chou) | |
| dc.contributor.author | Yi-Ting Wang | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 王怡婷 | zh_TW |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-08T01:39:21Z | - |
| dc.date.copyright | 2016-08-23 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2016 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2016-08-22 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | 參考文獻
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| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/18914 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | 近年來各產業中,通路商的勢力興起,在美國,強勢通路商Wal-Mart,其擁有的影響力遠大於其供應商,而在台灣的通路商也發展興盛,如連鎖零售店7-11、全家等等,除實體通路之外,虛擬通路商如PChome也在供應鏈中扮演著領導者的角色。過往供應鏈中的文獻多著重於探討以供應商為主宰者的角色進行合約設計,而現今社會中,供應鏈中的領導權卻逐漸轉移至通路商,因此,本論文將以通路商的角度探討兩部收費合約設計。
兩部收費合約中包含對供應商的每單位營收抽成比率與固定收費,營收抽成比率的收費模式在早期的影片租借產業以及電子商務中廣為應用,而近年來,通路商的議價能力逐漸提升,越多通路商開始收取固定費用如上架費、廣告贊助費等等,而隨著固定費用項目越多、費用逐漸提升,也引起了許多爭議。而單一通路商在制定合約時,多會面對要與多家供應商簽定合約的情況,因此,本論文將考慮在兩家供應商競爭的情形下制定出雙方接受且可行的兩部收費合約。 本論文為上游雙佔、下游獨佔的賽局模型,討論通路商如何利用兩家供應商彼此競爭的關係來設計有所差別的合約,制定清楚的合約規格,並發展出可行的兩部費用合約收取方式,並討論不同的外生變數:市佔率與產品替代性對供應鏈中雙方的影響。 要能簽定一個上下游雙方均能接受的合約,需要滿足以下三項合約規格:(1) 對市占較高的供應商所收取的有效利率需小於對小供應商所收取的有效利率、(2) 要有清楚的制定固定收費的方法、(3) 供應商的利潤均不為負;由於三項合約規格互相衝突,本研究指出可以在限制內找出可行解,也因而發覺在合約規格下,無法對兩家供應商收取相同的固定費用,需要收取有所差別的固定費用。當市場競爭激烈時,使用此合約將有助於提升通路商的利潤,而當兩家廠商市占相差懸殊時,此合約則不利於通路商的利潤。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract | Power of distributors has increased in current industries. For example, large retailers like Wal-Mart have tremendous power over their suppliers. Distributors in Taiwan are also thriving, such as 7-ELEVEN. Besides physical distributors, virtual distributors like PChome also play the leading role in the supply chain. Power has shifted from suppliers to distributors, while existing literatures in this area take more emphasis on supplier-driven contracts. Hence, this thesis will discuss two-part tariff contract design from the perspective of distributors.
Two-part tariff contract includes revenue sharing percentage and fixed fee.. Recently, more distributors have started to charge fixed fee, such as slotting allowance. There is controversy surrounding the increasing charging of the fixed fee. Considering distributors often sign contracts with more than one supplier, this thesis designs feasible two-part tariff contracts for two suppliers. This research is a two echelon supply chain with one distributor and two suppliers with different market share. Taking supplier competition into account and designing different contracts from a distributor-Stackelberg game. This research design contracts by formulating feasible specifications. To design feasible contracts for supply chain partners require three specifications: (1) Charge more revenue sharing percentage to smaller supplier than bigger supplier. (2) Set a clear method to charge fixed fee. (3) Profit for suppliers shouldn’t be negative. With conflicting specifications, this research shows feasible contracts under three specifications and finds it impossible to charge same fixed fee for two suppliers. | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-08T01:39:21Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-105-R03546006-1.pdf: 2498233 bytes, checksum: 866f3ab51556da1f5fdc369fe6ee22b4 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 目錄
口試委員審定書 i 致謝 ii 摘要 iii ABSTRACT iv 目錄 v 圖目錄 vii 表目錄 viii 第一章 緒論 1 1.1 研究背景 1 1.2 研究問題分析 3 1.3 研究目的 5 1.4 研究架構 5 第二章 文獻回顧 7 2.1 供應鏈中的合約類型 7 2.2 營收分享文獻 9 2.3 固定收費文獻 11 2.4 兩部收費文獻 13 2.4.1 寄賣模式下的營收分享合約與上架費 13 2.4.2 通路商領導下的兩部收費合約 15 2.5 隱藏資訊下的合約選擇 20 2.6 考量服務的需求函數 21 第三章 兩部收費合約設計 22 3.1 兩部費用基礎模型 22 3.2 合約規格制訂 25 3.2.1規格一: 26 3.2.2規格二:制定固定費用 26 3.2.3規格三:供應商利潤不為負 27 3.3 總市場需求為M時的兩部收費合約 28 3.4 非標準化市場規模下的兩部收費合約模型 33 3.4.1模型假設與賽局 33 3.4.2非標準化市場規模合約模型分析與討論 36 3.5 非標準化規模合約制定固定收費 40 3.5.1 CD1 對供應商收取相同的固定收費 40 3.5.2 CD2對供應商收取不同的固定收費 42 3.5.3 CD3:保障供應商二最小利潤 46 3.5.4兩部收費合約CD1,2,3討論與分析 47 3.6 合作賽局下的兩部收費合約 49 第四章 結論與未來方向 51 4.1 研究結果與貢獻 51 4.2 未來研究方向 52 附錄一 附加費用項目表 53 附錄二 Lingo求解CD1,CD2程式碼 54 | |
| dc.language.iso | zh-TW | |
| dc.title | 通路商領導下的兩部收費合約規格制定 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | Two-part Tariff Contract Design for Distribution Channels | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 104-2 | |
| dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 洪一薰(I-HSUAN HONG),陳耀鴻 | |
| dc.subject.keyword | 合約設計,合約規格,兩部收費,固定收費,變動收費, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | contract design,contract specification,two-part tariff,fixed fee,variable fee, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 58 | |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.6342/NTU201603539 | |
| dc.rights.note | 未授權 | |
| dc.date.accepted | 2016-08-22 | |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 工學院 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 工業工程學研究所 | zh_TW |
| 顯示於系所單位: | 工業工程學研究所 | |
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