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| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 吳政鴻 | |
| dc.contributor.author | Chiao Fu | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 傅喬 | zh_TW |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-08T01:10:32Z | - |
| dc.date.copyright | 2014-09-03 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2013 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2014-08-17 | |
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| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/18538 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | 本研究探討供應鏈合約設計與長期產能投資決策，考慮兩階層供應鏈中下游端開始建立自有產能情況中，下游得以掌握生產成本與增加產能利用彈性，而上游則面臨訂單損失與下游所轉嫁之產能利用率變異風險；本研究期望以供應端角度出發，利用長期與短期供應鏈契約之結合保障上游利潤，並發展長期產能投資策略。
在每期期初景氣不確定性消除後，上游公布長約與短約價格，下游零售商使用長約預約接下來連續兩期產品，利用短約加訂當期不足的數量；此外，上游與自有產能之下游將在每期作產能投資決策；在上述過程中，上游均為決策領導者。本研究建構數學模型，結合賽局理論求解上下游短期決策，再進一步結合動態規劃方法，推導長期決策，探討契約設計中之各項元素對長期產能投資之影響。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract | This research studies contract design and capacity investment problem in a two-echelon supply chain consisting of a supplier and a downstream retailer who has in-house capacity. After building in-house capacity, the retailer would use his own capacity first. Under such situation, the risk of the variance of capacity utilization would be transferred to suppliers. The objective of this research is to protect the suppliers’ profit by exploring the coordination of supply contract (combining long-term and short-term contract) and capacity investment strategies.
At the beginning of each period, the demand uncertainty would be realized, and then the supplier would offer both long-term and short-term contracts. In long-term contract, the retailer makes a reservation for the next two successive periods; in short-term contract, the retailer orders products to fulfill the reserved deficiency. Additionally, the supplier and the retailer would make capacity investment decision in every period. The supplier has higher market power, making the capacity investment decision first and deciding the contracts. To solve the problem, we build a mathematical model, using game theory to decide the short-term decisions and exercising the dynamic programming to obtain the optimal policy in long-term. | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-08T01:10:32Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-102-R00546018-1.pdf: 4098624 bytes, checksum: 722f04234a24de5b5985c47c0c2da515 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 致謝 i
中文摘要 iii ABSTRACT iv 目錄 v 圖目錄 viii 表目錄 xi 第一章 緒論 1 1.1 研究動機與背景 1 1.2 研究目的 3 1.3 研究流程與方法 3 第二章 文獻回顧 5 2.1 供應契約研究 5 2.2 產能規劃文獻回顧 9 2.3 賽局理論文獻回顧 11 第三章 模型建構 14 3.1 問題描述 14 3.2 問題假設與參數設定 16 3.3 單一下游模型 19 3.3.1 單期短約決策模型 19 3.3.2 動態規劃模型 26 3.3.3 隨機動態賽局演算法 29 3.4 兩下游模型 31 3.4.1 單期短約決策模型 31 3.4.2 動態規劃模型 35 3.4.3 隨機動態賽局演算法 38 3.5 小結 42 第四章 數值驗證 43 4.1 單一下游零售商 43 4.1.1 模型推導驗證 43 4.1.2 演算法邏輯 50 4.1.3 參數設定 53 4.1.4 範例結果分析 54 4.2 兩下游零售商 58 4.2.1 模型推導驗證 58 4.2.2 演算法邏輯 65 4.2.3 參數設定 68 4.2.4 範例結果分析 69 4.2.5 參數分析比較 78 4.3 產能投資範例 87 第五章 結論 93 REFERENCE 95 附錄 100 單一下游範例結果 100 兩下游範例結果 100 參數分析比較 103 | |
| dc.language.iso | zh-TW | |
| dc.title | 動態供需契約與產能投資策略之整合 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | Coordination of Supply Contract and Capacity Investment Strategy | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 102-2 | |
| dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 洪一薰,陳文智,喻奉天 | |
| dc.subject.keyword | 供應鏈合約,產能擴充,動態規劃,賽局理論, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | supply chain contract,capacity investment,dynamic programming,game theory, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 106 | |
| dc.rights.note | 未授權 | |
| dc.date.accepted | 2014-08-17 | |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 工學院 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 工業工程學研究所 | zh_TW |
| 顯示於系所單位： | 工業工程學研究所 | |
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